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ABSTRACT 
Five studies were conducted to investigate the emotional and cognitive factors 
associated with the presence of imaginary companions in children aged 3 to 9 years. In 
Study 1 parents were asked to complete a questionnaire which sought information 
regarding the characteristics of children with and without imaginary companions. 
Overall, a significantly larger number of children with imaginary companions were 
reported to be very imaginative and to have an increased predisposition to fantasy 
compared to children without companions. 
Study two investigated the fearfulness, anxiety, and temperament characteristics 
of imaginary companion and non-imaginary companion children. Examination of 
maternal ratings on the Fear Survey Schedule for Children-H Parent (FSSC-BP), the 
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS), and the Short Temperament 
Scale for Children (STSC), found that a significantly larger number of imaginary 
companion than non-imaginary companion children were reported to experience 
internalised anxiety associated with sensitivity to the environment and the expectations 
of others. 
Study 3 further examined the predisposition to fantasy of imaginary companion 
and non-imaginary companion children by asking them a series of questions regarding 
their dreams, daydreams, and scary thoughts. Analysis of children's taped responses 
indicated that a significantly larger number of imaginary companion than non-imaginary 
companion children experienced vivid mental imagery that incorporated a fantasy 
element. 
Study 4 investigated the ability of imaginary companion and non-imaginary 
companion children aged 4 to 8 years to differentiate fantasy from reality. Following 
children's description of a monster, a monster shaped silhouette was unexpectedly 
projected into the room. Video recordings of each child's reaction to the silhouette and 
responses to a subsequent series of questions indicated that a significantly larger 
number of imaginary companion than non-imaginary companion children thought that 
an imaginary entity could be reflected in reality. However, as a number of non-
imaginary companion children also thought that an imaginary entity could be reflected 
in reality, differences in children's level of credulity, rather than the presence or absence 
of the imaginary companion was considered to account for the fantasy-reality 
confusion. 
Study 5 examined the transcribed responses and written evaluations of the 
children who participated in study 4 to investigate these children's language use and 
ability to develop rapport. This study found that a significantly larger number of 
imaginary companion children used more mature language and were easier to develop 
rapport with than non-imaginary companion children. The mature language used by 
imaginary companion children was considered to contribute to their increased ability to 
develop rapport. 
Combined, the findings of this series of studies were interpreted to indicate that 
children with imaginary companions have an increased sensitivity to environmental 
events that is potentiated by their ability to create vivid mental images. This enhanced 
imagery ability and consequent increased sensitivity was considered instrumental in the 
creation and maintenance of an imaginary companion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A fascinating aspect of children's development involves the occurrence of 
the imaginary companion. Despite claims that these companions are experienced by 
as many as 65% of children (Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990) there is still very 
little empirical data on this phenomenon. The lack of systematic investigations in 
early research (e.g., Vostrovsky, 1895) and the differing data collection procedures 
utilised in later studies (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; 
Jersild, Markey, & Jersild, 1933; Svendsen, 1934) have led to inconsistencies in the 
interpretation of results in the imaginary companion literature. More recent research 
(Harter & Chao, 1992; Manosevitz, Fling, & Prentice, 1977; Manosevitz, Prentice, 
& Wilson, 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1981; Taylor, Cartwright, & 
Carslon, 1993) has addressed these issues and included constraints such as 
participants within a similar age range and a standard definition of the imaginary 
companion. The most frequently cited definition is that offered by Svendsen (1934) 
who refers to the imaginary companion as: 
An invisible character, named and referred to in conversation with other 
persons or played with directly for a period of time, at least several months, 
having an air of reality for the child, but no apparent objective basis. This 
excludes that type of imaginative play in which an object is personified, or in 
which the child himself assumes the role of some person in his 
environment.(p. 988) 
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The theoretical orientation of imaginary companion research has also 
changed. Earlier research (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Svendsen, 1934; 
Vostrovsky, 1895) focused exclusively on the individual and environmental factors 
associated with imaginary companions. In contrast, more recent investigations 
(Harter & Chao, 1992; Manosevitz et al., 1977; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 
1990; Singer & Singer, 1981; Taylor et al., 1993) have been aimed at clarifying the 
relationship between these factors and the role of imaginary companions in 
childhood development. Collectively these studies indicate that children use 
imaginary companions to exercise their autonomy, extend social and language skills, 
engage in role-play, and come to terms with their fears. From a cognitive 
perspective, the imaginary companion is viewed as a method of assimilating new 
experiences into available schemas, thus promoting the formation, manipulation, 
and decontextualisation of symbolic representations. This in turn facilitates the 
child's understanding of the difference between internal mental representations of 
external stimuli and the actual stimuli (Singer & Singer, 1990; Somers & Yawkey, 
1984; Taylor et al., 1993). 
The reported air of reality (Manosevitz et al., 1973; Svendsen, 1934; Taylor 
et al., 1993) with which children surround their imaginary companions has raised 
questions regarding their ability to understand the difference between internal 
mental events (e.g., pretense or fantasy) and reality. As investigators into the child's 
theory of mind have found that children as young as 3-year-old can distinguish 
mental entities from real entities (Leslie, 1987; Wellman & Estes, 1986), children's 
reported treatment of imaginary companions appears contradictory. 
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However, research findings indicate that there are times when even older 
children's ability to maintain the border between fantasy and reality breaks down 
and they revert to fantastic or magical explanations (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; 
Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotsky, 1984, 1994). Harris, Brown, Marriott, 
Whittall, and Harmer (1991) hypothesised that these breakdowns may occur 
because children either become unsure of the rules that govern the transformations 
between fantasy and reality, or that imagining an outcome may increase the 
likelihood of such an outcome occurring. Although these hypotheses offer plausible 
accounts for the air of reality with which children surround their imaginary 
companions, they should be treated as pure speculation until more is known about 
the factors associated with the presence of these companions. 
The inability of imaginary companion research to clarify the extent to which 
children with imaginary companions understand the difference between fantasy and 
reality, underscores the need for more comprehensive research. The majority of 
research in this area has used traditional questionnaire interview methods which do 
not allow the behavioural and developmental components to be considered 
independently. Developmental theorists (e.g., Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Estes, 
1986; Woolley & Wellman, 1993) have focused on the fantasy-reality distinction in 
children but not the behavioural characteristics that may account for individual 
differences. The fundamental aim of the research reported in this thesis therefore, 
was to incorporate the principles of traditional research methods within the current 
developmental framework. In order to fulfill this aim, the emotional and cognitive 
factors associated with the presence or absence of imaginary companions in children 
were examined. The factors that were investigated included fearfulness, anxiety, 
characteristic temperament, language use, and the ability to distinguish fantasy from 
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reality. Research focusing on these factors will not only provide additional 
information regarding the role of imaginary companions in children's emotional 
development, but also much needed information regarding these children's 
cognitive development and in particular, their understanding of the fantasy-reality 
distinction. 
In the next section, a general description of children and their imaginary 
companions is presented followed by a detailed overview regarding the 
characteristics of children who have imaginary companions. Within this overview, 
existing empirical studies regarding the characteristic temperament, anxiety level, 
and fearfulness of children with imaginary companions are reviewed. The possible 
relationship between these variables and the predisposition of children with 
imaginary companions to engage in fantasy play is also discussed. The remainder of 
the chapter presents a brief summary of research findings regarding young 
children's understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction. This summary is followed 
by a more detailed review of the existing empirical studies that have investigated the 
ability of children with imaginary companions to differentiate fantasy from reality, 
as well as the effect that these companions may have on children's language use. 
Finally, the aims of the thesis in regard to the behavioural characteristics of children 
with imaginary companions and their ability distinguish fantasy and reality are 
outlined. 
1.1 Children and Imaginary Companions  
Imaginary companions typically appear between the ages of two years and 
six years, although their presence has been reported for children up to the age of 
nine years (Ames & Learned, 1946; Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Svendsen, 1934). 
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These companions may take the form of humans, anthropomorphised toys, 
television characters, or animals. In addition, it is not unusual for children to 
experience two or more companions rather than a single entity (Jalongo, 1984; 
Jersild, 1968; Singer & Singer, 1990; Somers & Yawkey, 1984). 
Research findings indicate that imaginary companions most often occur 
amongst children who are either only children or who do not share chronological 
proximity to their siblings (Manosevitz et al., 1973; Svendsen, 1934). The emotions 
that these companions evoke are highly charged and positive with children reported 
to feel love for the companion and to be happy when playing with them (Hurlock & 
Burstein, 1932; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990). 
Imaginary companions are also reported to be either the same age or older than the 
child and more prevalent amongst girls than boys. Of the children who experience 
these companions, girls are more likely than boys to have opposite sex companions 
and boys are more likely than girls to have animals as imaginary companions (Ames 
& Learned, 1946; Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & 
Singer, 1990). The reality with which children treat their companions has also been 
described throughout the literature. Children have been reported to treat their 
companion as a distinct personality who occupies space and who requires a place at 
the table or space in the child's bed (Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Manosevitz et al., 
1973; Svendsen, 1934; Taylor et al., 1993). 
Less consistently reported have been the estimates regarding the prevalence 
of imaginary companions. These have been highly variable with frequencies ranging 
from 13% (Svendsen, 1934) to 65% (Singer & Singer, 1990). According to 
Manosevitz et al. (1973) this variability can be attributed to different methods in 
data collection including questionnaire, observation, and interview methods (e.g., 
Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990), varying sample 
sizes, and the degree of inclusiveness of the definition of the companion at times 
involving toys that are not assumed to have human or live properties but which are 
carried around as concrete playthings. Singer and Singer (1990) also suggest that 
the reported prevalence rate of imaginary companions can differ depending on 
whether the reports are obtained from parents or children. Previous research by 
these authors (1981) suggests that parents may under-report the presence of these 
companions by as much as 10%. 
1.2 Characteristics of Children Who Create Imaginary Companions  
The theorised positive effect of the imaginary companion on childhood 
behaviour has been well documented. Research findings (Ames & Learned, 1946; 
Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer, 1961; Singer & Singer, 1981) have reported an 
increased level of social skill and control in children with imaginary companions. 
These children were reported to be more skilled at talking to adults and 
demonstrated a preference for socialising and interacting with other children, 
reduced aggressiveness, and an increased ability to develop interpersonal 
relationships. Additional research by Mauro (1990) suggests that children with 
companions are less shy, more sociable, and have more real friends than those 
without. 
However, in a recent study, Harter and Chao (1992) presented empirical 
data that suggest imaginary companions play a compensatory role for children. In 
this study, Harter and Chao administered the Pictorial Scale of Perceived 
Competence and Social Acceptance for Young Children (PSPCSA; Harter & Pike, 
1984). This 24 item measure asks children to rate their own level of competence 
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and social acceptance in four domains: cognitive competence (e.g., being able to do 
puzzles), physical competence (e.g., being able to hop), peer acceptance (e.g., 
having lots of friends), and maternal acceptance (e.g., mother and child playing 
together). Each item is presented in a pictorial plate that contains two pictures 
situated side by side; one which depicts a child who is competent or accepted and 
one which depicts a child who is not so competent or accepted. 
Initially, children were asked to choose the picture that they thought 
represented themselves. Following this choice, children were then asked to indicate 
using a 4-point pictorial scale (1= least competent or accepted to 4 = most  
competent or accepted ) the degree to which they thought the picture represented 
them. Children with imaginary companions were also asked to rate the competence 
and social acceptance of their companion. Teachers were asked to rate children's 
level of competence and social acceptance using a parallel scale that utilised verbal 
statements rather than pictures. 
The study found that although teachers rated children with imaginary 
companions as less competent and less popular than children without companions, 
this was not the case in children's self-reports. Children with imaginary companions 
reported a higher level of cognitive competence than that reported by children 
without companions, as well as levels of physical competence, maternal acceptance, 
and peer acceptance that was consistent with the self-reports of children who did 
not have Companions. Interestingly however, imaginary companions were rated as 
either super-competent or less competent according to each child's needs. Overall, 
these results were interpreted as indicating that children create imaginary 
companions as compensatory mechanisms for dealing with reduced competence in 
specific areas. 
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One potential concern with Harter and Chao's (1992) study is that although 
teachers were unaware of the hypotheses of the study and the names of the children 
who had imaginary companions, they did know the general nature of the study. As 
children with imaginary companions do talk about them (Taylor et al., 1993) 
teachers may have known which children had imaginary companions and reported 
levels of competence according to their preconceived ideas about these children. 
Another concern with Harter and Chao's (1992) study is the use of the 
PSPCSA to assess the competence and social acceptance of preschool children. 
According to Fantuzzo, McDermot, Holliday Manz, Hampton, and Alvarez Burdick 
(1996) there are a number of problems with the scale. First, the psychometric 
properties of the scale have not been independently evaluated. Second, the construct 
validity of the scale is questionable. Third, the sample in the original Harter and Pike 
(1984) study was predominately from a higher-socioeconomic background. Thus, 
their assumptions about what constituted a developmentally appropriate measure 
did not take into account differing levels of children's comprehension in the wider 
social context. Finally, the preschool version of the PSPCSA was developed by 
extending test assumptions to preschool children without taking into account 
younger children's level of comprehension. According to Gorsuch, Henighan, and 
Barnard (1972) developing a preschool test method without taking into account 
younger children's level of comprehension can result in random responding that may 
alter the psychometric properties of a test. Consideration of each of these issues not 
only raises doubts regarding the reliability of children's responses in the Harter and 
Chao (1992) study, but also calls into question the interpretation that these 
investigators offer regarding children's perception of their own and their imaginary 
companion's competence and social acceptance. 
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In summary, the literature presents contradictory evidence regarding the role 
of the imaginary companion in childhood development. The strong conclusion from 
the collected observations of previous research (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; 
Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990) suggests that imaginary companions appear 
during development for children who are competent in areas such as language and 
social skills. 
1.3 Temperament  
The view that imaginary companions were compensatory for children with 
personality difficulties pervaded early research work. Vostrovslcy (1895) reported 
that children with a "nervous temperament" were more likely to create imaginary 
companions. Subsequent research by Svendsen (1934) found that 88% of mothers 
whose children had imaginary companions reported that their child exhibited 
characteristics such as timidity with other children, fear of physical activity, 
sensitivity, and a reserved demeanour. Thus, it appears that children with imaginary 
companions were considered to be temperamentally difficult. 
In contrast, Ames and Learned (1946) observed that children who created 
imaginary companions could neither be categorised as a particular personality type 
nor exclusively described as timid, lonely, or experiencing "personality difficulties". 
Additional research evidence (Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer & 
Singer, 1981) supports this view and indicates that imaginary companions play an 
adaptive and constructive role in childhood development. 
Although research findings (Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & Singer, 1981) 
have indicated that children with imaginary companions display characteristics such 
as persistence, sharing behaviour, reduced aggression, general happiness during 
spontaneous p14, and cooperation with adults and children, few investigators have 
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specifically examined the relationship between temperament and the development of 
imaginary companions. 
One study that did examine this relationship was conducted by Mauro 
(1990) who used maternal ratings on the Children's Behaviour Questionnaire (CBQ; 
Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher cited in Ahadi, Rothbart, & Ye, 1993) to 
compare the temperamental characteristics of children with and without imaginary 
companions. This 195 item questionnaire requires mothers to rate their children's 
behaviour on fifteen dimensions using a 7-point scale (1 = extremely untrue of your 
child to 7 = extremely true of your child). The dimensions of behaviour that are 
assessed include: Activity Level, Anger/Frustration, Approach, Attentional 
Focusing, Discomfort, Fear, High Intensity Pleasure, Low Intensity Pleasure, 
Impulsivity, Perceptual Sensitivity, Inhibitory Control, Falling Reactivity and 
Soothability, Sadness, Shyness, and Smiling and Laughter. Mauro (1990) found that 
mothers of children with imaginary companions rated their children as less shy and 
more able to focus their attention for longer periods of time than mothers of 
children without companions. These data were interpreted as indicating that 
children with imaginary companions enjoy social interaction and develop their 
increased ability to focus as a consequence of employing sustained concentration 
during imaginative play. 
In an indirect investigation of the attentional capacities of children with 
imaginary companions, Singer (1961) examined children's waiting ability and its 
association with imaginative play. Children aged between 6- and 9-years were 
divided into low and high fantasy groups on the basis of their responses to four 
questions. These questions were: "What is your favorite game-what do you like to 
play most?"; "When you play by yourself, what games do you play?"; "Do you ever 
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have pictures in your head?", "Do you have a make-believe playmate?". Each 
question received a score of 1 if it contained an element of fantasy and a score of 0 
if it did not, leading to a possible total from 0 to 4. Children who scored a 0 or 1 
were considered to have a low predisposition to fantasy and comprised the low 
fantasy group, whereas children who scored 2 and above were considered to have a 
high predisposition to fantasy and comprised the high fantasy group. Prior to 
commencement of the waiting task, each child was told of the need for more 
astronauts and given a description of the narrow confines and solitude of space 
travel. Following this, they were asked to either sit or stand quietly in an imaginary 
space capsule. The length of time that each child could stand or sit quietly before 
becoming bored was then measured. The results showed that high fantasy children 
were able to remain quietly in the imaginary capsule for significantly longer periods 
of time than low fantasy children. In addition, these children tended to sustain 
themselves by introducing elements of play such as mouthing sound effects and 
occasionally gesturing as though they were actually participating in space flight. 
Singer (1961) concluded that children who reported extensive fantasy play became 
bored less easily because they could focus on their daydreams or imaginary stories 
rather than the passage of time. Singer and Singer (1990) more recently interpreted 
these results as providing support for the notion that fantasy play may be associated 
with an increased ability to concentrate. 
One problem with Singer's (1961) study is that it was not specifically 
designed to compare children with and without imaginary companions. According 
to Singer's classification, it is possible for children without imaginary companions to 
be in the high fantasy group, whilst children who answer "yes" only to question four 
including children with imaginary companions, will be in the low fantasy group. In 
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addition, attentional capacity was not assessed using a standardised assessment 
method, but was inferred from the experimental manipulation of an enforced waiting 
period. These methodological shortcomings reduce the extent to which these 
findings can be meaningfully compared to the results of other imaginary companion 
studies (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1977; Mauro, 1990). 
In a partial replication of the Singer (1961) study, Manosevitz et al. (1977) 
addressed the issue of participant selection and used parent report to identify 
preschool children with and without imaginary companions. Following this 
identification, each child was assigned to one of two groups: the imaginary 
companion group or the non-imaginary companion group. Then, using a modified 
version of the Singer (1961) procedure these investigators asked each child to sit 
quietly on the floor and pretend that they were driving a car. A heavy piece of 
folded cardboard was placed in front and around each child to screen out their 
surroundings. The length of time that each child could sit quietly before they stood 
up, turned around, or spoke was then measured. 
These investigators obtained results that had not been reported previously. 
Children with imaginary companions were not able to sit in the imaginary car for 
longer periods of time than children without these companions. The authors 
concluded that these results may have been due to the modifications of the task, the 
selection of younger participants, the criterion used to classify children, and the 
method of identifying children with imaginary companions. Manosevitiz et al. 
(1977) classified children according to the presence or absence of an imaginary 
companion, whereas only one of the four questions in the Singer (1961) study dealt 
with the presence of imaginary companions. Thus, Singer used a much broader 
definition to classify children. Further, Singer asked children directly whether they 
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had an imaginary companion, whereas Manosevitz et al. (1977) relied on parent 
report the accuracy of which has been questioned (e.g., Mauro, 1990). 
In summary, the only study that has specifically examined the relationship 
between temperament and the presence of imaginary companions was conducted by 
Mauro (1990). According to this investigator, the research findings indicate that: a) 
children with imaginary companions are motivated to create them by their inherent 
sociability and the positive emotionality they experience when interacting with 
others, and b) the sustained concentration they use when engaged in this type of 
fantasy play increases their ability to focus their attention. 
An alternative conclusion from previous research (e.g., Svendsen, 1934; 
Vostrovsky, 1895) is that children with imaginary companions have a nervous 
temperament. This claim may have some validity in the light of recent temperament 
theory. According to temperament theorists (e.g., Goldsmith et al., 1987; 
Kohnstamm, Bates, & Rothbart, 1989) temperament is a dynamic concept that 
encompasses the interaction between environment and behaviour, as well as 
between different levels of behaviour such as observable behavioural patterns and 
neurological processes. At a neurological level, individual differences in nervous 
system reactivity are regulated by both environmental influences and through 
experiences of nervous system reactivity (e.g., the intensity and frequency with 
which the environment activates the arousal systems). Individuals with more highly 
reactive nervous systems may experience higher levels of arousal and an increase in 
the intensity of negative emotions such as fear and anxiety (Bates, 1989). 
With regard to children with imaginary companions, these children may have 
highly reactive nervous systems and consequently experience increased levels of 
arousal and negative emotionality. In order to reduce their physiological, and hence 
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negative behavioural reactions to external events, children with these companions 
may immerse themselves in fantasy. However, additional research that specifically 
investigates the temperament profiles of children with and without companions is 
needed before any conclusions regarding the relationship between imaginary 
companions and temperament can be made. 
1.4 Anxiety  
Throughout the imaginary companion literature fear and anxiety are treated 
inseparably. Whilst this may not be completely inaccurate as both involve the same 
physiological responses (Graham, 1990), the pervasive nature of anxiety 
necessitates that it be distinguished from fear (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). 
Spielberger (1972) defined anxiety as a complex of emotional reactions that occur 
when an individual perceives a specific situation as threatening, regardless of 
whether there is any real danger. In contrast, fear is considered to be an adaptive 
response to a life threatening situation (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). 
Anxiety as a separate concept has not been investigated in children with 
imaginary companions. Early writings (e.g., Svendsen, 1934; Vostrovsky, 1895) 
imply that anxiety is present in children with imaginary companions, but refer to it 
as an inherent characteristic of the child rather than a construct that can be 
specifically identified and assessed. Recent research has investigated the presence of 
anxiety in children with imaginary companions, but only in a secondary way. Mauro 
(1990) and Meyer and Tuber (1989) assessed anxiety in children with imaginary 
companions as part of an overall behavioural assessment that was conducted using 
the Child Behaviour Checklist (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983). The results from 
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both of these studies indicate the absence of any pathological anxiety in children 
with imaginary companions. 
Although both the Mauro (1990) and Meyer and Tuber (1989) studies could 
be considered to provide some assessment of anxiety, two reasons mitigate this 
view. First, the combined anxiety and depression scale in the checklist makes the 
differential evaluation of anxiety difficult (Kline, 1994). Second, the checklist is 
designed to assess severe emotional-behavioural problems in children and 
incorporates a number of clinical items that may not be appropriate for non-
psychiatric populations (Merrill, 1995). Consequently, children who experience non-
clinical levels of anxiety may be incorrectly assessed as without anxiety. 
Singer and Singer (1981) also indirectly addressed the question of anxiety 
and the presence of imaginary companions. These investigators observed the 
affective behaviour of preschool children with and without imaginary companions 
during several sessions of spontaneous play. Affective behaviours were defined 
according to their valence. Positive affective behaviours included expressions of 
liveliness and elation such as smiling, enjoyment during play activities, and laughter. 
Negative affective behaviours included expressions of anger, fear or anxiety, 
fatigue, and sadness. Instances of each behaviour that comprised the positive and 
negative affective categories were then rated on a 5-point scale where 1 
corresponded to no overt expressions of these behaviours and 5 corresponded to 
extreme expressions of these behaviours. The results indicated that children with 
imaginary companions showed more positive affect in their play and were less likely 
to be anxious during later play sessions than children without imaginary 
companions. The authors concluded that the presence of an imaginary companion 
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increases the likelihood that a child will demonstrate positive emotionality during 
play and will play happily in preschool. 
Despite the implications of these findings, this study did not clarify the 
nature of the relationship between anxiety and the presence of imaginary 
companions. Singer and Singer (1981) did not specifically examine anxiety, but 
included it as a component of fear. Thus, the specific anxieties and levels of anxiety 
that were experienced by these children was not systematically assessed. 
In summary, the relationship between children's anxiety levels and the 
presence of imaginary companions has received little separate attention in imaginary 
companion research. The data that are available are inconclusive and vague 
suggesting that although children with imaginary companions do not experience 
pathological levels of anxiety (Mauro, 1990; Meyer & Tuber, 1989) they may 
experience some anxiety but at reduced levels as a consequence of the presence of 
the imaginary companion (Singer & Singer, 1981). However, before any 
conclusions can be reached regarding the role of these companions in children's 
emotional control, the level and types of anxiety that are experienced by children 
with and without imaginary companions needs to be specifically assessed. 
1.5 Fear 
There are many anecdotal accounts of children who create imaginary 
companions to overcome specific fears. One frequently cited account is that by 
Fraiberg (1968) who describes her niece Jan's creation of an imaginary tiger. 
Named Laughing Tiger because it laughed rather than bit children, this companion 
was created at a time when Jan was afraid of animals such as dogs that could bite. 
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Following the creation of this companion, Jan became less frightened of animals 
until she finally overcame her fear and Laughing Tiger disappeared. 
Despite this anecdotal evidence, very little empirical research has been 
conducted that examines the relationship between children's level of fearfulness and 
the presence of imaginary companions. Researchers have tended to include 
fearfulness as a personality trait without quantifying it as a separate construct. For 
example, Svendsen (1934) reported descriptions of children's fearful behaviour as 
one of a number of personality difficulties. Similarly, a questionnaire study by 
Inuzuka, Satoh, and Wada (1991) incorporated fearfulness within a personality trait 
inventory. The respondents in this study reported that they would describe 
themselves as "timid" and "inclined to worry". Other studies (e.g., Manosevitz et 
al., 1973; Singer & Singer, 1981) have incorporated fearfulness within a 
constellation of observable behaviours. The results of these studies indicate that 
children with imaginary companions do not display more fearful behaviour than 
children without companions. 
Similar to anxiety, the relationship between children's level of fearfulness 
and the presence of imaginary companions has received little separate attention in 
imaginary companion research. Different methodologies such as interview, 
observation, and questionnaire (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & Singer, 
1981; Svendsen, 1934) and the lack of specificity in the research has resulted in 
discrepant claims that children with imaginary companions are both more, and less 
likely to experience fearfulness than children without these companions. The 
tentative conclusion that can be drawn from anecdotal accounts (e.g., Fraiberg, 
1968) is that children with imaginary companions create them in order to overcome 
their fears. However, the relationship between these children's experience of 
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specific fears requires systematic investigation before any conclusions regarding the 
relationship between imaginary companions and fearfulness can be drawn. 
1.6 Theory of Mind and the Fantasy-Reality Distinction  
According to Singer and Singer (1990) children who have an imaginary 
companion probably vacillate between a sense of reality of their companion and an 
awareness that the companion is part of their pretend play. The extent to which 
these children vacillate is particularly relevant given the recent theoretical and 
empirical work on the child's theory of mind (Harris et al., 1991; Leslie, 1987; 
Lillard, 1993; Taylor et al., 1993; Wellman & Estes, 1986; Woolley & Phelps, 1994; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1993). 
Much of this research has focused on whether young children understand 
that pretense involves the manipulation of mental representations of objects. 
Researchers remain divided on this issue. Leslie (1987) asserts that children's 
engagement in pretend play implies an understanding of this connection. In contrast, 
Lillard (1993) presents empirical evidence that suggests children understand 
pretense as action only and do not consider it as involving a mental state until they 
are at least six years of age. 
Attempts to resolve this controversy have focused on how well children 
understand the difference between mental representations and reality. Despite recent 
research evidence (e.g., Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Wellman & Estes, 1986; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1993) that suggests children as young as 31.i2-years-old 
understand that imaginary representations do not reflect reality, the extent to which 
children understand this distinction has yielded a less consistent pattern of results. 
19 
Woolley and Wellman (1993) addressed this issue and investigated the 
extent to which 3- and 4-year-old children believed imaginary representations reflect 
reality by assessing their understanding of the non-perceptual origin of imagination. 
These investigators told children stories about characters who were either imagining 
the contents of a container or who knew the contents of the container. Children 
were then asked to judge whether the characters believed that the object was in the 
container and whether they would find it if they looked for it. The majority of 
children indicated that only perceptual knowledge would allow the character to 
judge whether the object was in the container and whether they would find it. 
However, a number of younger 3-year-olds (i.e., children up to 3 years of age) 
claimed that the imagined object was in the container. 
In a second study, the children themselves either saw or imagined an object 
in a container. They were then asked to judge whether the object that they had 
imagined was in the container. Similar to study one, only the younger 3-year-old 
children believed that the imagined object was in the container. These findings 
indicate that only younger 3-year-old children become confused about the extent to 
which mental contents reflect reality and erroneously judge that imaginary 
representations reflect the real world. Woolley and Wellman (1993) concluded that 
children between the ages of 3- and 4-years understand that imaginary 
representations do not reflect reality. 
These findings differ from the developmental pattern that was observed by 
Harris et al. (study 4, 1991). Children aged between 3- and 6-years were asked to 
imagine either a frightening creature (e.g., a monster) or a friendly creature (e.g., a 
rabbit) in one box whilst the other box remained neutral. After ascertaining 
children's understanding of the instructions and the imaginary status of the creature, 
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the experimenter left each child alone in the room and recorded their behaviour 
towards the boxes on video. The results revealed that half of the children 
approached the pretend box more frequently, and touched and opened the pretend 
box more frequently than the neutral box. When questioned about their behaviour 
toward the boxes, many children admitted to wondering whether a creature was 
inside the box. Harris et al. (1991) concluded that although young children have an 
understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction they cannot always maintain a firm 
barrier between these two realms. 
Two hypotheses were proposed to account for this occurrence: the 
availability hypothesis and the transmigration hypothesis. The availability hypothesis 
was derived from Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) finding that imagining a 
possibility makes it easier to bring to mind. According to this hypothesis, engaging 
in fantasy increases subjective judgments regarding the likelihood of possible events 
when there is a pre-existing belief in the possibility (e.g., children's pre-existing 
belief in monsters). The transmigration hypothesis states that children remain unsure 
of the rules that govern the boundary between fantasy and reality and may entertain 
the possibility that an imagined creature could change into a real creature. This 
hypothesis implies that children do not have to have a pre-existing belief in monsters 
to credit their imagination with the power to infuse life into imagined entities. 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the methodology that was 
employed by Harris et al. (1991). In a close scrutiny of their methodology, Golomb 
and Galasso (1995) identified three areas of concern. First, children's behaviour 
toward the boxes in the Harris et al. study may have been influenced by the 
emotional valence of the imagined creature. Second, the lack of toys in the testing 
room may have prompted children to examine the boxes because there was nothing 
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else to do rather than because they believed the imagined entity to be in the box. 
Finally, because the experimenter did not signal that the pretense was concluded 
before leaving the room, children may have explored the box in a continuation of 
the game rather than uncertainty regarding the presence of an imagined entity. 
Golomb and Galasso (1995) addressed each of these issues and examined 
children's ability to maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality in two studies 
that modified and extended the methodology used by Harris et al. (1991). In the 
first study, a slightly modified version of the Harris et al. procedure was used. These 
modifications included the experimenter not leaving the room, a second condition in 
which toys were provided, and the experimenter terminating the pretense. In 
contrast to the findings of Harris et al., this study found that the majority of children 
neither approached nor opened the boxes and did not wonder whether a creature 
could be inside the box. Terminating the pretense further reduced the number of 
children approaching and touching the box, with the majority of these children 
electing to play with the toys when they were provided. 
In a second and more extensive study, Golomb and Galasso (1995) 
investigated the conditions that may affect children's ability to maintain the border 
between fantasy and reality. Children aged between 3- and 5-years were asked to 
imagine a creature in a box within pretend play scenarios that were designed to 
increase their involvement in the pretense. Children were assigned to one of four 
pretend play conditions: adult initiated pretense and positive imagined entity, adult 
initiated pretense and negative imagined entity, child initiated pretense and positive 
imagined entity, and child initiated pretense and negative imagined entity. Similar to 
the first study, the experimenter stayed in the room, terminated the pretense, and a 
box of toys was included to provide an alternative activity to examining the boxes. 
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These investigators found that children's ability to differentiate between an 
imagined and real entity was not affected by the emotional valence of the imagined 
creature. Observations of children's behaviour toward the boxes revealed that 
children approached, touched or opened the pretense and neutral boxes with equal 
frequency until the pretense was terminated. Following the termination of pretense, 
the majority of children engaged in exploratory behaviour with the toys. When 
asked about their belief concerning the presence of a creature, most of the children 
indicated that the creature was not real and consequently could not have been in the 
box. Golomb and Galasso (1995) concluded that the findings from both studies did 
not support those of Harris et al. (1991) and proposed that both 3- and 4-year-old 
children can maintain the border between fantasy and reality, but their behaviour can 
be misinterpreted when pretense is not terminated. Moreover, these investigators 
concluded that the affective valence of the imagined creature is not influential in 
children's ability to maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality. 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) adopted a different perspective from which to 
examine children's ability to differentiate fantasy and reality. These investigators 
included a behavioural response that had real world consequences for another 
person. Children aged between 3- and 5-years saw a real object in one box (e.g., a 
sock) and were asked to imagine the same type of object (e.g., a sock) in another 
box. Following an assessment of children's belief regarding the reality of the 
imagined object, an unfamiliar person entered the room and asked the children for 
object that they had imagined (e.g., a sock). The results revealed that the majority of 
children gave the investigator the box with the real item in it, rather than the box 
with the imagined item in it. In addition, although the younger 3-year-old children 
verbally indicated that they thought the imagined object was in the box, few children 
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chose to give this box to the investigator. Thus, the majority of children did not act 
as though they believed their imagination reflected reality. Woolley and Phelps 
(1994) concluded that when children perceive that a situation has real world 
consequences, they do not feel as though they can explore their imaginative beliefs 
and their behaviour is guided by more practical considerations. 
In summary, research findings regarding young children's understanding of 
the extent to which imaginary representations reflect reality has yielded an 
inconsistent pattern of results. The conclusion from the Harris et al. (1991) study is 
that young children can differentiate between fantasy and reality, but this distinction 
may weaken under some circumstances and children may erroneously judge an 
imaginary creature to be real. An alternative conclusion from Golomb and Galasso 
(1995) is that children can differentiate between fantasy and reality, but may not 
appear to do so because of their deep involvement in the pretense. Similarly, 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) contend that although children may indulge in the belief 
that imagination reflects reality, this indulgence disappears when the child is faced 
with real world consequences. 
Thus, it appears that children's ability to differentiate fantasy from reality is 
subject to a number of influences, and is therefore relative rather than absolute. 
According to Woolley (1995)one factor that may influence children's ability to 
judge whether imagination can be reflected in reality is whose idea the imagined 
entity is. Children who create imaginary companions may have an increased 
understanding of the mental nature, fantasy-reality, and origin of their imaginings 
because they create a personal entity. 
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1.7 Imaginary Companions and the Fantasy-Reality Distinction  
Taylor et al. (1993) examined the question of whether children with and 
without imaginary companions differ in their ability to distinguish fantasy from 
reality in two consecutive studies. In the first study, these investigators were 
concerned with establishing the extent to which children between the ages of 3- and 
5-years were aware of the fantasy status of their companion. Children were asked a 
series of questions regarding the companion's physical appearance (e.g., hair colour, 
eye colour) and then prompted to use a toy phone to invite their companion to play 
with them. The same procedure was followed for children without companions, but 
they were asked about a real friend. Each child's involvement in the pretense was 
recorded and rated according to whether it was low, medium, or high. In addition, 
each child was asked a series of questions regarding whether the companion or real 
friend could be seen and touched by either themselves or the interviewer. This study 
found that children with imaginary companions were rated as engaging in 
significantly higher levels of pretense than children without companions, although 
some children in both groups indicated that the interviewer could see and touch 
their companion or real friend. The authors concluded that children with imaginary 
companions were more highly involved in fantasy than children without 
companions. 
However, one area of concern with this first study by Taylor et al. (1993) is 
that it did not resolve the issue of whether children with and without imaginary 
companions differ in their belief regarding the extent to which an imagined entity 
can be reflected in reality. As these investigators acknowledge, the see and touch 
questions that were designed to assess the extent to which children were aware of 
the fantasy status of either the imaginary companion or real friend, may have 
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reflected children's engagement in shared pretense rather than any fantasy-reality 
confusion. As a consequence of this methodological difficulty, conclusions 
regarding the ability of children with imaginary companions to differentiate between 
fantasy and reality could not be drawn. 
In the second study, Taylor et al. (1993) examined the issue of fantasy-
reality confusion, as well as the predisposition of children with and without 
imaginary companions to engage in fantasy. Children participated in a series of tasks 
that asked them to differentiate real from pretend objects, engage in pretend actions 
such as brushing their hair, make decisions regarding the reality of a series of 
pictures, and engage in a period of free play. This study found that both children 
with and without imaginary companions were able to distinguish real from pretend 
objects and fantasy from reality. However, children with imaginary companions 
were more likely than children without imaginary companions to spontaneously 
engage in fantasy play and use imaginary objects when pretending to perform 
actions. From the results of both of these studies Taylor et al. (1993) concluded that 
the reality with which children treat their imaginary companions indicates a strong 
propensity to engage in fantasy and a more mature level of pretense, rather than 
confusion differentiating fantasy from reality. 
The issue of children's involvement in pretense and fantasy was investigated 
further in a recent study by Taylor and Carlson (1997). Children aged 3- and 4-years 
were divided into high and low fantasy groups based on whether they did or did not 
create an imaginary companion or impersonate a character. Children who created an 
imaginary companion or impersonated a character were placed in the high fantasy 
group, whilst children who did not create an imaginary companion or impersonate a 
character were placed in the low fantasy group. Children's involvement in fantasy 
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was then determined according to two steps: a) by interview and by assessing their 
performance on four behavioural measures (the selection of fantasy-oriented versus 
reality-oriented toys, engagement in fantasy play with reality-oriented toys, 
engagement in fantasy play with fantasy-oriented toys, and the use of imaginary 
objects in pretend actions), and b) by conducting a principal components factor 
analysis on the scores of the interview and behavioural measures that were used in 
the study. 
This investigation found that 4-year-olds in the high fantasy group were 
more likely to engage in fantasy play with reality-oriented toys and selected more 
fantasy-oriented toys than children in the low fantasy group. In addition, both 3-and 
4-year-old children in the high fantasy group used more symbolic objects when 
asked to perform pretend actions than children in the low fantasy group. 
Examination of the results from the factor analysis revealed that the two measures 
which loaded most heavily onto the fantasy/pretense factor were presence of the 
imaginary companion (.73) and impersonation of a character (.67). Combined, these 
findings were considered as providing evidence that children who create an 
imaginary character have a strong propensity to engage in fantasy and pretense.' 
Thus, findings from both the Taylor and Carlson (1997) and Taylor et al. 
(1993) studies support the conclusion that children who create imaginary characters 
have a strong predisposition to engage in pretense and fantasy. However, 
conclusions regarding the ability of children with imaginary companions to maintain 
the fantasy-reality boundary remain highly speculative. Methodological problems 
This paper only became available after the research reported in this thesis had been 
conducted. 
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such as shared pretense, and insufficient systematic research prevent firm 
conclusions being drawn regarding the ability of children with imaginary 
companions to differentiate fantasy from reality. Addressing these issues in future 
investigations may provide more conclusive evidence regarding the relationship 
between the presence of imaginary companions and children's ability to differentiate 
fantasy from reality. 
1.8 Social and Verbal Skills  
The verbal abilities and social skills of children with imaginary companions 
have been consistently reported throughout the imaginary companion literature. 
Investigators (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & 
Singer, 1981) have reported that children with imaginary companions demonstrate 
advanced verbal skills, an increased ability to develop interpersonal relationships, 
and are more able to carry on a conversation with adults compared to children 
without these companions. 
Consideration of these findings and theoretical assertions regarding the 
association between connected communication and interpersonal skills (e.g., 
Gottman, 1983; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996) suggests that the ability of children 
with imaginary companions to develop interpersonal relationships may be related to 
their enhanced verbal skills. However, very few studies have been conducted that 
specifically examine the speech of children with imaginary companions. 
Singer and Singer (1981) examined this issue and recorded the speech of 3- 
and 4-year-old children with and without imaginary companions during eight 
periods of spontaneous play. Amongst the language variables examined were the 
number of spoken utterances, the mean length of utterances, the number of past 
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and future verbs, descriptive adjectives, personal and possessive pronouns, 
questions, and nouns. The results indicated that the presence of imaginary 
companions was strongly associated with increases in the number of words spoken 
and the mean length of utterances produced by boys. The presence of the 
companion in girls did not contribute to their use of language. Nevertheless, Singer 
and Singer (1981) concluded that the presence of an imaginary companion enhances 
the verbal skills of children. 
One potential concern with Singer and Singer's (1981) study is that it did 
not take into account the extent to which children differ in how much they speak. 
Language development was assessed purely by numerical scores and no 
consideration was given to how much speech each child produced. Consequently, it 
is not certain whether this study's findings reflect the generally enhanced verbal 
skills of boys with imaginary companions, or an artificial inflation of this group's 
scores due to some boys talking more than others. 
There are also concerns with Singer and Singer's (1981) interpretation of 
their findings. First, although mean length of utterances (MLU) is a relatively 
sensitive index of development in very young children, increases in MLUs have 
been found to slow down after 	years of age as children's grammatical 
knowledge increases and their utterances become more succinct. As a consequence 
of this loss of sensitivity, MLUs are not considered a very sensitive index of 
language development in older preschool children (Wells, 1985). Second, 
according to Wells (1985) analysis of MLUs for an entire sample does not indicate 
the relationship between MLUs and language development. It is only when each 
child's MLU is analysed that a relationship between MLUs and stage of language 
development emerges. Finally, research findings suggest that differences between 
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boys and girls in spontaneous speech is context dependent (Wells, 1985). Boys 
speak more when they are playing and girls speak more when they are engaged in 
helping or general activity. 
Thus, Singer and Singer's (1981) interpretation of their findings may have 
been based on a number of erroneous assumptions. First, MLUs accurately indicate 
stages of language development for children in all age groups. Second, numerical 
scores of language variables accurately represent children's language skills. Finally, 
the language of boys and girls does not differ across contexts. 
Both the methodological and interpretative concerns associated with Singer 
and Singer's (1981) study and the lack of specificity in earlier research (e.g., Ames 
& Learned, 1946; Manosevitz et al., 1973) indicate the need for further research. 
Until more research is conducted that specifically investigates the relationship 
between imaginary companions and the language skills of children, the conclusion 
that imaginary companions enhance language skills should be treated with caution. 
1.9 The Aims of the Thesis  
The main aim of this research was to investigate systematically the emotional 
and cognitive factors associated with the presence of imaginary companions. Whilst 
each of these factors has been investigated to some extent in previous research, 
methodological problems such as inadequate definitions and methods of assessment 
(e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer, 1961; Singer & Singer, 1981; Svendsen, 
1934) have led to inconsistent results and prevented firm conclusions being drawn 
regarding the relationship between these factors and the presence of imaginary 
companions. 
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Thus, the research in this thesis specifically aimed to investigate: a) the 
prevalence rate and characteristics of children with imaginary companions, b) the 
level of fearfulness, anxiety, and temperament characteristics of children with and 
without imaginary companions, c) the degree of absorption in fantasy that is 
experienced by children with and without companions, d) the ability of children with 
and without companions to differentiate between fantasy and reality, and e) the 
language use of children with and without imaginary companions. 
These aims are pursued in a series of studies the first of which is an overall 
examination of the prevalence rate and characteristics of children with imaginary 
companions. This is followed by study two which sought to examine with greater 
specificity the association of fearfulness, anxiety, and temperament with the 
presence of these companions. This study addressed the methodological problems 
of previous research by examining each factor individually and utilising standard 
psychometrically sound measurement instruments. Studies three and four examined 
the extent to which children with imaginary companions become absorbed in fantasy 
and the ability of these children to differentiate fantasy from reality. The final study 
examined the language use of children with and without imaginary companions with 
the aim of identifying those aspects of language structure that could indicate social-
cognitive maturity. 
CHAPTER 2 
STUDY ONE 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent research evidence suggests that imaginary companions occur in up to 
65% of preschool children (Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990). These 
companions may take the form of humans, animals, toys, or television characters, 
and children often include them in their daily routine (Jalongo, 1984; Jersild, 1968; 
Singer & Singer, 1990; Somers & Yawkey, 1984). 
A dominant view regarding the role of the imaginary companion is that it 
has a positive effect on children's development. Research findings (e.g., Ames & 
Learned, 1946; Mauro, 1990; Singer, 1961; Singer & Singer, 1981) indicate that 
children with these companions demonstrate an increased ability to develop 
interpersonal relationships and exercise social control, a preference for socialising 
and interacting with other children, reduced aggressiveness, enhanced language 
skills, and have more real friends than children without companions. 
As indicated in chapter one, a large amount of research into this 
phenomenon has utilised questionable methodologies (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; 
Vostrovksy, 1895). In particular, inadequate sample sizes and insufficient control 
groups have resulted in a series of non-systematic studies that prevent meaningful 
comparisons of research findings (Manosevitz et al., 1973). 
Moreover, because many of the data derive from differing research 
methodologies including questionnaire, observation, and interview methods (e.g., 
31 
32 
Ames & Learned, 1946; Hurlock & Burstein, 1932; Jersild et al., 1933; Svendsen, 
1934) the ability of research findings to substantiate earlier claims is restricted. For 
example, Ames and Learned (1946) concluded that children with higher verbal 
intelligence and higher levels of creativity are most likely to experience imaginary 
companions. This conclusion was partially supported by subsequent research (e.g., 
Mauro, 1990; Schaefer, 1969). However, because different methods were employed 
in gathering these data, the ability of subsequent research to substantiate previous 
claims remains limited. Thus, inconsistencies regarding the findings and 
interpretation of results occur throughout the imaginary companion literature. 
Consideration of these issues prompted Manosevitz et al. (1973) to conduct 
one of the most systematic investigations of the factors associated with the presence 
or absence of imaginary companions. These researchers administered a self-report 
questionnaire to the parents of preschool children. The factors that were 
investigated included demographic information, family structure, play activities, and 
the personality characteristics of both the imaginary companions and the children. 
The results indicated that birth order was associated with the presence of imaginary 
companions, with first born children being more likely to have a companion. Only 
two other factors were associated with the presence of imaginary companions, 
namely increased self-initiated play and engagement in a greater number of different 
family play activities. The presence of increased self-initiated play and involvement 
in a greater number of family play activities was considered evidence that children 
with imaginary companions could be described as self-starters. 
Thus, despite the systematic nature of the Manosevitz et al. study, very little 
specific information was obtained regarding the factors associated with the presence 
of imaginary companions. Two reasons may account for these results. First, the age 
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range of the sample was restricted to children 3-to-5-years-old. As previous 
research findings (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Hurlock & Burstein, 1932) have 
reported the presence of imaginary companions in children up to nine years of age, 
some of the factors associated with the presence of these companions may not have 
been apparent in younger children. 
Second, information regarding children's involvement in fantasy was not 
included in the original questionnaire. From a cognitive perspective, this oversight 
may have resulted in the exclusion of information. According to cognitive-affective 
theory, children use fantasy play as a method of assimilating new experiences into 
available schemas that reduce the fearfulness of an incongruous event and promote 
positive emotions such as interest or excitement that permit exploration (Singer & 
Singer, 1990). Within this theoretical framework, the imaginary companion may be 
considered to be a fantasy figure that assists children to assimilate new experiences 
into available schemas, thereby reducing the fearfulness of a highly unexpected 
event and creating a positive atmosphere for exploration (Singer & Singer, 1990; 
Somers & Yawkey, 1984; Taylor et al., 1993). This theoretical position has been 
partially substantiated by research findings that children six years of age can be 
prompted to engage in fantasy thinking when confronted with the possibility of a 
highly unexpected event (Harris et al., 1991). 
Consideration of each of these issues combined with recent research findings 
by Harris et al. (1991) suggests that additional insight regarding the role of 
imaginary companions may be provided by extending the age range to include older 
children and utilising a method that obtains information regarding children's 
involvement in fantasy. In addition, consideration of the problems associated with 
imaginary companion research, necessitates the use of a method that permits 
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meaningful comparisons with previous research. Thus, for the purpose of the 
present study the questionnaire used by Manosevitz et al. (1973) was modified and 
utilised to investigate the prevalence and characteristics of children with imaginary 
companions. 
Specifically, the modified questionnaire sought to investigate: a) the 
prevalence of children with imaginary companions, b) the family structure of 
children with and without imaginary companions, c) the personality and behavioural 
characteristics of children with and without imaginary companions, d) the patterns 
of play of children with and without imaginary companions, and e) the 
incorporation of myth (as a measure of fantasy) in the daily lives of children with 
and without imaginary companions. 
Two outcomes, additional to those which would assist in evaluating 
information provided by the results of the Manosevitz et al. (1973) study, were 
expected. First, it was expected that the inclusion of fantasy items would indicate an 
association between the presence of imaginary companions and children's 
predisposition to engage in fantasy. Second, it was expected that extending the age 
range would provide information indicating that the tendency to have imaginary 
companions continues beyond the preschool years. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants  
The Imaginative Play Activities Questionnaire was distributed through 
preschool and school centres to the parents of 900 children. The final sample on 
which the analysis was based totaled 478. There were 237 girls (M age = 5 years 
and 9 months; range, 2 years and 2 months to 9 years and 5 months) and 241 boys 
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(M age = 5 years and 11 months; range, 2 years and 6 months to 9 years and 3 
months). Within this sample, 81 children were reported to either have, or have had 
an imaginary companion (M age = 5 years and 6 months; range, 2 years and 9 
months to 8 years and 7 months) and 397 children were reported as not having, or 
never having had an imaginary companion (M age = 6 years and 0 months; range, 2 
years and 2 months to 9 years and 5 months). 
Because of concerns that questions about income may be considered to be 
intrusive, parental education level, rather than financial status was used as an 
indicator of socioeconomic background. In particular, mother's education level was 
used because according to Entwisle and Astone (1994) it is rarely missing from 
surveys and has been found to be highly correlated with father's education level. 
The education levels of mothers in the present study indicated that 
respondents were not fully representative of the general population for the area. 
Questionnaires were completed and returned from 26% of mothers who reported an 
education level of "some high school", 36% who reported an education level of 
"high school", and 38%, who reported an education level of "university". In 
contrast, the percentage of respondents found at these education levels in the 
general population was 66%, 14%, and 8% respectively (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1991). Thus, despite efforts to obtain a representative sample by 
distributing the questionnaire to children from a range of socioeconomic 
backgrounds, a large percentage of the respondents who completed and returned 
the questionnaire were educated beyond high school. Consequently, the sample in 
this study is weighted toward more highly educated families. 
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2.2.2 Questionnaire  
For the purpose of the study, the Imaginative Play Activities Questionnaire 
was developed. This questionnaire comprised four sections: i) demographic data, 
ii) children's play activities and behaviour, iii) mythical beings, and iv) imaginary 
companions. Sections 1, 2, and 4 were derived from the Imaginary Companion 
Questionnaire developed by Manosevitz et al. (1973) and were incorporated in 
slightly modified form into the current questionnaire. Section 3 was added to 
provide specific data regarding a child's exposure, incorporation in play, and belief 
concerning mythical beings (e.g., Santa Claus). 
The modifications to sections 1, 2, and 4 included changing and adding 
items that were more applicable to the present day (e.g., phonograph to CD/record 
player, and including computer games); rewording items and phrases to suit 
Australian English (e.g., check to tick); deleting items that may be considered to 
have an intrusive quality and were not required (e.g., death of a child or spouse); 
and dividing questions that sought information on two issues concurrently (e.g., 
child's contact with music and literature). 
Each section requested specific information. Section 1 requested 
information regarding family composition and parental education. Section 2 
requested information regarding a child's: a) friends (i.e., age, sex, and number) b) 
style of play and interaction with others, c) exposure to music and literature, d) type 
and number of toys, and e) existence of any behavioural problems. Section 3 
requested information regarding the extent of the child's: a) exposure to mythical 
beings through stories and traditions, b) belief in mythical beings and their reaction 
to the denial by others of their existence, and c) imaginativeness and use of 
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mythical characters in pretend play and story telling. Finally, section 4 requested 
information concerning imaginary companions and covered the following topics: a) 
age when the companion appeared, and if relevant, disappeared, b) age, number, 
and type (e.g., non-human vs human), c) interaction between the child and the 
companion, and d) parental attitudes toward the companion. 
Following completion of section 2, parents were provided with a definition 
concerning mythical beings. For the purpose of the research, a mythical being was 
defined as a fictional character around which stories and cultural traditions have 
arisen. This definition allowed parents to determine whether the fictional characters 
and traditions experienced by the child were mythical. 
The final section dealt with imaginary companions. An imaginary companion 
was defined as a very vivid imaginary character that does not actually exist but 
which is treated as real by the child who plays with it and refers to it in conversation 
throughout the day. This definition allowed parents to exclude the transient 
characters or objects that children use in pretend play and determine whether or not 
their child had an imaginary companion. Those parents whose child had an 
imaginary companion completed this section. Those whose children did not have an 
imaginary companion were instructed to proceed to the Optional page at the end of 
the questionnaire. 
As the questionnaire could be returned anonymously, the Optional page 
was for those parents who were interested in discussing their child's participation in 
future studies. The provision of choice was designed to promote an acceptable 
return rate, by allowing parents to return the questionnaire anonymously if they 
wished. A copy of this questionnaire is presented in Appendix Al. 
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2.2.3 Procedure  
Following ethics approval from the institutional ethics committee, 
questionnaires were delivered to eleven centres (kindergartens, day care centres, 
preschools, and primary schools) in the Hobart metropolitan area. These centres 
covered the range of socioeconomic backgrounds (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics,1991) and child enrolments ranged from 31 to 209. Initial contact with 
these centres was conducted via the telephone and followed-up by a personal visit 
to each in order to enlist cooperation. 
The questionnaires were distributed by staff to the parents of all enrolled 
children. Each centre was provided with a post box as a 'drop off' point for the 
completed questionnaires. In addition, each questionnaire was accompanied by an 
envelope and an explanatory cover letter that briefly explained the nature of the 
research and asked parents to post the completed questionnaires in the box 
provided at each centre (see Appendix A2). Parents were assured that all 
information would be treated in the strictest confidence. After 10 days a follow-up 
letter was sent to all parents urging them to complete and return the questionnaire if 
they had not already done so. 
2.3 Results 
The prevalence rate for parents reporting of imaginary companions was 
computed for the entire sample. Within the entire sample, 35 (7%) children were 
reported as having one or more imaginary companions, 46 (10%) were reported as 
having had one or more imaginary companions in the past, and 397 (83%) were 
reported as never having had an imaginary companion. As the low numbers in each 
imaginary companion group would have rendered separate analyses unreliable 
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(Siegel & Castellan, 1988), for the purpose of the analysis past and present 
companion groups were combined to form one imaginary companion (IC) group. 
2.3.1 Analyses 
Analyses of categorical variables were conducted using chi-square tests. 
Because of the large difference in the number in each group, percentages are 
referred to in the tables and the text for clarity. However, all analyses were based on 
frequency data and all of the percentages that are reported in the text are based on 
the frequency counts within each cell. T-tests were conducted for numerically 
scored variables such as the total number of behaviour problems, level of 
imaginativeness, personality characteristics, and the ability to interact with adults 
and children. Equality of variance of the groups in the t-test was assessed by the 
Levene test. 
Frequency data from the categorical variables were cast into 2x2 (if = 1) 
and larger (df > 1) contingency tables and analysed using chi-square (x. 2 ) tests. 
However, if the larger contingency tables had one cell with expected frequencies of 
less than five categories were combined to increase their values. This strategy 
resulted in frequency data being cast into 2x2 contingency tables. Analyses of these 
contingency tables were then conducted according to two criteria. First, because it 
increases accuracy, application of this test was corrected for continuity. Second, as 
the data were cast into 2x2 contingency tables, the Phi coefficient (M was used to 
measure the strength of association between variables. As measures the strength 
of this association on a scale from zero to one, values close to zero should be 
interpreted to indicate a weak relationship between variables, values close to one 
should be interpreted to indicate a strong relationship to variables, and values 
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halfway between zero and one should be interpreted to indicate a moderate 
relationship between variables (Diekhoff, 1992; Howell, 1987; Siegel & Castellan, 
1988). 
Results that are significant at an alpha level of .05 are reported. However, 
because of concerns that this alpha level may result in a Type I error, findings that 
were significant at .05 but not at more stringent alpha levels should be interpreted 
with caution. 
2.3.2 Family Structure  
The family structure of IC and MC children was measured on four 
dimensions: the number of siblings, birth order, the number of any additional 
household members (e.g., aunts, uncles) and parents' relationship status. These data 
are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 
The Percentage of IC and MC Children Reported for Each Category of Family  
Structure  
Family Structure IC MC 
(L= 81) (n = 397) 
Number of Siblings 
None 20 12 
One or more 80 88 
Birth Order 
Firstborn*** 
Yes 29 14 
No 71 86 
Only child 
Yes 20 12 
No 80 88 
(table continues) 
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Family Structure IC NEC 
(n = 81) (ii= 397) 
Additional Household Members 
None 96 91 
One or more 4 9 
Parents' Relationship Status 
Living together 87 80 
Divorced 3 2 
Separated 3 3 
Other 7 15 
The percentages of ICs and NICs who were reported as having one or more 
siblings, or having additional household members living with them were not 
significantly different. 
As the number of "divorced", "separated" and "other" responses to parents' 
relationship status was low, these were all considered indicative of a separation 
response and recoded to equal "separated" for the analysis. The percentage of ICs 
and NICs whose parents were reported to be separated versus living together was 
not significantly different. 
However, analysis of birth order revealed that a significantly larger 
percentage of ICs than NICs were reported to be firstborn children X. 2 (1, n = 478) 
= 14.75, p<  .001; = .18. 
2.3.3 Education Level  
Information regarding the education level of mothers is summarised in Table 
2.2. The percentage of mothers of IC and NIC children who reported qualifications 
at each educational level was not significantly different. 
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Table 2.2 
The Percentage of Mothers of IC and NIC Children Who Reported Education at 
Each Level  
Education Level IC MC 
(n = 81) (n = 397) 
Some high school 4 5 
Finished high school 25 20 
Finished high school plus 
technical training 25 23 
Some university 10 13 
Finished university 3 13 
Finished university plus 
additional training 33 26 
2.3.4 Style of Play and Patterns of Interaction with Friends  
The style of play and patterns of friendship interactions of IC and MC 
children were measured on four dimensions: the number of friends, the number of 
hours spent in play with friends, the style of play, and interaction during play with 
other children. These data are summarised in Table 2.3. The percentages of ICs and 
NICs who were reported to have one or more friends, spend up to 10 hours in play 
with these friends, frequently disagree with other children, and engage in self-
initiated or quiet play were not significantly different. 
However, analysis of how often and well ICs and NICs play with other 
children revealed that a significantly larger percentage of NICs than ICs were 
reported to play often and well with other children, x 2 (1, n = 478) = 5.35, n < .05; 
= .11. 
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Table 2.3 
The Percentage of IC and MC Children Reported for Each Style of Play and 
Pattern of Interaction with Friends  
Play Interactions IC 
= 
MC 
81) 	 (n = 397) 
Number of Friends 
None - 31 22 
One or more 69 78 
Number of Hours in Play 
Up to 10 hours 76 69 
More than 10 hours 24 31 
Style of Play 
Quiet 
Yes 51 43 
No 49 57 
Self-initiated 
Yes 89 90 
No 11 10 
Interaction During Play 
Frequent disagreements 
Yes 7 9 
No 93 . 	91 
Plays often and well* 
Yes 82 91 
No 18 9 
*p < .05. 
2.3.5 Patterns of Interaction with the Family 
The patterns of family interaction that were reported for IC and NEC 
children were measured on three dimensions: the number of hours spent with 
mother, the number of hours spent with father, and the number of joint activities 
that are engaged in with family members. These data are summarised in Table 2.4. 
' 
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Table 2.4 
The Percentage of IC and MC Children Reported in Each Category of Family 
Interaction 
Interactions IC 
('i= 81) 
MC 
(n = 397) 
Number of Hours Spent with Mother 
Up to six hours 17 19 
More than six hours 83 81 
Number of Hours Spent with Father 
Up to six hours 80 83 
More than six hours 20 17 
The Number of Joint Activities Engaged in with Family Members 
Activities with mother 
Up to two 7 9 
More than two 93 91 
Activities with father 
Up to two 19 18 
More than two 82 82 
Activities with siblings* 
Up to two 41 29 
More than two 59 71 
Activities with family group 
Up to two 23 19 
More than two 77 81 
<.05. 
The percentages of ICs and NICs who were reported to spend up to six 
hours with mother and father were not significantly different. Similarly, the 
percentages of ICs and NICs who were reported to participate jointly in two or 
more activities with mother, father, and the family group were not significantly 
different. 
However, a significantly larger percentage of NICs than ICs were reported 
to engage in two or more activities with siblings, X 2 (1, n = 478) = 4.02, p < .05; 
L= .10. 
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2.3.6 Behaviour Problems  
A list of 22 behaviours was presented and parents were asked to tick any 
behaviour problems that "...are giving parents concern at present or have given 
concern in the past." Examples of the behaviours that were listed include 
restlessness, shyness, excitability, daydreaming, fearfulness, and lack of self-
confidence. A complete list of these behaviours is given in Appendix A3. 
The total number of behaviour problems that were reported for ICs and 
NICs was computed from summing every ticked item for each IC and MC group. 
The mean number of behavioural problems was then calculated for each IC and NEC 
group. A t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between these 
means (IC, M= 1.31, SD= .89; NIC, M=  1.13, $D = .89; (476) = -1.63, p = .10; 
Levene test, p = .99). 
2.3.7 Personality Characteristics  
The personality characteristics of IC and MC children were rated on four 
personality dimensions: imaginativeness, ability to talk and interact with adults, 
ability to talk and interact with children, and shyness. Each of these dimensions was 
rated using a 7-point scale where 1 corresponded to very positive and 7 
corresponded to very negative. 
T-tests were performed to compare parents ratings of IC and MC children 
on each of the four personality dimensions. These tests revealed that there were no 
significant differences in ratings of IC and NIC's ability to talk and interact with 
adults (I (476) = .46, p = .64), talk and interact with children (t (476) = -.05, a = 
.96), and degree of shyness (t (476) = -.94, p = .35). However, the mean parent 
rating of level of imaginativeness for ICs was significantly lower than for NICs (IC, 
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M = 1.48, SD = .59; MC, M = 2.00, $D = .98; t(476) = 4.47, g < .001; Levene 
test, g = .57) indicating a higher degree of imaginativeness in these children 
compared to NICs. 
2.3.8 Involvement in Music and Stories  
The involvement in music and stories of IC and MC children was measured 
on two dimensions. These were general reaction to music and general reaction to 
literature. These data are summarised in Table 2.5. The percentages of ICs and 
NICs who were reported to participate actively or listen quietly to music and 
literature were not significantly different. 
Table 2.5 
The Percentage of IC and MC Children's Reported Active and Quiet Participation 
in Music and Literature  
General Reaction IC MC 
(n= 81) (n = 397) 
Music 
Actively participates 
Yes 95 89 
No 5 11 
Listens quietly 
Yes 41 47  
No 59 53 
Literature 
Actively participates 
Yes 89 80 
No 11 20 
Listens quietly 
Yes 57 65 
No 43 35 
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2.3.9 Involvement in Myth  
The involvement in myth of IC and NIC children was measured on seven 
dimensions: frequently read stories involving mythical characters, involvement in 
mythical traditions, belief in mythical beings, angrily denies challenges to mythical 
belief, make-up stories of mythical beings, involve mythical beings in play, and 
explain events as magical. These data are summarised in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 
The Percentage of IC and NEC Children Who were Reported to Incorporate 
Myth in Their Daily Life  
Mythical Events 	 IC 	 MC 
= 	81) (n = 	397) 
Parents Frequently Read Stories of Myth  
Yes 	 32 	 29 
No 68 71 
Child is Involved in Mythical Traditions  
Yes 	 91 	 91 
No 9 9 
Belief in Mythical Beings  
Yes 	 96 	 93 
No 4 7 
Angrily Denies Challenges to Mythical Belief 
Yes 	 14 	 14 
No 86 86 
Make-up Stories of Mythical Beings*** 
Yes 	 68 	 42 
No 32 58 
Involves Mythical Beings in Play*** 
Yes 	 57 	 32 
No 43 68 
Explains Events as Magical* 
Yes 	 46 	 32 
No 54 68 
< .05. ***p. < .001. 
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The percentage of ICs and NICs who were reported to have mythical 
stories read frequently to them was not significantly different. Similarly, the 
percentages of ICs and NICs who were reported to be involved in mythical 
traditions, believe in mythical beings, and angrily deny challenges to mythical belief 
were not significantly different. 
However, significantly larger percentages of ICs than NICs were reported to 
make-up stories of mythical beings that did not include the imaginary companion, 
( 1, n = 478) = 17.74, p < .001; = .20, involve mythical beings other than the 
imaginary companion in play, x2 ( 1, = 478) = 16.47, p < .001; = .19, and 
explain events as magical, v ( 1, n = 478) = 5.00, p <.05; 4 = .11. 
2.3.10 Imaginary Companions  
The next phase of the analysis dealt with the questionnaire data that were 
obtained from the parents of children with imaginary companions (N = 81). The 
first analysis was conducted to determine the existence of any gender differences 
with regard to the number of companions experienced by males and females. 
The total number of imaginary companions comprising male, female, and 
those with no specific gender that were reported for females and males did not 
differ significantly. However, a significantly larger number of male companions 
were reported for males compared to females (IC as male; male, M = .46, SD = .51; 
female, M = .23, SD = .42; t (79) = 2.25, p < .05; Levene test, p < .0005) and a 
significantly larger number of female companions were reported for females 
compared to males (IC as female; female, M = .57, SD = .50; male, M = .32, SD = 
.48; t (79) = -2.23, p < .05; Levene test, p = .06). However, these results should be 
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treated with caution as the Levene tests indicate that the group variances are not 
equal. 
Additional descriptive data that were obtained from parents whose child has 
or had an imaginary companion are summarised in Table 2.7. Of particular interest, 
the imaginary companion was a person whose age was either unknown (37%) the 
same as the child's (43%) or older than the child's (20%). The majority of children 
played happily (78%) with their companions, played in the home (88%) with them, 
and ignored the companion when other children were present (83%). 
The attitude of parents toward the imaginary companion was mostly 
positive. Only one parent referred to the companion as harmful. The other parents 
either regarded the companion as good for their child (66%) or as having no effect 
(33%). A similar pattern of results was found for parental treatment of the 
companion with 73% of parents encouraging the companion, 24% ignoring the 
companion, and only 3% discouraging the companion. 
Table 2.7 
A Summary of Questionnaire Data from Parents of Children with Imaginary 
Companions (N = 81)  
Question 	 % Response 
Type of companion  
Person 	 77 
Animal and other 	 23 
Same sex companion  
Males 	 46 
Females 57 
Number of companions  
One 	 59 
Two 21 
(table continues) 
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Question 	 % Response 
Age of the companion 
Unknown 	 37 
Same age as the child 	 43 
Older than the child 20 
Parental attitude  
Good for the child 	 66 
No effect on the child 33 
Harmful for the child 	 1 
Frequency of appearance of imaginary companions  
Steady companion, appears almost every day 	 46 
Appears frequently but not everyday 	 42 
Appeared only once or twice 	 7 
Mood of child when talking or playing with imaginary companion  
Happy and in high spirits 	 78 
Quiet and reserved 	 4 
Lonely 	 3 
Angry 3 
No specific mood 	 12 
Origin of names of imaginary companion 
Friend 	 21 
Television 12 
Interaction with companion 
Preferred not to interact with companion when other 
children were available 	 83 
Nature of relationship between imaginary companion and child  
Usually play peacefully together 	 85 
Sometimes have arguments and disagreements 	 17 
At times child consults or asks permission of 
imaginary companion before doing something 	 25 
At times the imaginary companion asks permission 
of the child to do something 	 21 
Child uses imaginary companion to escape blame 	 25 
Place and activities that imaginary companion usually accompanies the child  
Outside 	 62 
In home 88 
Driving in car 	 52 
While eating 35 
While shopping 	 27 
To and at preschool/school 	 14 
(table continues) 
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Question 	 % Response 
Place and activities that imaginary companion usually accompanies the child  
lobed 	 48 
While watching television 	 12 
Talks on telephone to imaginary companion 	 32 
Physical space imaginary companion occupies  
Needs its own chair at the table 	 25 
Needs place in child's bed 	 32 
Needs room in the car 36 
Needs space of its own, various places other than 
those specified above 	 10 
Does not need any space 48 
Parental behaviour that prompted appearance of the imaginary companion 
Punishment or scolding 	 9 
Requiring child to play indoors or in 
his/her room 	 10 
Parent unable to attend to child 	 22 
Questioning child or expressing interest in 
imaginary companion 	 36 
Other 	 20 
Parental Treatment of imaginary companion  
Encourage the companion 	 73 
Discourage the companion 3 
Ignore the companion 	 24 
Disappearance of imaginary companion 
Child gradually stopped playing and talking 
to imaginary companion 	 37 
When child started preschool 	 12 
Imaginary companion left suddenly without 
explanation 	 24 
Imaginary companion disappeared after a fight 	 0 
Imaginary companion moved away or died 5 
2.4 Discussion 
This study utilised a modified version of a previously developed method to 
promote meaningful comparisons between the present study and previous research 
regarding the prevalence and characteristics of children with imaginary companions. 
The study also explored the possibility of an association between the presence of 
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imaginary companions and children's involvement in fantasy, as well as the 
possibility that the effects of imaginary companions continue beyond the preschool 
years. 
The findings of the present study indicate differences between IC and NIC 
children regarding their birth order and level of imaginativeness that are consistent 
with previous research (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Manosevitz et al., 1973). In 
the present study, IC children were more often reported to be very imaginative. In 
addition, these children were more often reported to be firstborns. This finding 
substantiates the view that one function of the imaginary companion may be to 
ameliorate the loneliness of a child who does not have any siblings close in age 
(Manosevitz et al., 1973). 
The results of this study also provide evidence that there is an association 
between the presence of imaginary companions and children's predisposition to 
engage in fantasy. Children with ICs were more often reported to make up stories 
about mythical beings that did not include the imaginary companion, involve 
mythical beings other than the imaginary companion in play, and explain events as 
magical. As a measure of fantasy, these results corroborate previous research 
findings that children with ICs have a strong tendency to engage in fantasy play 
spontaneously (Taylor et al., 1993). This predisposition to fantasy, combined with 
the finding in this study that the majority of children were reported to be happy 
when playing with the companion, suggests that another function of the imaginary 
companion may be to assist children to assimilate new information into available 
schemas by creating a positively reinforcing atmosphere for exploration (Singer & 
Singer, 1990). 
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The present study also found differences between IC and MC children in 
their interactions with family members and other children that are not consistent 
with recent reports (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer, 1973; 
Singer & Singer, 1990). This study found that MC children, rather than IC children 
were reported to engage in more activities with siblings. In addition, MC children, 
more than IC children were reported to play often and well with other children. 
Although these findings may be interpreted to indicate that IC children are less 
sociable than MC children, two explanations can be offered that challenge this 
assessment. First, as children with imaginary companions were more often reported 
to be firstborns, age differences may have prevented a significant proportion of 
these children from engaging in many activities with their younger siblings. Second, 
use of the word "often" with "well" may have prompted some parents to report 
their child's interaction according to either often, well, or both often and well. Thus, 
it cannot be known whether parents were reporting that their child played often but 
neither well nor poorly with other children, played well but not always often with 
other children, or played often and well. As a consequence of these interpretative 
difficulties, firm conclusions regarding differences in the social interactions of IC 
and MC children cannot be made. 
The prevalence rate of children with imaginary companions was also found 
to be much lower in this study compared to that reported by other researchers (see 
Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990). There are two 
explanations that may account for this low prevalence rate. First, the questionnaire 
in the present study did not focus specifically on imaginary companions but 
requested information on these companions as one of a number of children's play 
activities. As a consequence of its broad emphasis, the questionnaire targeted all 
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parents and increased the likelihood of obtaining responses from parents whose 
children did not have imaginary companions. In contrast, the questionnaire that was 
used by Manosevitz et al.(1973) focused specifically on the topic of imaginary 
companions, thus targeting the parents of children who had these companions and 
increasing the likelihood of these parents responding. 
Second, this study utilised parent report. Previous researchers (e.g., Brooks 
& Knowles, 1982; Mauro, 1990; Singer & Singer, 1990) suggest that parents are a 
poor source of information regarding imaginary companions and tend to have 
negative attitudes toward them. According to these views, parents either report 
inaccurate details regarding their child's companion, or demonstrate a bias against 
reporting its presence. 
However, subsequent interview research conducted by the author does not 
substantiate these views. Information gathered from interviews (conducted in study 
three of this thesis) with 37 NIC children from the present study, indicated that 
parents had provided accurate information regarding the absence of imaginary 
companions in their children. In all 37 cases children's responses to the interview 
questions confirmed the parent report data. Thus, it is argued that the reported 
prevalence rate of imaginary companions in the present study is an accurate 
reflection of the prevalence of imaginary companions among children generally, 
rather than an outcome of inaccuracies and biases. 
Additional information obtained by the author whilst conducting these 
interviews also indicated that parents do not have a negative attitude toward their 
child's IC, but view them as a positive manifestation of a remarkable imagination. 
These findings are corroborated in the present study that found only one parent 
considered the companion as "harmful to the child" compared to 66% who 
55 
considered the companion to be "good for the child" and 33% who considered that 
it had "no effect on the child". 
According to these findings, if the parents in the present study were 
reporting in a biased manner it would be a positive, rather than a negative bias. 
Thus, parental reports regarding the absence of imaginary companions in children 
reflect observation rather than a reluctance to report the existence of an imaginary 
companion. Indeed, whilst some researchers report evidence of some subjectivity in 
mothers' reports (e.g., Bates & Bayles, 1984) other researchers (e.g., Achenbach & 
Edelbrock, 1978) report evidence that mothers' reports reflect observable 
behaviours. As 80% of questionnaires in the present study were completed by 
mothers, it is not unreasonable to assume that their reporting was based on 
observation rather than subjective biases. 
In summary, this study in combination with previous imaginary companion 
research (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Manosevitz et al., 1973) suggests that birth 
order combined with personality characteristics such as imaginativeness and a 
predisposition to fantasy are significant factors in the presence of imaginary 
companions. In addition, the data that were obtained in this study support the 
interpretation that imaginary companions may function to alleviate loneliness and 
promote emotional and cognitive growth by creating a positive atmosphere for 
exploration (Singer & Singer, 1990). Moreover, the inclusion of older children in 
the sample suggests that ICs and their effects extend beyond the preschool years. 
However, there are two methodological issues that require discussion. First, 
a high proportion of the questionnaires was completed and returned from mothers 
who reported a higher education qualification. Consequently, the findings of this 
study may have been partially influenced by education level and may not be 
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applicable to children whose parents do not have this higher education qualification. 
Second, although the findings of the present study indicate that children with 
imaginary companions do not experience an increased number of behavioural 
problems compared to children without these companions, specific measurement 
methods and definitions for each behaviour were not given. As a consequence of 
this lack of specificity, conclusions regarding the relationship between the presence 
of imaginary companions and children's emotional experience cannot be 
determined. Consideration of the pertinence of this methodological issue to both the 
present study and previous research (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & Singer, 
1981; Svendsen, 1934) necessitated a more specific investigation of the emotional 
experiences of children with and without imaginary companions. Thus, the 
fearfulness, anxiety level, and temperament of IC and MC children across an 
extended age range (i.e., 3 years to 9 years), was examined in the next study. 
CHAPTER 3 
STUDY TWO 
3.1 Introduction 
The lack of systematic studies that specifically examine the relationship 
between the presence of imaginary companions and emotional factors of fear, 
anxiety, and temperament has produced inconsistencies in the interpretation of 
research findings that occur throughout the imaginary companion literature. Further, 
the lack of research utilising psychometrically sound instruments and theoretically 
derived definitions of fear, anxiety, and temperament has resulted in questionable 
conclusions regarding the relationship between these variables and the presence of 
imaginary companions. Thus, the present study was guided by the intention to 
adequately assess the fearfulness, anxiety, and temperament of children with 
imaginary companions using three standard assessment instruments. The basis of 
selection for each of these instruments will be discussed in turn. 
3.1.1 Fear 
Fear is considered to be an innate biologically driven condition that 
facilitates human survival with autonomic, cognitive and behavioural responses 
being aimed at either reducing contact with, or mastery of, a specific aversive 
stimulus (McCathie & Spence, 1991). According to developmental theorists (e.g., 
Jersild & Holmes, 1935; Jersild et al., 1933; 011endick, Matson, & Helsel, 1985) 
children experience similar patterns of fears within each developmental stage from 
infancy to adolescence, but the pattern differs across developmental stages. 
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Research findings (e.g., Gullone & King, 1992; 011endick et al., 1985) have 
substantiated this view and consequently assisted in the clinical differentiation 
between developmental (normative) fears and phobias. 
Gullone and King (1992) define normative fears as those that do not 
interfere with daily living and which are age specific and transitory. Typically, 
concrete and immediate fears are experienced by children within the 1 to 2 year age 
range; anticipatory or imaginative fears are experienced by children within the 4 to 8 
year age range; and fears associated with failure and social criticism are 
experienced by older children and adolescents (9 years to 18 years) (Gullone & 
King, 1992; Jersild & Holmes, 1935; Jersild et al., 1933; 011endick et al., 1985). 
However, whilst developmental trends in fear content have been consistently 
reported, gender differences and developmental trends in fear prevalence have not. 
According to Gullone (1992) these inconsistencies occur because of the utilisation 
of differing research methodologies (direct observation, parent report, and 
interview) (e.g., Eme & Schmidt, 1978; Jersild & Holmes, 1935; Lapouse & Monk, 
1959) that may not have accounted for the individualistic expression of fear and the 
influence of factors such as physical and cognitive development (Gullone & King, 
1992). 
Consideration of these limitations has resulted in the development and 
progressive refinement of a self-report methodology to investigate children's fears 
(Gullone & King, 1992). The most widely used instrument in this progressive 
refinement is the Fear Survey Schedule for Children (FSSC) (Scherer & 
Nakamura,1968). This instrument has formed the basis of numerous adaptations 
one of which was recently undertaken by Gullone and King (1992). Renamed the 
Fear Survey Schedule for Children - II (FSSC-II) the scale was amended to be more 
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suitable for Australian children and adolescents within the 13 to 18 year age range, 
and included updated items such as nuclear war and AIDS. 
The FSSC-II comprises 78 items for which respondents are instructed to 
rate their level of fear according to a 3-point scale (1 = not scared, 2 = scared and 
3 = very scared). Consistent with previous research (see 011endick, 1983; 
011endick, King, & Frary, 1989) Gullone and King (1992) obtained a five-factor 
solution: "Fear of Death and Danger", "Fear of the Unknown", "Fear of Failure and 
Criticism", "Animal Fears", and "Psychic Stress-Medical Fears". In addition, 
psychometric evaluation of the FS SC-II revealed a reliable and valid instrument that 
was applicable across closely related cultures and sensitive to age and gender 
differences (the number of self-reported fears decreased with increasing age, and 
girls self-reported more fears than boys). 
Despite these advances, the FSSC-II does not allow meaning -fill comparisons 
to be made with children younger than 7 years of age. Two reasons may account for 
this shortcoming. Firstly, the scale does not include many items of relevance to 
preschool, and secondly it is difficult to obtain reliable self-report for preschool 
children. 
Bouldin and Pratt (in press) addressed these concerns by modifying the 
FSSC-II to parent report and including items relevant to a younger developmental 
age period. Permission to modify the FSSC-II was obtained from Neville King 
(personal communication 25 th August, 1995). The Fear Survey Schedule for 
Children-II Parent (FS SC-IIP) developed by Bouldin and Pratt comprises 94 items 
for which parents are instructed to rate their child's level of fear according to a 4- 
point scale (0 = not applicable, 1 = not scared, 2 = scared and 3 = very scared). 
The not applicable and not scared categories were then coded as equivalent on the 
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basis that similar to the FSSC-II (Gullone & King, 1992), the purpose of the 
schedule was to identify situations known to cause fear at that time and both 
categories signaled that the child had not ever reacted as being scared in that 
situation. Thus, each category of response was assigned a score on a 3-point scale, 
where 1 corresponded to not scared or not applicable, 2 corresponded to scared, 
and 3 corresponded to very scared. These investigators obtained an eight-factor 
solution. As four of these factors were conceptually very similar to four of Gullone 
and King's (1992) factors, the factor names were retained. The four additional 
factors were named: "Mythical Creatures Fears", "Vulnerability Fears", "School 
Fears", and "Altered Environment Fears". 
Using the FSSC-IIP, Bouldin and Pratt report gender differences in the 
number of reported fears that are consistent with previous research (a greater 
number of parent-reported fears for girls compared to boys), as well as age 
differences not previously reported (a greater number of parent-reported fears for 
older children compared to younger children) (Gullone & King, 1992; King et al., 
1989; 011endick, 1983; 011endick et al., 1985). However, the authors suggest that 
this finding does not represent a contradiction of previous research findings, but 
rather an indication that children may experience increased fearfulness as a 
consequence of developmental changes. They further conclude that the amount of 
agreement that was achieved between their study and past research suggests the 
potential utility of the FSSC-IIP for the assessment of fearfulness in children. 
Consequently, the FSSC-ITI3 was utilised in the present study. 
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3.1.2 Anxiety 
Although theorists cannot agree on a definition of anxiety, there is general 
agreement on commonly accepted aspects of the concept such as the experience of 
an unpleasant affective state. One of the most widely accepted conceptualisations of 
anxiety is derived from Spielberger (1972) who differentiated between two types of 
anxiety: state anxiety and trait anxiety. State anxiety occurs in response to a 
particular situation and is therefore transitory. It is experienced as an unpleasant 
consciously perceived feeling of apprehension that occurs concomitantly with an 
increase in the arousal of the autonomic nervous system. In contrast, trait anxiety is 
considered to be a more permanent aspect of an individual's personality. It reflects 
an individual's predisposition to experience anxiety even in situations where the 
stimulus for evoking anxiety is relatively weak. Consequently, these individual's 
experience of anxiety is more lasting and can occur across a variety of settings. 
The necessity for an objective and separate measure of anxiety prompted 
Taylor (1951) to develop a scale that measured trait anxiety in adults. Using 
selected items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; 
Hathaway & McKinley, 1942) Taylor devised the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS). 
The experimental and clinical usefulness of this measure in identifying adults with 
chronic anxiety reactions resulted in a modification of the scale for children. 
Renamed the Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (CMAS; Castaneda, McCandless, 
& Palermo, 1956) the inventory used items from the MAS and reworded them to be 
more appropriate for children. Following administration of the new 53-item scale to 
primary school children, Castaneda et al. (1956) found that it measured a general 
anxiety factor and incorporated a lie scale. 
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Despite extensive use of the CMAS by clinicians and researchers, as well as 
its usefulness in identifying both the specific nature and extent of anxiety 
experienced by children, the scale was criticised on three accounts: a) for being 
psychometrically unsound (Flanagan, Peters, & Conry, 1969), b) for not assessing 
enough areas of anxiety in children, and c) for being too difficult for young children 
to understand (Reynolds & Richmond, 1978). 
Addressing these concerns, Reynolds and Richmond (1978) revised the 
CMAS and developed the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS). 
Originally developed to measure trait anxiety in children and adolescents aged six 
years to 19 years, the scale was later successfully extended to include preschool 
children within the four year to six year age range (Reynolds, Bradley, & Steele, 
1980). 
Subtitled "What I Think and Feel", the RCMAS is a 37-item self-report 
instrument that includes 28 anxiety and 9 "lie scale" items. Each of these items 
describe either an action or a feeling (e.g., "I wiggle in my seat a lot", "I feel that 
others do not like the way I do things") and children are asked to indicate whether 
the item is descriptive of the their actions or feelings by circling either "Yes" or 
Children's anxiety level is then measured according to a global measure of 
anxiety (represented by the Total Anxiety score), and three sub scales of anxiety: 
Physiological Anxiety, Worry-oversensitivity Anxiety, and Concentration Anxiety; 
that have been consistently identified in previous factor analytic studies of the scale 
(Finch, Kendall, & Montgomery, 1974; Reynolds & Paget, 1981; Reynolds & 
Richmond, 1978, 1979). Normative scores segregated by ethnicity, gender, and age 
have also been calculated and are presented in a manual that accompanies the 
63 
RCMAS (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). These authors advise that scores 1 
standard deviation (SD) above or below the mean scores of the normative sample 
are significant enough to warrant further consideration. 
Psychometric evaluation using alpha coefficients has revealed that the 
RCMAS has high internal consistency (> .80) and test-retest reliability for the Total 
Anxiety Scale (> .90) across a broad age range, gender, and ethnicity (Reynolds & 
Richmond, 1985). In addition, examination of the construct validity of the RCMAS 
revealed a significant correlation (.85) between the Total Anxiety scores from this 
scale and the Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAIC; Spielberger, 
1973), supporting the validity of the RCMAS as a measure of trait anxiety 
(Reynolds, 1980, 1985). 
Although it was recognised that the adaptation of an assessment instrument 
can alter its psychometric properties, the reliability and validity of the original 
RCMAS indicated its potential usefulness as a parent report instrument for use in 
the present study. Adaptation of the RCMAS for parent report (RCMAS-P) 
involved rewording the 37 items more objectively. For example, "I have trouble 
making up my mind" was reworded to "Has trouble making up his/her mind". 
Permission to modify the RCMAS was obtained from Western Psychological 
Services (official communication 5 fll September, 1995). Parents were asked to rate 
whether each of the 37 items were representative of how they perceive their child 
usually thinks and feels by circling either "Yes" or "No". 
3.1.3 Temperament  
The definition of temperament that underlies most recent research refers to 
intrinsic behavioural characteristics that appear early in development, are relatively 
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stable across time and situations, and can be modified through interaction with the 
environment (Buss & Plomin, 1975; Goldsmith & Campos, 1982; Thomas & Chess, 
1977). 
A major influence on the study of temperament has been the work of 
Thomas and Chess (1977). These investigators defined temperament as the how 
rather than the what (content) or why (motivation) of behaviour and proposed a 
transactional or "goodness of fit" model of temperament. This model acknowledges 
the interaction between individual intrinsic behavioural characteristics and the 
environment, and the effect that this interaction has on these characteristics 
(Pedlow, Sanson, Prior, & Oberklaid, 1993; Prior, 1992). 
In addition, Thomas and Chess and associates in the New York Longitudinal 
Study (NYLS) (e.g., Thomas & Chess, 1977) developed a definition of the concept 
of temperament in terms of nine dimensions: Activity Levels, Adaptability, 
Approach/Withdrawal, Threshold of Response, Quality of Mood, Distractibility, 
Persistence, and Rhythmicity. This conceptualisation combined with the research 
work undertaken by the NYLS has formed the basis for numerous studies (e.g.,' 
Carey & McDevitt, 1978; Fullard, McDevitt, & Carey, 1984; Keogh, 1983; Prior, 
Sanson, & Oberklaid, 1989). 
One such study is the Australian Temperament Project (ATP) (Prior et al., 
1989). This longitudinal study investigated the continuity and stability of 
temperament structure in a large sample from infancy to eight years of age using 
questionnaires based on the nine dimensional model of temperament proposed by 
Thomas and Chess (1977). Factor analysis of these questionnaires resulted in a 
series of new short form parent report questionnaires, one of which is the Short 
Temperament Scale for Children (STSC; Prior et al., 1989). 
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The STSC is a 30-item parent report inventory that enables the assessment 
of temperament style in Australian children and provides norms for three 
developmental age periods: 3 years 5 months to 4 years 5 months, 4 years 10 
months to 6 years 6 months, and 6 years 8 months to 8 years 3 months. Each item 
describes childhood behaviour in specific situations such as completing a puzzle or 
compliance with parental advice. Parents are asked to rate their child's behaviour on 
each item according to a 6-point scale, where 1 corresponds to almost never and 6 
corresponds to almost always. 
Following completion of the inventory, each child's temperament style is 
classified on four dimensions: Approach (approach vs. withdrawal from new people 
and situations), persistence (tendency to persevere with tasks or activities), 
rhytlunicity (regularity of biological and behavioural functions), and inflexibility (a 
combination of cooperation-manageability and irritability factors). The scores on 
three of these dimensions (approach, persistence, and inflexibility) are then 
combined to form a continuous easy-difficult scale that permits the classification of 
each child's overall temperament style without losing any information. A cut-off of 
1 SD above and below the mean score on this scale is used as a classification cut-
off. Subsequent research by the authors has found the scale to be a reliable and valid 
instrument with test-retest reliability ranging from .77 for inflexibility to .90 for 
approach (Prior et al., 1989; Sanson, Prior, Garino, Oberldaid, & Sewell, 1987). 
Consequently, the scale was utilised in the present study. 
In summary, a review of the development of the FSSC-IIP, the RCMAS, 
and STSC indicates that these instruments have good psychometric properties and 
utilise theoretically approved definitions and standard assessment procedures. 
Consideration of these issues, the methodological problems associated with 
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previous imaginary companion studies investigating fear, anxiety, and temperament, 
and the aims of the thesis resulted in the utilisation of these instruments in the 
present study. 
The aim of this study was to investigate systematically the association of 
fear, anxiety, and temperament with the presence or absence of imaginary 
companions using standard data collection methods and reliable instruments. 
Whereas the contradictions in the literature discussed above prevent clear 
predictions being made regarding the association of these factors with the presence 
of imaginary companions, as an exploratory study, it was expected that the use of 
systematic procedures, as well as instruments specifically designed to evaluate fear, 
anxiety, and temperament would clarify the relationship between these factors and 
the presence of imaginary companions. Clarification of this relationship was 
expected to provide more insight regarding the role of imaginary companions in 
children's emotional development. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants  
The participants were 37 mothers of children who have or who have had 
imaginary companions (IC children; M age = 6 years and 0 months; range = 3 years 
and 2 months to 8 years and 6 months) and 37 mothers of children without 
imaginary companions (NIC children; M age = 6 years and 1 month; range = 3 years 
and 2 months to 8 years and 7 months) who had participated in study one and 
expressed an interest in participating in study three. Each child's IC or NIC status 
was verified by direct questioning by the author. There were 19 girls and 18 boys in 
each of the IC and NIC groups. 
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3.2.2 Behavioural Measures  
The present study used three instruments to measure parents' perceptions 
of childhood behaviour._ These measures were: (a) the Fear Survey Schedule for 
Children - II Parent (FS SC-IEP; Bouldin & Pratt, in press), (b) the Revised 
Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale which was adapted for parent report (RCMAS; 
Reynolds & Richmond, 1985), and (c) the Short Temperament Scale for Children 
(STSC; Prior et al., 1989; Sanson et al., 1987). 
3.2.3 Procedure  
All 74 mothers were initially contacted by phone. During this initial contact, 
mothers were given a brief explanation of the study and offered the opportunity to 
participate in the research. Mothers were also given a brief outline of the child 
interview that formed the basis of the next study and offered the opportunity for 
their child to participate in the research. If mothers agreed to participate, a one hour 
home visit was arranged. 
During the visit and prior to commencement of the data collection, a brief 
explanation regarding the purpose of the interview and of each of the scales was 
given. General instructions regarding the completion of the FSSC-IIP, RCMAS-P, 
and STSC were also given. Subsequent to these explanations, all mothers were 
invited to ask any questions they had regarding either study, as well as confirm their 
understanding regarding the purpose and completion of the scales. Following this 
sequence, mothers who agreed for both themselves and their child to participate 
signed a written consent form (see Appendix B1). 
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During completion of the scales, mothers were encouraged to request 
clarification on any issue including the meaning of specific items or methods of 
rating specific items. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Analyses  
Pearson product-moment coefficients of correlation were initially calculated 
to investigate the magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variables 
(fear, anxiety, and temperament). Although it was recognised that there may be 
some overlap between these variables, statistical tests were selected conceptually on 
the assumption that the scales would largely "tap" distinct areas. Hence three 
multivariate analyses of covariance (MANCOVA) were planned. However in order 
to test this assumption, correlation coefficients were considered. Moreover, age was 
used as a covariate because only the effects of IC status on the dependent variables 
was desired. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
3.3.1.1 Correlation analysis.  
Pearson product-moment coefficients of correlation were calculated on the 
total fear, anxiety, and temperament scores. The correlations are presented in Table 
3.1. Small but significant correlations were found between fear and anxiety, and 
between temperament and anxiety. The correlation between fear and temperament 
was not significant. 
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Table 3.1 
Intercorrelations Among Fear, Anxiety, and Temperament (N = 74) 
Fear 	 Anxiety 	Temperament 
Fear 
Anxiety 	 .39** 
Temperament 	 .09 	 .30** 
* *R < .01. 
Although these findings indicate some overlap between variables, it was 
decided for the purpose of clarity to continue with the planned analyses of the data 
using three separate MANCOVAs. 
3.3.1.2 Multivariate analyses.  
IC and MC children's reported levels of fearfulness, anxiety, and 
temperament were examined in three separate between subjects repeated measures 
MANCOVAs. For each of the analyses results of the evaluation of homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, homogeneity of regression, and multicollinearity was 
satisfactory. The results of these evaluations are presented in Appendix B2. As 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices could be guaranteed for each of the 
three analyses, Wilks' criterion was used to evaluate multivariate significance. Age 
is recognised as being an adequately reliable variable for covariance analysis 
(Tabachnick & Fidel!, 1989). 
3.3.2 Fear 
A summary of the means and standard deviations for all fear scores is 
presented in Table 3.2. A between subjects (IC/NIC) repeated measures 
MANCOVA was performed on the eight individual fear scores that comprise the 
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overall measure of fearfulness. After adjusting for age, the combined DVs were not 
significantly affected by IC status, F (7, 66) = 1.55, = .17. 
Table 3.2 
Mean Scores on Each of the Eight Factors and Total Fear for IC and MC Children 
(N = 74)  
Factor IC 
(n = 37) 
MC Total 
(n_ = 37) 
Factor 1 37.30 (4.22) 36.89 (5.25) 37.09 (4.73) 
Factor 2 17.73 (2.67) 16.30 (2.68) 17.01 (2.75) 
Factor 3 24.78 (4.65) 24.11 (4.33) 24.45 (4.47) 
Factor 4 11.38 (3.34) 11.30 (2.85) 11.34 (3.08) 
Factor 5 7.87 (2.42) 7.41 (2.33) 7.64 (2.37) 
Factor 6 8.84 (2.48) 8.27 (2.16) 8.55 (2.32) 
Factor 7 7.24 (1.30) 7.05 (1.49) 7.15 (1.39) 
Factor 8 5.62 (0.92) 5.43 (0.65) 5.53 (0.80) 
Total 120.76 (14.49) 116.76 (13.73) 118.76 (14.16) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3.3.3 Anxiety  
A summary of the means and standard deviations for all anxiety scores is 
presented in Table 3.3. A between subjects (IC/NIC) repeated measures 
MANCOVA was performed on the four components of anxiety (concentration 
anxiety, physiological anxiety, oversensitivity and worry, and the lie scale) that 
comprise the overall measure of anxiety. 
After adjusting for age, the combined DVs were significantly affected by IC 
status, F (3, 70) = 3.19, a < .05. ICs were reported to experience a significantly 
higher overall level of anxiety than NICs. However, the strength of the relationship 
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between the adjusted combined DVs and IC status was relatively weak with i 2 = 
.06. 
Table 3.3 
Mean Scores for Each Anxiety Component and Total Anxiety for IC and MC 
Children (N = 74)  
Anxiety Components IC 
(11 = 37) 
MC Total 
(11=37) 
Concentration 0.43 (0.96) 0.70 (1.10) 0.57 (1.03) 
Physiological anxiety 2.76 (1.95) 2.68 (1.92) 2.72 (1.92) 
Worry-oversensitivity 3.27 (2.21) 2.21 (1.60) 2.74 (1.99) 
Lie 3.00 (2.19) 2.32 (2.03) 2.66 (2.12) 
Total anxiety score 9.73 (4.36)* 8.22 (4.18)* 8.97 (4.31) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*p < .05. 
Because of the correlations among the anxiety components (see Table 3.4) a 
stepdown analysis was performed to determine which of these components made a 
contribution to predicting differences between ICs and NICs. This analysis revealed 
that after adjusting for differences in age, worry-oversensitivity anxiety made a 
significant contribution to detecting differences between ICs' and NICs' overall 
level of anxiety, stepdown F (1,71) = 4.32, p < .05, ri 2 = .04. Children with ICs 
were reported to experience more worry-oversensitivity anxiety (adjusted mean = 
4.41) than children without ICs (adjusted mean = 3.53). After the pattern of 
differences measured by worry-oversensitivity and physiological anxiety were 
accounted for, concentration anxiety was also found to make a significant 
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contribution to detecting differences between ICs' and NICs' overall level of 
anxiety, stepdown F (1,71) = 6.95, p < .05, ri 2 = .06. Children with ICs were 
reported to experience more concentration anxiety after adjustment for age 
(adjusted mean = 1.87) than children without ICs (adjusted mean = 1.01). The 
pooled within-cell correlations among the DVs and the covariate age are presented 
in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
Pooled Within-cell Correlations Among the Four Dependent Variables and Age 
Worry 
Physiol 
Conc 
Lie 
Age 
Worry 
1.93 
0.31 
0.37 
-0.06 
0.06 
Physiol 
1.93 
0.43 
-0.21 
-0.20 
Conc 
0.27 
-0.84 
0.14 
Lie 
2.11 
-0.01 
Age 
0.46 
Note. Worry = worry-oversensitivity anxiety; Physiol = physiological anxiety; Conc 
= concentration anxiety. 
3.3.4 Temperament  
A summary of the means and standard deviations for the four temperament 
scores and the total temperament score is presented in Table 3.5. A between 
subjects (IC/NIC) MANCOVA was performed on the four dimensions of 
temperament (approach, inflexibility, persistence, and rhythmicity) that comprise an 
overall temperament score. However, as the easy-difficult dimension is an average 
of the three DVs (approach + inflexibility + persistence) that precede it in the 
analysis, it would be inappropriate to include this dimension in the MANCOVA. 
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Thus, in order to determine whether differences exist between ICs and NICs on the 
easy-difficult dimension, a t-test was performed. 
Table 3.5 
Mean Scores on the Four Temperament Dimensions and Total Temperament for IC 
and NIC Children (N = 74)  
Temperament 
Dimension 
IC 
(n = 37) 
NIC Total 
(n = 37) 
Approach 3.54 (0.38) 3.68 (0.46) 3.61 (0.42) 
Inflexibility 3.03 (0.78) 3.27 (0.71) 3.15 (0.75) 
Persistence 3.96 (0.72) 3.92 (0.85) 3.94 (0.78) 
Rhythmicity 3.73 (0.42) 3.82 (0.45) 3.78 (0.44) 
Total 14.26 (1.36) 14.69 (0.84) 14.48 (0.81) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
The MANCOVA revealed that after adjusting for age, the combined DVs 
were not significantly affected by IC status, F (3, 70) = .41, = .75. 
Scores on the easy-difficult dimension were computed from the sum of 
approach, inflexibility and persistence for each IC and NIC group. The mean scores 
on the easy-difficult dimension were then calculated for each IC and NIC group. A 
t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between these means (IC 
easy-difficult, M = 3.51, SID = 0.36; MC easy-difficult, M = 3.62, SD= 3.57; t(72) 
= .92, p = .08; Levene test, p = .66). 
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of the study was to use systematic investigative methods and 
assessment instruments to clarify the relationship between the presence of imaginary 
companions and fearfulness, anxiety, and temperament. Utilising the FSSC-IIP, 
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RCMAS-P, and the STSC to investigate these factors, the study found reported 
differences in IC and MC children's level of anxiety but not in their fearfulness and 
temperament. 
This study found differences in the anxiety level of children with imaginary 
companions that have not been reported previously (e.g., Mauro, 1990; Meyer & 
Tuber, 1989; Singer & Singer, 1981). Children with imaginary companions were 
reported to experience a higher overall level of anxiety than children without these 
companions. Additional analyses using the stepdown procedure revealed that 
concentration anxiety and worry-oversensitivity anxiety were the sub-components 
that contributed to the difference in the anxiety score. 
According to Reynolds and Richmond (1985) high worry-oversensitivity 
anxiety scores suggest that a child is afraid or oversensitive to the environment and 
tends to internalise this anxiety until they become overburdened with it. High 
concentration anxiety scores suggest that a child is concerned that they are not as 
capable as other children and cannot meet the expectations of significant others. 
However, the anxiety scores of children with imaginary companions, 
although higher than the scores of children without companions, were within 1 SD 
above the normative scores. According to Reynolds and Richmond (1985) scores 
that do not exceed 1 SD above the mean do not require further attention. This 
interpretation suggests that the increased anxiety which was reported for children 
with imaginary companions may be indicative of a tendency to experience anxiety 
rather than a chronic anxiety that requires attention. 
Whilst it is recognised that there are no grounds to draw conclusions about 
cause and effect, it may be speculated that the interpretation of the anxiety scores 
combined with the findings of the present study suggests that children with 
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imaginary companions have an inwardly directed attitude and sensitivity to the 
expectations of others that results in a form of fantasy that at once personifies, and 
defends them against their anxious tendencies. Thus, one function of the imaginary 
companion may be to reduce anxiety in children who are predisposed to experience 
it. 
Further, the reported worry-oversensitivity of children with imaginary 
companions suggests that these children may have a tendency to experience 
increased anxiety in new situations. The degree of interrelationship between fear 
and anxiety that was found in this study and in previous research (King, Gullone, & 
011endick, 1992; 011endick, 1983) suggests the applicability of cognitive-affective 
theory to anxiety. Within the framework of this theory, these results suggest that 
imaginary companions may promote emotional and cognitive growth by reducing 
the anxiety associated with a new situation, thus creating a positive atmosphere for 
exploration and play (Singer & Singer, 1990). 
However, there are additional findings that require discussion. The strength 
of the relationship between overall anxiety, the anxiety sub-components and the 
presence of imaginary companions was found to be relatively weak. There are two 
possible reasons that may account for this finding. First, children with imaginary 
companions have an increased predisposition to experience trait anxiety but this is 
very slight and the imaginary companion does not greatly reduce this anxiety. 
Second, children with imaginary companions are predisposed to experience 
trait anxiety at levels that may cause distress but the companion functions to reduce 
these anxiety levels. This interpretation is derived from Singer and Singer's (1981) 
reported observation that the presence of the imaginary companion in preschool 
children was a predictor that these children would experience reduced anxiety in 
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later play sessions and play happily in preschool. However, as Singer and Singer did 
not utilise standard assessment instruments specifically devised to measure trait 
anxiety, direct comparisons between the findings of the present study and those 
reported by these investigators cannot be made. In addition, any speculation 
regarding the strength of association between anxiety and imaginary companions 
and the possible anxiety reducing function of these companions has a tendency to 
become circular. Thus, until further research is conducted that can clarify this issue 
only tentative conclusions can be made regarding the extent to which the imaginary 
companion reduces anxiety. 
The present study found that parents did not report any differences in the 
fearfulness of children with and without imaginary companions. Children with 
imaginary companions were not found to experience higher levels of fearfulness 
compared to children without these companions. These findings are similar to those 
obtained in previous imaginary companion research (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; 
Singer & Singer, 1981) although the extent to which they can be directly compared 
to previous findings is limited because of differing data collection methods and the 
inadequate assessment and definition of fearfulness (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973). 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study indicate that fearfulness is not 
associated with the presence of imaginary companions. Reports of the increased 
fearfulness of children with imaginary companions in previous research (e.g., 
Inuzuka et al., 1991; Svendsen, 1934) suggest that fearfulness may have been 
reported where anxiety was indicated. The inseparable treatment of these two 
factors in previous imaginary companion research (e.g., Svendsen, 1934), as well as 
similarity in the physiological, and hence behavioural responses to fear and anxiety 
(Graham, 1990; Reynolds & Richmond, 1985) may have produced reports that 
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were based on erroneous assumptions. Thus, it could be concluded that previous 
reports of the increased fearfulness of children with imaginary companions may 
have been a misinterpretation of behavioural responses, rather than a true indication 
' of fearfulness. 
This study also found that parent reports regarding the temperament of 
children with and without imaginary companions were not significantly different. 
This finding contrasts with previous research by Mauro (1990) who found that 
children with imaginary companions were less shy and more able to focus their 
attention than children without these companions. These contrasting research 
findings may be attributed to sampling and instrument design differences. The 
present study used a questionnaire that assessed children's temperament on a 
smaller number of dimensions than that used by Mauro. 
In addition, the age range of the children in the Mauro study differed to the 
age range of the children in the present study. The youngest children in the Mauro 
study were 5-years of age compared to the inclusion of 3-year-olds in this study. 
According to Prior et al. (1989) although temperamental characteristics are stable 
across age, the relative significance of these characteristics may change with age. 
For example, irritability is a distinct aspect of temperament in 3-year-olds but is not 
a distinct aspect of temperament in 4-year-olds. Thus, some of the temperament 
differences that were obtained by Mauro may not have been distinct aspects of 
temperament in the younger children in this study. 
However, it is interesting to note that in both the Mauro and the present 
study, children with imaginary companions were not reported to have a difficult 
temperament. These findings refute the conclusions made by early imaginary 
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companion researchers (e.g., Svendsen, 1934) that these children are 
temperamentally difficult. 
In summary, the present study found that only slightly elevated anxiety 
scores were associated with the presence of imaginary companions. These findings 
were interpreted to indicate that one function of the imaginary companion may be to 
alleviate anxiety in children who are predisposed to experience it. However, claims 
regarding findings from parent report should be treated with caution until they are 
directly compared to children's self-reports. Thus, future research should directly 
compare the self-reported fears and anxieties of children with and without imaginary 
companions with parents' reports of their children's fears and anxieties. In addition, 
as the study adapted the RCMAS and FSSC-II for parent report, future research 
should investigate the psychometric properties of these adapted instruments. 
Although psychometric evaluation of these instruments is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, indications in the present study that children with imaginary 
companions internalise their anxieties and use a fantasy figure to reduce the impact 
of these anxieties suggests that these children have a predisposition to engage in 
fantasy. This predisposition is investigated in the next study. 
CHAPTER 4 
STUDY THREE 
4.1 Introduction 
One belief that is restated throughout the imaginary companion literature is 
that children with imaginary companions enjoy an enriched fantasy life (e.g., Ames 
& Learned, 1946; Nagera, 1969; Svendsen, 1934). This belief has been 
substantiated by recent research findings (e.g., Taylor et al., 1993) that children 
with imaginary companions spontaneously engage in fantasy play. Evidence for 
these children's predisposition to fantasy was also found in study one of this thesis. 
In that study, children with imaginary companions were more often reported to 
make up stories of mythical beings, involve these beings in play, and explain events 
as magical compared to children without these companions. 
From a cognitive perspective (Piaget, 1962; Singer, 1973) fantasy play, 
daydreaming, and dreaming all evolve from the same mental processes, with fantasy 
play considered to be the earlier developmental form. Children use fantasy play to 
make sense of their world. Within this arena, children reduce complex material to 
small packets so that it can be explored and manipulated until through repetition in 
the game, each element of the material is assimilated into the child's available 
schemas. Thus, according to Singer (1973) fantasy play reflects the continual 
private rehearsal process that children use to gain control over their symbolic 
representation system. Children's ability to form, recombine, store, and integrate 
images over time is reflected in their fantasy play, which in turn reflects a general 
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imaginative predisposition (Singer, 1973, 1977). Research findings (e.g., Singer, 
1961, 1973; Singer & Singer, 1981) that children who reported extensive 
engagement in fantasy play were also those who were more imaginative, provides 
partial substantiation for this view. 
Despite these findings, Rosenfeld, Huesmann, Eron, and Tomey-Purta 
(1982) claimed that the concept of imaginative predisposition did not account for 
children's differing styles of fantasy play and daydreaming. Consideration of this 
issue prompted the authors to devise the Children's Fantasy Inventory (CFI). 
Comprising 45 items, the CFI asks children to rate their experience of daydreams, 
dreams, and pretend play on a 3-point scale for items 1- 39 (0 = p , = a little and 
2 = a lot) and on a 4-point scale for items 40 - 45 (0 = never, 1 = sometimes not  
every day, 2 = one time a day, and 3 = many times a day). 
Administration of this scale to 713 children between the ages of six years 
and nine years revealed that children's style of play could be differentiated on nine 
dimensions: "Frequency of Imaginative Activity", "Aggressive Fantasy", "Fanciful 
Fantasy", "Absorption in Fantasy" "Scary Fantasy", "Vividness of Fantasy", 
"Intellectual Fantasy", "Active-Heroic Fantasy", and "Dysphoric Fantasy". In 
addition, psychometric evaluation of the inventory revealed a reliable and valid 
instrument that was sensitive to age and gender differences. Reliability alphas of 
each scale ranged from .42 (Absorption) to .70 (Frequency) and test-retest 
correlations ranged from .39 (Absorption) to .67 (Intellectual). Examination of the 
construct validity of the CFI revealed significant correlations between scores on 
the nine dimensions and two previously developed measures of fantasy in children. 
Rosenfeld et al. (1982) concluded that the CFI is a reliable and valid measure of 
children's fantasy behaviours. 
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The results of the Rosenfeld et al. (1982) study are of particular interest in 
imaginary companion research for two reasons. First, reports such as the vividness 
with which children can describe their companions (e.g., Svendsen, 1934), the 
tendency of children with imaginary companions to engage in more mature levels of 
pretense (e.g., Taylor et al., 1993), and the intense emotions that are associated 
with the presence of the companion (e.g., Hurlock & Burstein, 1932) indicate that a 
non-specific measure of fantasy predisposition would not adequately assess the type 
of imaginative activity that these children engage in. 
Second, previous research (e.g., Singer, 1961) that has investigated the 
fantasy predisposition of children with imaginary companions has assessed this 
tendency using the non-specific concept of imaginative predisposition. Moreover, as 
noted in section 1.3 this assessment was conducted indirectly as children with these 
companions may have been grouped together with those who had reported either a 
high fantasy, or a low fantasy involvement. Thus, although there are suggestions in 
the literature (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Somers & Yawkey, 1984) that children 
with imaginary companions are predisposed to engage in fantasy, there has been 
very little empirical research specifically investigating this issue. 
The aim of the present study was to compare the predisposition to fantasy of 
children with and without imaginary companions. Specifically, the study sought to 
explore the feasibility of interviewing children with and without imaginary 
companions as a method of assessing these children's tendency to engage in 
fantasy. It was expected that the interview would indicate an association between 
the presence of imaginary companions and children's predisposition to fantasy. In 
addition, the inclusion of items from the CFI was expected to indicate differences in 
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the fantasy style of children that are related to the presence or absence of imaginary 
companions. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants  
The participants were 37 children who have or who have had imaginary 
companions (IC; M age = 6 years and 0 months; range = 3 years and 2 months to 8 
years and 6 months) and 37 children without imaginary companions (NIC; M age = 
6 years and 1 month; range = 3 years and 2 months to 8 years and 7 months) whose 
parents had participated in study two. There were 19 girls and 18 boys in each of 
the IC and MC groups. 
4.2.2 Children's Predisposition to Fantasy Interview  
For the purposes of the present study, a structured interview, the Children's 
Predisposition to Fantasy Interview (CPFI) was developed to measure children's 
fantasy involvement in five areas: dreams, daydreams, scary thoughts, involvement 
in pretend games, and the possible presence of imaginary companions. The CPFI 
comprised 21 items, 12 of which were incorporated from the Children's Fantasy 
Inventory (CFI; Rosenfeld et al., 1982) and nine additional items. A copy of the 
CPFI is presented in Appendix Cl. 
The 12 items from the CFI were selected from four of the nine factors 
identified by Rosenfeld et al. (1982). These included: five items from the 
"Frequency of Imaginative Activity" scale, two items from the "Fanciful Fantasy" 
scale, two items from the "Scary Fantasy" scale, and three items from the 
"Vividness of Fantasy" scale. These items were selected because they were 
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considered relevant to a younger age group and to provide information regarding 
children's tendency to engage in fantasy. 
Each of these items was incorporated into the CPFI in a modified form. This 
modification included rewording items and phrases to suit younger children (e.g., 
rewording daydream to pictures in your head). A list of these modified items and 
the factors from which they were selected is presented in Appendix C2. 
The nine additional items were designed to obtain descriptive information in 
each of the five areas. Two of these nine items were specifically devised as 
alternative or prompt questions which were to be asked if the child did not appear 
to understand the original form of the question (e.g., the alternative to "Do you 
have dreams when you are asleep at night?" was "Do you see the pictures in your 
head when you are asleep at night?"). 
4.2.3 Procedure  
The process of obtaining mothers' consent for their child to participate in 
the study was outlined in chapter three. 
Prior to commencement of the interview each child was offered the 
following explanation: 
(child's name) I'm going to ask you a few questions about the kinds of 
dreams you have and the games you like to play. If you can't answer then 
that's OK, but I'd really like you to try hard because I really need your help. 
OK? 
All children were then asked about their dreams, daydreams, scary thoughts, 
pretend games, and whether they currently had an imaginary companion. The 
interview was concluded if the child responded "yes" to the imaginary companion 
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question and the author could satisfactorily conclude that the child's imaginary 
companion conformed to the definition offered by Svendsen (1934). If the child 
'replied "no" to this question, they were asked if they had ever had a companion 
before the interview was concluded. 
Information concerning the number of children who reported having an 
imaginary companion has been included because initial participation was based on 
parent report. The complete agreement that was found in the present study between 
parents' reports and children's reports regarding the presence of an IC refutes 
suggestions in the literature that parents under report the presence of these 
companions (e.g., Mauro, 1990). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 IC Status  
Children's reports regarding the presence or absence of an IC were exactly 
the same as those reported by their parents. Of the 37 children for whom parents 
had reported the presence of an imaginary companion, 19 children stated when 
asked that they had a companion at present and 18 children stated that they had had 
one in the past. Of the 37 children whose parents reported that their child did not 
have a companion, all 37 children stated when asked that they did not and had never 
had an imaginary companion. 
4.3.2 Analyses  
Initial analysis of the CPFI was conducted using content analysis (Weber, 
1990). Frequency data from the subsequent categorical variables were initially cast 
into 2x2 (df = 1) and larger (df > 1) contingency tables and analysed using chi- 
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square (x, 2 ) tests. Application of this test for frequencies in the contingency tables 
was undertaken according to the following criteria. Chi square tests were performed 
when the sample size ranged between 20 and 40 and all expected frequencies were 
five or more. These were corrected for continuity to improve the accuracy of the 
tests. Fisher exact probability tests were performed when the sample size ranged 
between 20 and 40 and expected frequencies were less than five (Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988). 
Chi square tests for frequencies in larger contingency tables were performed 
only if less than 20 percent of the cells (i.e., one cell) had expected frequencies of 
less than five and none of the cells had an expected frequency less than one. If the 
expected frequencies fell below this criterion, categories were combined to increase 
their values. As a result of this, all contingency tables larger than 2x2 were reduced 
to 2x2. The resultant contingency tables were then analysed using the previously 
specified criteria. Because analyses were conducted using 2x2 contingency tables, 
the Phi coefficient (4:1) was used to measure the strength of the association between 
variables (Diekhoff, 1992; Howell, 1987; Siegel & Castellan, 1988). As outlined in 
section 2.3.1 of study one, an upper alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests although significant findings at this level should be interpreted with caution. 
4.3.2.1 Coding.  
Children's audio taped responses to each question on the CPFI were 
transcribed and coded. Consideration of all responses given by the children resulted 
in a classification system that enabled responses to be classified according to four 
major categories. That is, responses were categorised according to confirmation 
(yes, no, or sometimes) memory (remember or can't remember) mood (happy, sad, 
or happy and sad) and composition (mythical, fictional, and realistic). Within each 
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of the confirmation, memory, and mood categories a child's response could only be 
assigned to one of the subcategories. For example, a child's response to 
confirmation would be either "yes" or "no" or "sometimes". In contrast, 
composition responses could include reference to more than one of the 
subcategories. For example, a child's description of daydreams could include 
mythical and fictional and realistic elements. 
The descriptive content of dreams, daydreams, scary thoughts, and pretend 
games was classified according to the type of detail that the child supplied. 
Descriptions were judged to have a mythical quality when the child described 
mythical items that belonged to a generic group of non-existent beings (e.g., fairies, 
dragons, and monsters), a fictional quality when the child referred to specific 
fictional characters (e.g., cartoon characters, Peter Pan), and a realistic quality when 
the child referred to beings that exist (e.g., animals, parents). Details regarding the 
classification of children's responses is provided in the code book in Appendix C3. 
4.3.2.2 Reliability.  
Reliability was established for all responses on the CPFI by two independent 
judges. The judges were both university students. One judge was a postgraduate 
student with a psychology major who was recruited through the psychology 
department. The other judge was an undergraduate student with extensive 
experience working with young children who was recruited through a general notice 
board advertisement. 
Each judge was provided with a code book (see Appendix C3) that 
provided sample definitions and protocols for scoring children's responses to each 
question on the CPFI. Following explanations regarding each protocol, judges 
completed a sample interview using the coding procedure. 
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Inter-judge agreement between two judges who independently scored 20% 
of all protocols was calculated using Cohen's kappa coefficient (Bakeman & 
Gottman, 1997). The inter-judge agreement for this study ranged from .80 for 
dreams to .86 for pretend games. Any areas of disagreement were resolved through 
discussion. 
4.3.3 Analyses of Categorical Variables  
The number of responses that were analysed did not always sum to the 
number of subjects in each group (37). The reason for this disparity is that some 
questions comprised a series where the response to the first question indicated 
whether subsequent questions should be asked. Thus, the number of responses in 
the first question in the series (e.g., Qla, in the series Qla, Q lb, & Qlc) will sum to 
the number of subjects in each group (37); responses in the subsequent questions in 
the series will either sum to the number of "yes" and "sometimes" responses in the 
first question, or the number of "remember" responses in the memory category of 
the subsequent question. Questions that comprised a series are identified by a 
number followed by a letter of the alphabet (e.g., Q2b is part of the series Q2a, 
Q2c, Q2d, & Q2e). 
In addition, as the number of "sometimes" responses was low, it was 
considered indicative of an affirmative response and recoded to equal "yes" for the 
analysis. 
4.3.3.1 Dreams.  
The dreaming activity of ICs and NICs is summarised in Table 4.1. The 
number of ICs and NICs who reported that they experienced dreams at night was 
not significantly different. Of those ICs and NICs who reported experiencing 
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dreams, memory for dreams, fictional and realistic dream content, and dream mood 
did not significantly differ between the two groups. However, a significantly larger 
number of ICs than NICs reported mythical dream content, x, 2 (1, n = 38) = 5.22, g 
<.05; .37. 
Table 4.1 
The Number of IC and NEC Children's Responses to Questions Concerned with 
Dreams  
Question 	 IC 
(Li = 37) 
MC 
(ii = 37) 
Dreams 
Q1 A. Do you have dreams at night? 
Confirmation 
Yes 31 27 
Sometimes 3 9 
No 3 1 
Q1 B. Can you tell me about some of your dreams? 
Memory 
Remember 17 21 
Can't remember 17 15 
Composition 
Mythical* 
Yes 12 7 
No 5 14 
Fictional 
Yes 3 4 
No 14 17 
Realistic 
Yes 8 11 
No 9 10 
Q1 C. Are they happy dreams or sad dreams? 
Memory 
Remember 34 35 
Can't remember 0 1 
(table continues) 
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Question IC MC 
(=37) (ii = 37) 
Mood 
Happy 
Yes 10 10 
No 24 26 
Sad 
Yes 4 7 
No 30 29 
Happy and sad 
Yes 20 18 
No 14 18 
*a < .05. 
4.3.3.2 Daydreams.  
The daydreaming activity of ICs and NICs is summarised in Table 4.2. 
Inspection of the table reveals that a significantly larger number of ICs than NICs 
reported daydreaming activity, x 2 (1, n = 74) = 24, a < .001; = .60. 
Of those ICs and NICs who reported daydreaming activity, memory for 
daydreams, and daydream content and mood did not significantly differ between the 
two groups. However, significantly larger numbers of ICs than NICs reported 
daydreaming when alone, Fisher's exact test, < .05, and almost being able to see 
and hear the contents of their daydream in front of them, Fisher's exact test, a < 
.01. 
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Table 4.2 
The Number of IC and MC Children's Responses to Questions Concerned with Daydreams 
Question 
	 IC 	 MC 
(ii = 3 7) (ii = 3 7) 
Daydream 
Q2 A. Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head (daydream) during the day? 
Confirmation *** 
Yes 27 6 
Sometimes 1 0 
No 9 31 
Q2 B. What kinds of pictures do you see? 
Memory 
Remember 23 5 
Can't remember 5 1 
Composition 
Mythical 
Yes 9 0 
No 14 
Fictional 
Yes 5 1 
No 18 4 
Realistic 
Yes 16 4 
No 7 1 
Q2 C. Are they happy pictures or sad pictures? 
Memory 
Remember 27 6 
Can't remember 1 0 
Mood 
Happy 
Yes 21 5 
No 6 0 
Sad 
Yes 1 
No 26 6 
Happy and sad 
Yes 5 
No 22 
(table continues) 
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Question 	 IC 	 MC 
(=37) 
Q2D. Do you picture these things in your head when you are on your own? 
Confirmation * 
Yes 26 1 
Sometimes 0 2 
No 2 3 
Q2E. Do the people and things that you picture in your head sometimes seem so real that 
you think you can almost see or hear them in front of you? 
Confirmation ** 
Yes 27 2 
Sometimes 1 0 
No 0 4 
*p. < .05. **g < .01. ***p < .001. 
4.3.3.3 Scary thoughts.  
The reported experience of scary thoughts by ICs and NICs is summarised 
in Table 4.3. A larger number of ICs than NICs reported experiencing scary 
thoughts. However, this difference was not significant. Of those ICs and NICs who 
reported experiencing scary thoughts, memory for scary thoughts, scary thought 
content, and trying hard not to think about scary things did not significantly differ 
between the two groups. 
Table 4.3 
The Number of IC and NIC Children's Responses to Questions Concerned with Scary 
Thoughts  
Question 	 IC 	 NEC 
(fl = 37) (1. = 37) 
Scary Thoughts 
Q3 A. Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think about? 
Confirmation 
Yes 19 14 
Sometimes 2 1 
No 16 22 
(table continues) 
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Question 	 IC 
( =37) 
MC 
(11 = 37) 
Q3 B. What kinds of things do you think 
Memory 
about that scare you? 
Remember 14 13 
Can't remember 7 2 
Composition 
Mythical 
Yes 7 3 
No 7 10 
Fictional 
Yes 2 1 
No 12 12 
Realistic 
Yes 8 10 
No 6 3 
Q3 C. Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Confirmation 
Yes 21 13 
Sometimes 0 0 
No 0 2 
4.3.3.4 Pretend games.  
Analyses could not be performed on the memory component of question 5B 
("What kind of pretend games do you play with your friends?"). According to the 
coding scheme, the responses to this question could only be categorised into one of 
two possible subcategories. The resultant lack of scores in one of the 
subcategories, rendered an analysis unworkable (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). 
The pretend game activity of ICs and NICs is summarised in Table 4.4. The 
number of ICs and NICs who reported that they played pretend games by 
themselves was not significantly different. Of those ICs and NICs who reported 
playing pretend games alone, memory for games and playing games with fictional 
and realistic content did not significantly differ between the two groups. However, a 
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significantly larger number of ICs than NICs reported playing games with mythical 
content, x 2 (1, n = 70) = 4.86, p < .05; = .30. 
The number of ICs and NICs who reported that they played pretend games 
with their friends was also not significantly different. Of those ICs and NICs who 
reported playing pretend games with friends, the types of game content did not 
significantly differ between the two groups. 
Similarly, the number of ICs and NICs who reported that they did not want 
the game to end was not significantly different. However, a larger number of ICs 
than NICs reported that they could almost see the pretend people and places in the 
room with them, x 2 (1, n = 74) = 15.91, p < .001; = .49. 
Table 4.4 
The Number of IC and MC Children's Responses to Questions Concerned with Pretend 
Games  
Question 	 IC 	 MC 
(ii= 37) (n = 3'7) 
Pretend Games 
Q4 A. Do you play pretend games when you are by yourself? 
Confirmation 
Yes 	 36 	 33 
Sometimes 	 1 1 
No 	 0 	 3 
Q4 B. What kinds of pretend games do you play by yourself? 
Memory  
Remember 	 36 	 34 
Can't remember 	 1 0 
Composition  
Mythical* 
Yes 	 12 	 3 
No 24 31 
Fictional 
Yes 	 9 	 10 
No 27 24 
(table continues) 
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Question IC NIC 
(ll = 37) (n = 3 .7) 
Realistic 
Yes 32 29 
No 4 5 
Q5 A. Do you play pretend games when you are with your friends? 
Confirmation 
Yes 35 35 
Sometimes 0 0 
No 2 2 
Q5 B. What kinds of pretend games do you play with your friends? 
Memory 
Remember 35 35 
Can't remember 0 0 
Composition 
Mythical 
Yes 5 1 
No 30 34 
Fictional 
Yes 16 12 
No 19 23 
Realistic 
Yes 32 28 
No 3 7 
Q 6. Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel so happy that you don't ever 
want the game to end? 
Confirmation 
Yes 29 20 
Sometimes 1 2 
No 7 15 
Q 7. Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel like you can really see the 
pretend places and people in the room with you? 
Confirmation***  
Yes 30 10 
Sometimes 0 2 
No 7 25 
*R < .05. ***p < .001. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the predisposition to fantasy of 
children with and without imaginary companions. The study explored the possibility 
that formulation of an interview specifically for this purpose would indicate an 
association between the presence of imaginary companions and children's 
predisposition to engage in fantasy. In addition, inclusion of items from the CFI was 
expected to indicate differences in the fantasy style of children that were related to 
the presence or absence of imaginary companions. 
The findings of the present study provide evidence that there is an 
association between the presence of imaginary companions and a predisposition to 
engage in fantasy. The study found that there were differences between ICs and 
NICs in their reported dream content, involvement in daydreams, vividness of 
daydreams and game content images, and game content when playing alone. In 
addition, the inclusion of items from the CFI indicated differences in the fantasy 
style of children that were related to the presence or absence of imaginary 
companions. 
The finding that there are differences in IC children's involvement in 
daydreams and vividness of daydream and game images is consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Singer, 1961; Taylor et al., 1993). Children with these companions 
more often reported that they daydreamed, daydreamed when they were alone, and 
felt that they could almost see and hear the contents of their daydream in front of 
them. This finding substantiates the view that children with imaginary companions 
are able to create vivid mental images that sustain them in times of solitude (Singer, 
1961). 
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In addition, the more frequent reports by these children that they 
experienced vivid imagery during pretend games and played solitary games with a 
mythical theme substantiates Taylor et al's. (1993) findings that children with 
imaginary companions engage in a higher level of pretense and more spontaneous 
fantasy play than children without companions. 
Consideration of these combined findings and Singer's (1973, 1977) view 
of a relationship between mental imagery, fantasy play, and fantasy predisposition, 
suggests that children with imaginary companions are predisposed to engage in 
fantasy. Moreover, the finding that children with imaginary companions more often 
reported dreams with a mythical content substantiates previous claims that these 
children have enriched fantasy lives (e.g., Nagera, 1969) and are highly imaginative 
(e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Svendsen, 1934). 
Differences in the fantasy style of children with and without imaginary 
companions were also reported. Children with imaginary companions more often 
reported daydream and pretend game activities that were related to the "Frequency 
of Imaginative Activity" and "Vividness of Fantasy" factors than children without 
companions. This finding suggests two alternative possibilities. First, incorporating 
items from the CFI assisted in differentiating the fantasy style of children with and 
without imaginary companions. Second, there may not be any actual differences 
between the fantasy style of children with and without imaginary companions, but 
children with these companions may be more at ease discussing their fantasies. 
However, subjective impressions gained by the author when conducting 
these interviews raises doubts regarding the validity of this second possibility. 
According to these impressions, children in both groups were willing to discuss their 
fantasies, but children with imaginary companions tended to provide more detailed 
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descriptions of their fantasies than children without companions. In addition, 
children with imaginary companions tended to describe more than one fantasy 
image. Combined, these subjective impressions suggest that children with and 
without imaginary companions differ in their fantasy style, rather than their 
willingness to discuss their fantasies. 
In summary, the findings of the present study in combination with previous 
research (e.g., Taylor et al., 1993; Singer, 1961) suggest that children with 
imaginary companions have a predisposition to engage in fantasy. In addition, the 
different fantasy activities that were reported by the children in the present study 
suggests the potential utility of the interview to indicate this predisposition and 
differentiate children's fantasy styles. 
Despite the success of the interview in determining the fantasy 
predisposition and fantasy styles of children with and without imaginary 
companions, the study only assessed children's verbal responses. According to 
Subbotsky (1984) when children converse with adults they tend to make use of 
socially approved norms. Thus, it cannot be known whether some children 
responded to the interview questions (and the author) according to their experience 
of socially approved norms, or whether they responded to the interview questions 
according to their experiences of dreams, daydreams, pretend games, and scary 
thoughts. It was considered necessary therefore, to investigate further the fantasy 
predisposition of children with and without imaginary companions utilising a 
method that did not rely solely on verbal responses. This study is presented in the 
following chapter. 
CHAPTER 5 
STUDY FOUR 
5.1 Introduction 
The air of reality with which children treat their imaginary companions has 
resulted in questions regarding these children's ability to differentiate fantasy from 
reality. Reports (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Taylor et al., 1993) 
that children treat their companion as a separate individual who requires space at 
places such as the dinner table or in the child's bed, suggests the possibility that 
these children may experience a degree of fantasy-reality confusion. This issue is of 
particular relevance considering the current debate in the child's theory of mind 
literature regarding children's ability to maintain the boundary between fantasy and 
reality. 
As discussed in chapter one, recent research findings have indicated that 
although children as young as three years of age can differentiate between reality 
and fantasy (see Wellman & Estes, 1986) the presentation of counterfactual 
evidence often produces fantastic or magical explanations (Johnson & Harris, 
1994). Theorists (e.g., Wellman, 1990; Woolley & Wellman, 1993) propose that 
this contradiction occurs because young children have difficulty understanding how 
truthfully mental contents (e.g., imaginings or fantasy) reflect the real world. As a 
consequence, these children erroneously judge that imaginary representations reflect 
reality. Woolley and Wellman (1993) suggest that these errors disappear by the time 
children reach four years of age. 
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Harris et al. (1991) question this view and present research findings that 
suggest older children are also susceptible to these errors. Children 4- and -6-years-
old were asked to imagine a puppy inside one box and a monster inside the other. 
The results indicated that even some 6-year-olds acted as though the imagined 
entities were in the boxes as indicated by their willingness to approach the puppy 
box and desire to avoid the monster box. According to Harris et al. (1991) these 
erroneous judgments may have arisen because (even older) children remain unsure 
of the rules that govern the boundary between fantasy and reality. 
As discussed in section 1.6, Golomb and Galasso (1995) question this 
interpretation. These authors cite a number of methodological concerns that they 
consider may have influenced the actions of the children in Harris et al.'s study. For 
example, the use of a monster may have resulted in an emotional reaction rather 
than conceptual awareness, children may have examined the boxes because there 
were no other toys in the testing room rather than because they believed the 
imagined entity to be in the box, and children may have continued to engage in 
pretense because there were no clear indications that the game was over. 
However, an alternative explanation for Harris et al.'s (1991) findings is 
suggested in Subbotsky's (1984) hypothesis that children possess two distinct and 
inconsistent belief systems: everyday beliefs that differentiate between fantasy and 
reality and a second set of beliefs that allow for extraordinary transformations to 
occur. 
To test this hypothesis Subbotsky (1984) conducted a series of experiments 
that assessed children's belief that thought can transform an object. Children 4-, 5-, 
and 6-years-old were told a story about a magic box that transformed pictures into 
objects when magic words were recited. Following completion of the story, children 
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were asked whether this type of transformation was possible in everyday life. The majority 
of children denied this possibility. However, when left alone in the room with the magic 
box 90% of the children in each age group attempted some kind of transformation using 
the magic words. Subbotsky hypothesised that as children's verbal behaviour reflected 
rational scientific modes of thought, the contrast between children's verbal statements and 
their subsequent actions was indicative of the existence of these two inconsistent belief 
systems. 
Johnson and Harris (study 3, 1994) investigated this issue and examined children's 
credulity toward magical transformations. Children 4- and 6-years-old were asked to 
imagine a pretend entity (fairy or an ice cream cone) in one box whilst the other box 
remained neutral. After ascertaining children's understanding regarding the imaginary 
status of the pretend entity, the experimenter left each child alone in the room and 
recorded their behaviour toward the boxes on video. The results indicated that credulous 
children (i.e., those who stated that they wondered whether the pretend item may have 
been inside the box) were quicker to open the pretend box, were more likely to believe 
that the pretend entity was in the box, and more often referred to magical explanations 
than less credulous children. 
These investigators proposed an explanation for these findings based on two 
assumptions: Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) hypothesis that imagining a possibility 
makes it easier to bring to mind and Subbotsky's (1984) hypothesis that children have a 
latent set of magical beliefs. Combining these two assumptions, Johnson and Harris (1994) 
proposed that once a possibility has been made available it is either suppressed or accepted 
according to the child's predominant belief system. Thus, credulous children offer 
explanations for unexpected events by reverting to magical beliefs, whilst non-credulous 
children refer to physical laws and practical considerations to explain these events. 
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However, Johnson and Harris state that these assumptions do not imply that 
credulous children have difficulty differentiating fantasy from reality, rather any act 
of imaginative activity will encourage the latent animistic beliefs of these children. 
This view implies that credulous children may not only be more susceptible to 
availability effects, but may also have more difficulty suppressing magical 
explanations in everyday life compared to non-credulous children. These authors 
further speculated that individual differences in credulity may account for individual 
differences in fantasy predisposition, as well as the presence of imaginary 
companions in some children. 
In contrast, Woolley (1995) proposes a line of speculation that is consistent 
with previous research findings (e.g., Woolley & Wellman, 1993) that children as 
young as three years of age understand fictional mental states before epistemic 
states. Woolley (1995) suggests that this differential ability occurs because fictional 
states do not often reflect reality. Consequently, children find it easier to 
comprehend the difference between fictional mental representation and reality. 
Research findings by Woolley and Wellman (1993) that show children correctly 
judged the likelihood of finding a hidden object on the basis of perceptual 
information, rather than imagination or dreams is considered to substantiate this 
view. 
Extending this theoretical stance to include children with imaginary 
companions, Woolley (1995) speculates that children who create imaginary 
companions may have an increased understanding of the mental nature, fantasy-
reality, and origin of their imaginings because they create a personal mental entity. 
Thus, there are two opposing views regarding the presence of imaginary 
companions. Johnson and Harris (1994) suggest that children with imaginary 
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companions may be more credulous than children without these companions. This 
view implies that children with these companions may experience a weakening or 
confusion of the fantasy-reality boundary because of their susceptibility to 
availability effects and inability to suppress their latent magical beliefs. Woolley 
(1995) suggests that children with imaginary companions do not experience any 
fantasy-reality confusion because of their experience collaborating with a fictional 
entity. 
As discussed in section 1.7, Taylor et al. (study 1, 1993) investigated this 
issue in 3- and 4-year-old children. These investigators asked children with 
imaginary companions to pretend that their companion was present and children 
without companions to pretend that one of their real friends was present. After the 
experimenter had ascertained that the real friend or imaginary companion had been 
imagined, children were asked a series of questions to determine the extent to which 
they thought their imagined entity was reflected in reality. The study found that both 
children with and without imaginary companions considered their imagined entity to 
be reflected in reality. However, these authors considered that a methodological 
flaw prompted children to engage in shared pretense with the experimenter. Thus, 
children's responses to the questions were considered indicative of their 
engagement in shared pretense rather than fantasy-reality confusion. 
An additional problem with the Taylor et al. study involves the assessment 
of children's beliefs. Children's non-verbal behavioural responses regarding the 
extent to which they believed their imagined entity was reflected in reality was not 
specifically assessed. If, as Subbotsky (1984) suggests, children have two 
inconsistent belief systems that manifest differentially in verbal and non-verbal 
behaviours, Taylor et al.'s conclusion that children were not confused about the 
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fantasy status of their imagined entity cannot be determined with any certainty. As a 
consequence of these methodological issues, questions remain regarding the extent 
to which children with imaginary companions believe that imaginary representations 
can be reflected in reality. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the presence of an 
imaginary companion signals an increased predisposition to fantasy that weakens 
children's ability to maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality. This issue 
was addressed by: a) assessing the fantasy predisposition of children with and 
without imaginary companions through their verbal behaviour, and b) examining the 
verbal and non-verbal responses of children with and without imaginary companions 
to the presentation of a counterfactual event. 
However, as the present study incorporated elements of previous research 
methods (e.g., Harris et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1993) a number of methodological 
issues had to be addressed. First, in order to avoid a possible emotional reaction to 
an imagined entity, the children in this study were asked to imagine the monster 
themselves. According to Golomb and Galasso (1995) children who are asked to do 
this modify the emotional impact of their entity by varying its features accordingly 
(e.g., a monster without a mouth). 
Second, toys were provided in the testing room as alternative stimuli to the 
test equipment. This provision addresses concerns raised by Golomb and Galasso 
(1995) that children may examine the testing equipment (e.g., the boxes in the 
Harris et al., 1991 study) because there is nothing else to do rather than because 
they believe that an imagined entity could be reflected in reality. 
Third, according to Woolley (1995) explicit requests to children in previous 
research (e.g., Harris et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1993) to imagine an entity may 
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have promoted imagining that is under conscious control. As a consequence of this 
control, the imagining may not have intruded on reality and children may have been 
more able to distinguish their imaginings from reality. In order to reduce the 
possibility of this occurring, the present study used a combination of consciously 
controlled imagining with an unexpected (counterfactual) event. 
Fourth, children's verbal and non-verbal reactions to the counterfactual 
event were recorded to ascertain whether the verbal responses of children with and 
without imaginary companions differ to their behavioural responses. 
Fifth, the issue of children's shared pretense with the experimenter was 
addressed by not using the words pretend and make-believe during any phase of the 
study other than the final one, by providing clear indications that the imaginative 
episode was at an end, and by presenting counterfactual evidence that did not 
appear to be under the experimenter's control. 
Finally, Woolley and Wellman (1993) have demonstrated that the context of 
the experimental situation will often guide children's (observed) ability to 
differentiate between the imagined and the real. Previous research has used either an 
imaginative situation (e.g., Golomb & Galasso, 1995) or a practical situation (e.g., 
Woolley & Wellman, 1993). As children project their imaginary companion into the 
external world where both practical and imaginative activity takes place, separating 
the practical and imaginative in an experimental situation may produce unrealistic 
results. The present study attempted to provide a situation that included both 
imaginative and practical aspects. 
In summary, the study sought to investigate whether children with and 
without imaginary companions differed in their fantasy predisposition and ability to 
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maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality. The study also addressed 
previously identified methodological problems. 
Three outcomes were expected from this study. First, the examination of 
children's verbal and non-verbal behaviours following the presentation of a 
counterfactual event would indicate an association between the presence of 
imaginary companions and the extent to which children believed an imaginary entity 
could be reflected in reality. Second, the modifications in the present study would 
address the problems associated with previous fantasy-reality research and clarify 
further the relationship between the existence of any fantasy-reality confusion and 
the presence of imaginary companions. Finally, information gathered from the 
interview would indicate further that the presence of imaginary companions is 
associated with children's predisposition to fantasy. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 40 children with imaginary companions (IC; M age = 
5 years and 4 months; range = 4 years and 0 months to 7 years and 11 months) and 
40 children without imaginary companions (IC; M age = 5 years and 4 months; 
range =4 years and 0 months to 7 years and 5 months), who had not participated in 
any of the previous studies. Children were selected from one of eight metropolitan 
primary schools. There were 24 girls and 16 boys in each of the IC and MC groups. 
Children were initially allocated to either the IC or MC group in accordance 
with parent report. However, as discussed in section 4.2.3, because of concerns 
regarding the accuracy of parent report (e.g., Mauro, 1990) each child was asked if 
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they had an imaginary companion. As in the previous study, children's responses to 
this question confirmed their allocation to either the IC or NIC group. 
5.2.2 Materials  
5.2.2.1 Equipment.  
The equipment used in this study included a child's play tent (height 130cm 
x length 100cm) with a modified cloth covering that allowed a silhouette to be 
projected on either side, a slide of a hand drawn monster-like silhouette, a 35/70 - 
12 Var 10 carousel slide projector with a modified switch that permitted the 
projection light (and the silhouette) to be switched on and off without having to 
switch the projector's motor on and off, a CCD - V200E Video 8 Pro camera, and 
a basket of toys. 
5.2.2.2 Behavioural measures.  
Post-test interview: Children's ability to differentiate fantasy from reality 
was sought from a structured interview that was developed to measure children's 
fantasy involvement in three areas: belief that an imaginative monster could be 
reflected in reality, daydreams, and scary thoughts. This post-test interview 
comprised 20 items, eight of which were incorporated from the CPFI (used in study 
three), one which was derived from Singer and Singer (1981), four of which were 
derived from Harris et al. (1991), and seven additional items. A copy of this 
interview is presented in Appendix Dl. 
The item from Singer and Singer (1981) was incorporated into the post-test 
interview without modification. This question was "Do you ever see make-believe 
things or pictures in your mind and think about them?". The four items from Harris 
et al. (1991) were incorporated into the interview in a modified form. The original 
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questions were: a) "And what did you think when you went to open the box?", b) 
"Did you think there was nothing inside or did you think to yourself" I wonder if 
there's a nice, white, bunny rabbit (horrible, mean, black monster) inside", and c) 
"Were you sure there was nothing inside the box or did you wonder whether there 
was a bunny (monster) inside?". Each of these questions was reworded to suit the 
procedure of the present study. Thus, question a) was reworded to "What did you 
think when you went inside the tent?", question b) was divided into two separate 
questions, "Did you think there might have been a monster inside the tent?" and 
"Did you think there may have been something else inside the tent?" and question c) 
was reworded to "What made you think that there was nothing inside the tent?". 
The three modified items from Harris et al. (1991) as well as the seven 
additional items were designed to obtain information regarding children's belief that 
an imaginative monster could be reflected in reality. Of the seven additional items, 
one was specifically devised as an alternative question which was to be asked if the 
child did not want to enter the tent and three were specifically devised as probes 
which were to be asked if the child responded inappropriately to the question. The 
eight items from the CPFI and the item from Singer and Singer (1981) were 
designed to obtain information regarding children's daydreams and scary thoughts. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Prior to conducting the study, ethics approval was obtained from the 
Institutional Ethics Committee. Following this, parent permission forms were 
delivered to eight metropolitan primary schools and distributed by teachers to the 
parents of all children who were enrolled in kindergarten and grades one and two. 
These forms outlined the nature of the study, asked parents to indicate whether they 
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were willing to allow their child to participate in this, and the next study, and to 
indicate if their child had an imaginary companion. A contact phone number was 
provided and all parents were encouraged to call it if they had any queries regarding 
the study (see Appendix D2). 
Conducting the procedure: The procedure was divided into six phases: 
introductory, control, pre-test, test, post-test, and debriefing. Two experimenters 
were involved in the procedure, the author who accompanied each child to and 
from the testing room and the experimenter who conducted the procedure. 
The second, independent, experimenter was recruited to conduct the 
procedure because the author's previous research experience with children who had 
imaginary companions resulted in a strong impression regarding these children's 
ability to develop rapport with an adult. As children's ability to develop rapport 
formed the basis of the next study, there were concerns that the author would 
inadvertently bias the interaction. Thus, a second independent experimenter was 
recruited. 
Although the second experimenter was aware that the study involved an 
investigation of children's imaginary companions, she was naive to the aims and 
purposes of the study and did not know which children had imaginary companions 
and which did not. In addition, she was not aware of the author's subjective 
impressions regarding the ability of children with imaginary companions to develop 
rapport. 
Because this experimenter was not familiar with the procedure, training 
regarding the protocols associated with conducting the experiment was undertaken 
one week prior to commencement of the study. During this training period, the 
experimenter was given written instructions and practical experience in conducting 
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the procedure (see Appendix D3). Incorporated within these written instructions 
was the request to write down the ease or difficulty with which rapport was 
developed with each child. 
Approximately 10 children from each school were tested. Each child was 
tested individually during class time periods to minimise the possibility of children 
discussing the procedure with others. In order to further minimise this possibility, 
each child was asked during their escort back to the classroom not to spoil the 
surprise for other children who may be participating later. 
5.2.3.1 Introductory- warm-up phase.  
On entering the testing room, the author introduced the child to the 
experimenter and then left the room. The experimenter then engaged the child in a 
brief conversation during which they were asked about their favourite TV shows, 
games and stories. This conversation was designed to promote rapport between the 
experimenter and the child. Following this warm-up stage, the procedural phases of 
the study began. 
5.2.3.2 Control phase.  
In this phase the child was asked to retrieve the experimenter's writing pad 
from the play-tent. The tent was positioned approximately 40cm from the child. The 
side of the tent where the silhouette was to be projected was positioned directly in 
front of the child's line of vision. The tent opening was positioned to the child's side 
so that the interior of the tent could not be seen without entering it. 
5.2.3.3 Pre-test phase.  
During this phase, the experimenter presented the following scenario to each 
child: 
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Well, I'm trying to write a story for children your age. Its about a monster 
that lives in a cave, a bit like that tent over there. In my story, this monster is 
so good at hiding that it might be near you in the cave but you wouldn't 
know unless it decided to let you see it The only problem is, I'm having 
trouble describing what it looks like and I need your help. Do you think you 
could help me describe the monster? 
Throughout the description, the experimenter continually drew the child's 
attention to the tent with comments such as "Do you think the monster would fit in 
the tent?" or "Do you think the cave would be the same colour as the tent?" 
5.2.3.4 Test phase. 
Following the description of the monster, the experimenter praised the 
child's effort and again drew her or his attention to the tent whilst projecting the 
monster-like silhouette onto it. The silhouette was projected for a maximum of 
three seconds. If the child indicated either verbally or non-verbally (e.g., looking 
around the room) that they had seen the silhouette, it was not projected again. If the 
child did not react to the projection at all the experimenter made two additional 
remarks. One of these remarks included the question "Are you okay?" that was 
devised to convey empathy and prompt the child to indicate if they had seen the 
silhouette. The second remark was the statement "Okay, you just looked a bit 
worried". This statement was devised both as a dismissive comment to explain the 
experimenter's question and to prompt the child to indicate if they had seen the 
silhouette. Although it is not indicated in the text, this statement was said in a very 
light-hearted tone of voice that would not lead the child into thinking they should be 
worried. If the child still did not indicate whether or not they had seen the 
silhouette, the experimenter projected the silhouette again. 
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After ensuring that the child had seen the projection, the experimenter 
thanked them for their description and asked if they would put her pad back in the 
tent. Children who did not wish to enter the tent did not have to do so. 
5.2.3.5 Post-test phase. 
During this phase the experimenter told each child that whilst she was 
adding their description to her story, they could play with any of the toys in the 
room. The experimenter then made herself unavailable and moved away from the 
child but did not leave the room. After an interval of 90 seconds, and whilst the 
child was playing with the toys, the experimenter asked the child the post-test 
questions. 
5.2.3.6 Debriefing.  
During the debriefing the appearance of the silhouette and the method by 
which it was projected was explained to each child. Care was taken to ensure that 
this explanation was appropriate to the child's level of understanding and that she or 
he understood what had been explained. Following this explanation, the 
experimenter invited each child to explore the tent with them and see that it was 
empty. Whilst in the tent the experimenter encouraged the child to think of pleasant 
uses for it such as birthday tea parties. The debriefing was concluded only when the 
experimenter was certain that the child understood that the tent had always been 
empty. 
5.2.3.7 Post procedure.  
Following the debriefing, the experimenter invited the author to enter the 
testing room and escort the child back to the classroom. During this escort the IC 
status of each child was established from their responses to the question "Do you 
have a make-believe friend who you talk to and who goes places with you?" If the 
112 
child responded affirmatively to this question, the "see and touch" questions from 
Taylor et al. (1993) (see Appendix D4) were incorporated into the conversation to 
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confirm the imaginary status of the friend. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Analyses  
Transcriptions were made of each child's responses in the control, test, and 
post-test phases of the procedure and used as the basis for content analysis (Weber, 
1990). Frequency data from the subsequent categorical variables were cast into 2x2 
(df = 1) and larger (df > 1) contingency tables and analysed using chi-square (x 2 ) 
tests. Application of this test for frequencies in the contingency tables was 
undertaken according to the criteria specified in chapter four. The only exception in 
this application was the coefficient used to measure the strength of association 
between variables. Because the data were cast into contingency tables of varying 
sizes Cramer's V (V), rather then the Phi coefficient was used to measure the 
strength of association between variables (Diekhoff, 1992; Howell, 1987; Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988). An upper alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests with 
the limitation of interpretation stated in section 2.3.1. 
5.3.1.1 Coding. 
Children's responses: Children's responses in each phase of the procedure 
were scored in terms of their verbal and non-verbal responses whilst: a) seeing the 
silhouette, b) approaching the tent, c) entering the tent, and d) playing with toys. 
Consideration of all children's responses in each phase of the procedure resulted in 
a classification system that enabled non-verbal and verbal responses to be classified 
according to two major categories. That is non-verbal responses were categorised 
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according to action (e.g., reaction or no reaction) and verbal responses were 
categorised according to belief in the monster's presence (e.g., no comment, 
monster, or non-monster). 
Post-test interview: Consideration of all responses given by the children 
resulted in a classification system that enabled responses to be classified according 
to four major categories. That is, responses were categorised according to belief in 
monster's presence (don't know, monster, or non-monster), confirmation (yes, no, 
or sometimes), composition (don't know, mythical, fictional, or realistic), and 
rationalisation (justification or no justification). Within each category a child's 
response could only be assigned to one of the subcategories. For example, a child's 
response to confirmation would be either "yes" or "no" or "sometimes". 
The descriptive content of daydreams and scary thoughts was classified 
according to the type of detail that the child supplied. Descriptions were judged to 
have an unknown quality when the child could not provide any detail (e.g., "I 
forgot"), a mythical quality when the child described mythical items that belonged 
to a generic group of non-existent beings (e.g., fairies, monsters), a fictional quality 
when the child referred to specific fictional characters (e.g., cartoon characters), 
and a realistic quality when the child referred to beings that exist (e.g., , pets). 
Additional details regarding the types of responses that were classified in each 
category are presented in the code book in Appendix D5. 
5.3.1.2 Reliability. 
Reliability was established for all phases of the procedure by two 
independent judges. Both judges were postgraduate university students. One judge 
was a psychology postgraduate who was recruited through the psychology 
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department. The other judge was a nursing postgraduate who was recruited through 
child community health services. 
Children's responses in each experimental phase were scored from video 
recordings. Each judge was provided with a code book (see Appendix D5) that 
provided sample definitions and protocols for scoring children's responses. 
Following explanations regarding each protocol, judges practiced coding the verbal 
and non-verbal responses of two children in each experimental phase. 
Inter-rater agreement between the two judges who independently scored 
10% of all the protocols was calculated using Cohen's kappa coefficient (Bakeman 
& Gottman, 1997). The inter-judge agreement for this study ranged from .70 for 
children's general response to the silhouette to .82 for scary thoughts. Any areas of 
disagreement were resolved through discussion. 
5.3.2 Analyses of the Children's Reactions to the Silhouette  
5.3.2.1 Control phase.  
It was originally intended to classify children's approach to the tent 
according to two categories, hesitation or no hesitation. However, as none of the 
children hesitated on their approach to the tent, an analysis on these data was not 
performed. 
5.3.2.2 Test phase.  
Responses to the silhouette: Children's responses to the silhouette were 
measured according to two dimensions: their non-verbal responses which included a 
general response and physical reaction, and verbal responses which included 
spontaneous and prompted comments. These data are summarised in Table 5.1. 
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General response: Children's general response to the silhouette was 
classified according to two categories, no response or response. The number of ICs 
and NICs who generally responded to silhouette was not significantly different. 
Physical response: Children's physical response to the silhouette was 
classified according to two categories, no movement or movement. Analysis of 
children's physical responses to the silhouette revealed significant differences 
between ICs and NICs. A significantly larger number of ICs than NICs physically 
moved in response to seeing the silhouette, X 2 (1, n = 80) = 6.11, p < .01; V = .30. 
Spontaneous comments: Children's spontaneous comments were classified 
according to three categories: no spontaneous comment, spontaneous non-monster 
comment, or spontaneous monster comment. The number of ICs and NICs who did 
not make any spontaneous comments was not significantly different. 
Prompt statements: Children's prompt statements were classified according 
to three categories: no prompt comment, prompted non-monster comment, or 
prompted monster comment. Analysis of the statements that children made 
following prompting revealed significant differences between ICs and NICs. A 
significantly larger number of ICs than NICs stated that they thought they had seen 
a monster, X 2 (2, n = 80) = 12.95, p < .01; V = .39. 
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Table 5.1 
The Number of IC and NIC Children Who Responded Non-verbally and Verbally to  
the Silhouette 
IC MC 
Response to the Silhouette = 40) (11 = 40) 
Non-verbal Response 
General response 
No response 33 36 
Response 7 4 
Physical response** 
No movement 16 28 
Movement 24 12 
Verbal Response 
Spontaneous comments 
No spontaneous comment 22 27 
Spontaneous non-monster comment 13 13 
Spontaneous monster comment 5 0 
Prompt statements** 
No prompt comment 18 23 
Prompted non-monster 5 13 
Prompted monster 17 4 
**g < .01. 
Approach to the tent: Children's non-verbal behaviour during their approach 
to the tent was classified according to three categories: no hesitation, hesitation, or 
does not approach. Children's verbal behaviour was measured according to 
whether their statements indicated no hesitation (e.g., "Can I have a look?"), 
hesitation ("Is it 0. K. if I slip it under?"), or does not approach (e.g., "I don't 
want to"). However, as the number of children who did not approach the tent was 
low, these reactions were recoded to equal "hesitation" for the analysis. Each 
category of response is summarised in Table 5.2. The numbers of ICs and NICs 
who indicated either verbal or non-verbal no hesitation or hesitation were not 
significantly different. 
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Table 5.2 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Demonstrated Hesitation or No  
Hesitation in Their Non-verbal and Verbal Approach to the Tent  
Approach to the Tent 
IC 
(n = 40) 
MC 
(rt = 40) 
Non-verbal Behaviour 
No hesitation 33 37 
Hesitation 4 3 
Does not approach 3 0 
Verbal Behaviour 
No hesitation 34 38 
Hesitation 3 2 
Does not approach 3 0 
Behaviour at the tent: Children's behaviour at the tent was measured on two 
dimensions: their non-verbal behaviour which included whether they entered or did 
not enter the tent, and their verbal behaviour which included whether they did not 
make any comment, made a non-monster comment, or a monster comment. These 
data are summarised in Table 5.3. The numbers of ICs and NICs who did not enter 
the tent or who made comments whilst at the tent were not significantly different. 
Table 5.3 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Entered and Made Some Comment at 
the Tent  
IC MC 
Behaviour at the Tent (n = 40) (n = 40) 
Non-verbal Behaviour 
Enters 27 26 
Does not enter 13 14 
Verbal Behaviour 
No comment 24 31 
Non-monster 8 7 
Monster 8 2 
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5.3.2.3 Post-test phase.  
Play with toys: Children's interest in the tent during their play with the toys 
was measured on two dimensions: their non-verbal behaviour which included 
whether they looked intermittently at the tent or did not look intermittently at the 
tent, and their verbal behaviour which included whether they did not comment, 
made a non-monster comment, or made a monster comment. These data are 
summarised in Table 5.4. As the number of non-monster comments was low, these 
were considered indicative of a general lack of comment and recoded to equal "no 
comment" for the analysis. The number of ICs and NICs who did not comment or 
made a monster comment whilst playing with toys was not significantly different. 
However, a significantly larger number of ICs than NICs intermittently looked at 
the tent during play with the toys, Fisher's exact test, p < .05. 
Table 5.4 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Demonstrated Interest in the Tent 
Whilst Playing with Toys  
IC MC 
Play with Toys (11 = 40) (11=40) 
Non-verbal Behaviour* 
Looked intermittently 8 1 
Did not look intermittently 32 39 
Verbal Behaviour 
No comment 37 38 
Non-monster 0 1 
Monster 3 1 
*p < .05. 
Post test interview: Five questions were excluded from the analysis because 
they did not yield any additional information regarding children's daydreams or 
belief that a monster was in the tent. This redundancy combined with consideration 
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of the effect that conducting a large number of chi-square tests has on the Type I 
error rate, resulted in the exclusion of these variables from the analysis (Siegel & 
Castellon, 1988). However, the summary data from each of these questions are 
presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 
Summary Data of IC and MC Children's Responses to Questions that were 
Excluded from the Analysis  
Question 
(11 
IC 
= 40) 
MC 
(n = 40) 
Q1A. What did you think when you went inside the tent? 
Monster 17 3 
Non monster 2 25 
Don't know 21 12 
Q2. Did you think there was something inside the tent? 
Monster 1 4 
Non monster 3 1 
Don't know 0 0 
Q3. What did you think was inside the tent? 
Monster 12 3 
Non monster 2 4 
Don't know 3 0 
Q6B1. Can you describe them to me? 
Don't know 6 8 
Realistic 1 2 
Fictional 1 1 
Mythical 0 1 
Q6D. Can you see the picture in your head (daydreams) like you see me? 
Negative 7 12 
Sometimes 0 2 
Affirmative 29 15 
Note. The number of responses to Q3 are based on the number of "affirmative" 
responses to Q2 which were not scored. 
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An additional feature of the post-test interview analysis that warrants 
explanation is that the number of responses that were analysed in this interview did 
not always sum to the number of subjects in each group (40). The reason for this 
disparity is the same as that explained in section 4.3.3. Some questions comprised a 
series where the response to the first question indicated whether subsequent 
questions should be asked. Thus, the number of responses in the first question in the 
series (e.g., Q6a in the series Q6a, Q6b, & Q6c) will sum to the number of subjects 
in each group (40); responses in the subsequent questions in the series will either 
sum to the number of "affirmative" or "sometimes" responses in the first question. 
The exception in this sequencing occurs in question four where the number of 
responses in Q4c and Q4d sum to the number of "affirmative" and "negative" 
responses in Q4a. The number of responses in Q4b is independent of the others in 
the series. 
In addition, as the number of "sometimes" responses was low, it was 
considered indicative of an affirmative response and recoded to equal "yes" for the 
analysis. Similarly, as the number of "fictional" responses were low, they were 
considered indicative of a non-mythical response, recoded to equal "realistic" and 
both variables were renamed "non-mythical" for the analysis. 
Belief that a monster was in the tent: The belief status of ICs and NICs is 
summarised in Table 5.6. A significantly larger number of ICs than NICs thought 
that there may have been a monster in the tent, x 2 (1, n = 80) = 24.34, p < .001; V 
= .58. However, the numbers of ICs and NICs who thought that the monster in the 
tent was similar to the one they described for the story, thought something else was 
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in the tent, and were unable to justify the reason for their belief that nothing else 
was in the tent were not significantly different. 
Table 5.6 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Indicated Belief in the Presence of a 
Monster 
Question 	 IC 	 MC 
(n = 40) (11 = 40) 
Q4A. Did you think there might have been a monster inside the tent?*** 
Negative 	 7 	 30 
Affirmative 33 10 
Q4B. Did you think there may have been something else inside the tent? 
Negative 	 40 	 39 
Affirmative 0 1 
Q4C. Did you think the monster inside the tent was like the one you described to 
me for my story? 
Negative 2 1 
Affirmative 31 9 
Q4D. What made you think that there was nothing inside the tent? 
Justification 6 21 
No justification 1 9 
**'. 1` p < .001. 
Daydreams: The daydreaming activity of IC and MC children is 
summarised in Table 5.7. A significantly larger number of ICs than NICs reported 
experiencing daydreams, x 2 (1, n= 80) = 8.78, p < .01; V = .36. Of those ICs and 
NICs who reported daydreaming, the numbers of ICs and NICs reporting mythical, 
fictional, or realistic daydream content were not significantly different. However, a 
significantly larger number of ICs than NICs reported that their daydreams seemed 
so real that they could almost see and hear them in front of them, x 2 (1, n = 65) = 
9.64, a < .01; v = .42. 
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Table 5.7 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Experienced Daydreams and Vivid 
Mental Imagery  
Question 
	 IC 	 MC 
(11 = 40) (n = 40) 
Q5. Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head during the day?** 
Negative 5 18 
Sometimes 2 5 
Affirmative 33 17 
Q6A. Do you ever see make-believe things or pictures in your mind and think about 
them? 
Negative 4 11 
Sometimes 1 5 
Affirmative 35 24 
Q6B. What kinds of pictures do you see? 
Don't know 8 12 
Realistic 9 8 
Fictional 4 2 
Mythical 15 7 
Q6C. Do the people and things that you picture in your head sometimes seem so 
real that you think you can almost see or hear them in front of you?** 
Negative 3 13 
Sometimes 0 2 
Affirmative 33 14 
**g < .01. 
Scary thoughts: The experience of scary thoughts reported by ICs and NICs 
is summarised in Table 5.8. As the number of "don't know" responses was low, 
these were considered indicative of a non-mythical response and recoded to equal 
"non-mythical" for the analysis. A significantly larger number of ICs than NICs 
reported that they experienced scary thoughts, x 2 (1, n = 80) = 4.78, p < .05; V = 
.27. Of those ICs and NICs who reported experiencing scary thoughts, a 
significantly larger number of ICs than NICs reported scary thoughts with mythical 
content, X 2 (1, n = 46) = 8.19, p<  .01;V = .47. However, the number of ICs and 
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NICs who reported that they tried hard not think about scary things was not 
significantly different. 
Table 5.8 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Reported Scary Thoughts 
Question IC 
= 40) 
MC 
(n = 40) 
Q7A. Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think 
about?* 
Negative 12 22 
Sometimes 1 2 
Affirmative 27 16 
Q7B.What kinds of things do you think about that scare you?** 
Don't know 2 4 
Realistic 7 11 
Fictional 1 0 
Mythical 18 3 
Q7C. Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Negative 2 0 
Sometimes 1 0 
Affirmative 25 18 
*l<05 **a < .01. 
5.4 Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether the presence of an 
imaginary companion signals an increased predisposition to fantasy that weakens 
children's ability to maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality. In addition, 
the study sought to examine whether addressing the conditions of previous research 
would promote understanding regarding the ability of children with imaginary 
companions to differentiate fantasy from reality. These conditions included 
requesting children to imagine a monster themselves, the provision of toys in the 
testing room, the presentation of a counterfactual event, examination of children's 
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verbal and non-verbal responses, eliminating the possibility of shared pretense, and 
combining practical and imaginative activity in the procedure. 
The present study found differences between children with and without 
imaginary companions in their non-verbal and verbal responses to seeing the 
silhouette, their non-verbal interest in the tent whilst playing with the toys, and 
belief that a monster was in the tent. 
Children with imaginary companions were more often rated as physically 
responding to the silhouette and as looking intermittently at the tent whilst playing 
with toys than children without companions. In addition, children with imaginary 
companions more frequently reported following prompting that they thought they 
had seen a monster in the tent. This belief was confirmed in the post-test interview 
where children with imaginary companions more often stated that they thought the 
monster had been in the tent. These findings suggest that children with imaginary 
companions entertain the possibility that imaginary representations may be reflected 
in reality. 
However, the present study did not find any evidence to suggest that 
children with and without imaginary companions differed in the extent to which they 
believed an imaginary representation could be reflected in reality. If a child believed 
that a monster was in the tent, then irrespective of whether she or he had an 
imaginary companion, the majority of these children also stated that the monster in 
the tent was similar to the one that they had described. In other words, the 
predominant influence on these children's responses is related to their belief system 
and not the presence of the imaginary companion. This finding suggests that the 
experience of fantasy-reality confusion cannot be attributed solely to the presence of 
the imaginary companion. Consideration of this finding and Johnson and Harris's 
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(1994) view that imaginative activity may prompt credulous children to revert to 
latent magical beliefs to explain counterfactual events, suggests that individual 
differences in credulity (the belief that imaginary representations may be reflected in 
reality) may also account for the fantasy-reality confusion observed in this study. 
Additional factors that may have influenced the results of this study involve 
the experimental conditions under which the study was conducted. The observed 
differences in children's behavioural responses and beliefs regarding the reality of 
the silhouette suggest that the presentation of a counterfactual event overwhelmed 
the controlled aspects of imaginative activity. According to current theoretical 
opinion (e.g., Golomb & Galasso, 1995; Woolley, 1995) this presentation, 
combined with measures such as eliminating the words make-believe and pretend 
from all but the last phase of the study and providing clear indications that the 
imaginative episode was at an end, reduces the possibility of shared pretense with 
the experimenter. Thus, it may be concluded that the experimental conditions 
adopted in the present study "tapped" the predominant belief system of children 
rather than their desire to engage in shared pretense with the experimenter. 
In addition, the provision of toys in the testing room suggests that children's 
interest in the tent was not due to boredom, but reflected a belief that a monster 
was in the tent. However, the tendency for these children to continue playing with 
the toys regardless of their belief, supports Golomb and Galasso's (1995) claim 
that previous research findings (e.g., Harris et al., 1991) may have been influenced 
by the lack of stimulation in the testing room. 
The present study also found differences regarding the involvement of 
children with and without imaginary companions in daydreams and vivid mental 
imagery that are consistent with previous claims (e.g., Singer, 1961), as well as the 
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research findings reported in chapter four of this thesis. Children with these 
companions more often reported that they daydreamed, experienced mythical scary 
image content, and felt that the people and things they daydreamed about seemed so 
real they could almost see them in front of them. Consideration of these findings 
and Singer's (1973, 1977) claim that mental imagery ability is related to fantasy 
predisposition suggests that children with imaginary companions have a 
predisposition to fantasy. 
In summary, these findings suggest that children with imaginary companions 
have an increased predisposition to fantasy and a credulous attitude toward 
counterfactual events that results in fantasy-reality confusion. In addition, 
addressing the methodological issues that have been raised by previous research 
(e.g., Harris et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1993) has provided some clarity with regard 
to the interpretation of the results obtained in this study 
However, the lack of empirical investigations into the extent to which 
children with imaginary companions can maintain the fantasy-reality boundary 
necessitates caution in the interpretation of both the findings of the present study 
and the influence of the experimental conditions on these findings. In view of the 
current emphasis in the child's theory of mind literature regarding the extent to 
which children can maintain the fantasy-reality boundary, future research should 
continue to investigate the relationship between the presence of imaginary 
companions and the existence of fantasy-reality confusion ensuring the utilisation 
of an appropriate experimental situation. 
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY FIVE 
6.1 Introduction 
As indicated in section 1.2 and 1.3, children with imaginary companions 
have been reported to demonstrate enhanced verbal skills and an increased level of 
social skill and cooperation with adults and children compared to children without 
these companions (e.g., Ames & Learned, 1946; Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & 
Singer, 1981). 
Somers and Yawkey (1984) contend that children with imaginary 
companions demonstrate these characteristics because their play with the 
companion increases their sensitivity to others. These authors propose that this 
sensitivity develops from practice in three major areas. First, play with the 
companion allows children to model and practice social routines and functions such 
as preparing and eating a meal. Within this social context, children share comments, 
thoughts, and statements with the imaginary companion. Second, children's 
treatment of the imaginary companion as a separate individual promotes an 
understanding of themselves and others as these children's projection of attitudes, 
feelings, and beliefs onto another allows them to consider a perspective other than 
their own. Finally, children learn to develop relationships with others as children's 
treatment of the companion as a separate entity allows them to practice their 
feelings without becoming directly involved. Through the practice of anticipating 
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and expressing feelings children's understanding of their own and other's emotions 
are enhanced. 
Research findings by Mauro (1990) provide partial substantiation for this 
view. This investigator examined the ability of children with imaginary companions 
to take the emotional perspective of another person. Children between 4 years and 7 
years of age were shown pictures of a happy face, a sad face, and an angry face and 
asked to identify the emotion in each picture. Following this identification, the 
experimenter read eight stories to each child: four of which involved the child and 
the experimenter, and the child and the imaginary companion experiencing the same 
emotions, and four of which involved the child and the experimenter, and the child 
and the imaginary companion experiencing different emotions. 
After the presentation of each story, each child was asked to point to the 
picture that represented the feelings of each character in the story. The results 
indicated that children with imaginary companions were able to accurately identify 
the emotional perspective of both the imaginary companion and the experimenter. 
Mauro (1990) concluded that children with imaginary companions view their 
companion as a separate social entity and consider it to have a perspective that 
differs from their own. - 
However, one problem with this study is that Mauro did not examine the 
ability of children without imaginary companions to identify the emotional 
perspective of others. Thus, conclusions regarding the effect that the practice of 
taking the perspective of a separate pretend entity has on the social sensitivity of 
children with imaginary companions cannot be made. Nevertheless, these findings 
suggest that through play with the imaginary companion children practice key 
elements of social interaction such as sensitivity. 
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Another key element that is practiced through play with the imaginary 
companion is language use. According to Singer and Singer (1976) children's 
practice of thinking out loud during imaginative play provides them with feedback 
regarding previously learned words and allows them to practice and refine their use 
of the conventions associated with conversation. This view suggests that as an 
aspect of fantasy play, the imaginary companion would provide children with 
increased opportunities to practice their verbal skills. 
Singer and Singer (1981) found evidence for this view in their investigation 
of the language use of children with and without imaginary companions. As 
indicated in section 1.8, these authors found that children with imaginary 
companions produced an increased number of words and longer utterances than 
children without companions. Singer and Singer interpreted these findings as 
evidence that children with imaginary companions have enhanced verbal skills 
compared to children without these companions. 
In summary, there are suggestions in the literature that children's play with 
the imaginary companion has a positive effect on their behaviour and interactions 
with others. These children's sustained practice of adopting the perspective of a 
pretend other promotes a more refined understanding of social actions and 
relationships, and provides an opportunity to refine their verbal skills within a social 
context. This refinement results in an increased ability to anticipate and understand 
their own and other's feelings in particular situations and to regulate their behaviour 
accordingly (Singer & Singer, 1976, 1981; Somers & Yawkey, 1984). 
The enhanced interaction skills of children with imaginary companions has 
also been noticeable in this series of studies. Throughout studies two and three the 
author received the strong impression that rapport was easier to establish with 
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children who had imaginary companions compared to children who did not have 
these companions. Consideration of this subjective impression combined with 
previous research findings regarding these children's enhanced social and verbal 
skills (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & Singer, 1981) resulted in an 
exploration of these children's ability to build rapport with the experimenter in 
study four. 
Thus, the main aim of this study was to investigate the perceived ability of 
children with and without imaginary companions to develop rapport. Specifically, 
the study sought to investigate: a) the subjective impressions of an independent 
judge regarding the ability of children with and without imaginary companions to 
develop rapport, and b) whether the language use of children with and without 
imaginary companions contributed to this subjective impression. 
It was expected that examination of the subjective impressions of an 
independent judge would indicate further an association between the presence of 
imaginary companions and children's ability to develop rapport. It was also 
expected that the presence of imaginary companions would be associated with 
children's use of language which in turn, would contribute to their ability to develop 
rapport. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants  
The participants were 40 children with imaginary companions (IC; M age = 
5 years and 4 months; range = 4 years and 0 months to 7 years and 5 months) and 
40 children without imaginary companions (NIC; M age = 5 years and 4 months; 
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range 4 years and 0 months to 7 years and 11 months) who had participated in 
study four. There were 24 girls and 16 boys in each of the IC and NIC groups. 
6.2.2 Procedure  
Rapport: During work on study four, the experimenter was asked to 
provide written subjective impressions regarding the ease or difficulty with which 
rapport was developed between themselves and the 80 participants who formed the 
sample in study four. These impressions were noted for each child individually and 
written down immediately following her or his departure from the testing room. 
Children's ability to develop rapport was then analysed from these written 
subjective impressions. 
Language: The recorded verbal responses of the 80 participants who 
formed the sample in study four were transcribed verbatim and analysed for 
linguistic structure. 
6.2.2.1 Rapport - definitions. 
The development of rapport was classified as either easy or difficult. It was 
classified as "easy" if the independent experimenter had written that the child was 
either easy to talk to or did not have to be continually prompted to speak. It was 
classified as "difficult" if the independent experimenter had written that the child 
was either difficult to talk to or required continual prompting to speak. 
6.2.2.2 Language variables - coding.  
Compound sentences: These were classified according to four categories. 
These categories included the child's use of: a) free standing conjuncts only, where 
the coordinator began the sentence (e.g., "But there's a monster in there"); b) 
conjuncts 2 only, where the sentence included one coordinator (e.g., "He couldn't 
132 
be too big or he couldn't fit in there"); c) conjuncts 3 or more only, where the 
sentence included two or more coordinators (e.g., "It had a rocking chair and a light 
and I was thinking about that but then I suddenly said I'm frightened by bears so I 
wouldn't do that and I've decided to write about a horse"); and d) both free 
standing and conjuncts 2 or more where the coordinator began the sentence and 
included one or more additional coordinators (e.g., "And he's camouflaged and he 
has big eyes"). 
Complex sentences: These were classified according to three categories that 
included the child's use of: a) an embedded clause only (e.g., "I thought there was a 
monster in there"); b) a free standing clause only, where the subordinating 
conjunction began the sentence (e.g., "Because I lifted up the tent and looked in 
there"); and c) both free standing and embedded clauses (e.g., "Cause when I went 
in to get the pad there was nothing and I knew there was nothing except for the 
pad"). 
Modals: Modals were defined as a grammatical main clause in which the 
speaker expressed attitudes or opinions (Palmer, 1986) and were classified 
according to four categories specified in Wells (1985). These classifications were: 
a) Constraint modals that indicate constraints upon an individual's ability to act 
(e.g., "I can't remember"), b) Likelihood modals that indicate the probability of an 
event being actualised or true (e.g., "He'd be dead when I punched him"), c) 
Inference modals, where the individual infers the probability of an event from the 
available information (e.g., "Probably the monster!"), and d) Performative modals 
that indicate actions (e.g., "I can see changes in there!"). 
"And" as the coordinator: Children's use of and was classified according 
to three categories. These categories included the child's use of: a) free standing 
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and, where it began the sentence and was used as an indicator that the child had not 
finished speaking (e.g., "And he has a sword."); b) conjuncts 2, where the sentence 
included one and (e.g., "He's a pink monster and that's all."); and c) conjuncts 3 or 
more, where the sentence included two or more ands' (e.g., "They've got sharp 
teeth and it was white and it's like a big monster and so you can't touch it...."). 
6.3 Results 
The analyses were conducted in three stages. First, the subjective 
impressions of the independent judge were examined for differences in the ability of 
children with and without imaginary companions to develop rapport. Second, the 
recorded transcripts were examined by two language experts to ascertain whether 
the IC status of children could be identified from the transcripts. Finally, dependent 
on the language experts findings, the language variables on which children with and 
without imaginary companions appeared to differ were examined in a series of 
statistical analyses 
6.3.1 Exploratory Analyses  
Rapport: The written subjective impressions of the independent 
experimenter regarding each child's ability to develop rapport were classified 
according to two categories, easy or difficult. These data are summarised in Table 
6.1. Frequency data from this categorical variable was cast into a 2x2 (df = 1) 
contingency table and analysed using a chi-square (x 2 ) test. This analysis revealed 
that a significantly larger number of IC than MC children were reported as being 
easy to develop rapport with, x. 2 (1, n = 80) = 4.45, g < .05; 4=  .26. 
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Table 6.1 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who were Considered Easy or Difficult to 
Develop Rapport with  
IC 	 MC 
Category 	 (n = 40) (n. = 40) 
Rapport* 
Easy 	 31 	 19 
Difficult 9 21  
*p < .05. 
Language: This exploratory analysis involved the examination of 30 
randomly selected transcripts (15 IC and 15 MC) by two language experts who 
were unaware of each child's IC status. On the basis of the language used, one 
expert correctly classified 29 of the 30 children as belonging to either the IC or NIC 
group, and the second expert correctly classified 28 of the 30 children as belonging 
to either the IC or MC group. 
During this examination, the second language expert also investigated 
whether there were any differences in the categories of language used by children 
who had been classified as IC or MC on the basis of their transcribed responses. 
This examination revealed that within this sub-sample of transcripts children in the 
IC group used more types of modals, more complex sentence structure, and and as 
the conjunction compared to children in the MC group. 
6.3.2 Analyses  
Frequency data from each linguistic category were cast in to 2x2 (df = 1) 
contingency tables and analysed using chi-square (x 2 ) tests which were corrected 
for continuity to improve accuracy. Fisher exact probability tests were performed 
when the sample size ranged between 20 and 40 and expected frequencies were less 
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than five. Because the analysis was conducted using 2x2 contingency tables, the 
Phi coefficient () was used to measure the strength of association between 
variables (Diekhoff, 1992; Howell, 1987; Siegel & Castellan, 1988). An upper 
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests with the limitation of 
interpretation used in section 2.3.1. 
Age effects were excluded from the analyses. There are two reasons that 
account for this exclusion. First, the sole effects of IC status on language was 
desired. Second, as research findings indicate that children from the age of 3& years 
include two or more clauses and modal auxiliaries in a substantial number of their 
utterances (Ingram, 1989; Wells, 1985) the current analyses were not expected to 
yield any major age differences. 
6.3.2.1 Reliability.  
Reliability was established for all responses in each category of language by 
three independent judges. These judges were recruited through university 
psychology departments. Two of the judges were psychology postgraduates and the 
third judge was an expert in psycholinguistics. 
Each judge was provided with a coding guide (see Appendix El) that 
provided sample definitions and protocols for scoring children's responses. 
Following explanations regarding each protocol, judges scored two sample 
transcripts. 
Inter-judge agreement between the three judges who independently scored 
10% of all the protocols was calculated according to Cohen's kappa coefficient 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). This agreement was calculated as .72 for sentence 
complexity with areas of disagreement resolved through discussion, and 1.0 for 
modal types and categories of and 
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6.3.2.2 Compound sentence structure. 
Children's use of compound sentences structure was classified according to 
whether they did or did not use free standing sentences only, conjuncts 2 only, 
conjuncts 3 or more only, and free standing and conjuncts 2 or more. These data are 
presented in Table 6.2. Significantly larger numbers of IC than MC children used 
free standing sentences, x, 2 (1, n= 80) = 7.58, p < .01; 4=  .33, and sentences with 3 
or more conjuncts, x. 2 (1, n = 80) = 9.76, p< .01; = .38. In addition, although the 
number of IC and MC children who used sentences with 2 conjuncts was not 
significantly different, it did approach statistical significance, x 2 (1, n = 80) = 3.07, 
= .08; 4=  .22. 
Table 6.2 
The Number of IC and NEC Children Who Used Each Category of Compound 
Sentence Structure  
Category 
IC 
= 
NEC 
40) 	 (n = 40) 
Free Standing** 
Yes 22 9 
No 18 31 
Conjuncts 2 
Yes 15 7 
No 25 33 
Conjuncts 3 or More** 
Yes 18 2 
No 22 38 
Free Standing and Conjuncts 2 or More 
Yes 8 3 
No 32 37 
**n< 01 
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6.3.2.3 Complex sentence structure. 
Children's use of complex sentences structure was classified according to 
whether they did or did not use free standing clauses only, embedded clauses only, 
and free standing and embedded clauses. These data are presented in Table 6.3. A 
significantly larger number of IC than MC children used embedded clauses, 
x 2 (1, n = 80) = 6.11, a < .05; th = .30. 
Table 6.3 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Used Each Category of Complex 
Sentence Structure  
IC MC 
Category (n. = 40) (11 = 40) 
Free Standing 
Yes 5 3 
No 35 37 
Embedded Clause* 
Yes 31 18 
No 9 22 
Free Standing and Embedded Clause 
Yes 14 10 
No 26 30 
*Q< .05. 
6.3.2.4 Modals. 
Children's use of modals was classified according to whether they did or did 
not use constraint, likelihood, inference, and performative modals. These data are 
presented in Table 6.4. The numbers of IC and MC children who used constraint 
and likelihood modals were not significantly different. However, significantly larger 
numbers of IC than MC children used inference, x 2 (1, n = 80) = 4.45, a < .05; th = 
.26, and performative modals, X 2 (1, 11 = 80) = 4.61, p < .05; 4 = .27. 
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Table 6.4 
The Number of IC and MC Children Who Used Each Modal Type 
Modal Type IC 
(n = 40) 
NEC 
= 40) 
Constraint 
Yes 9 11 
No 31 29 
Likelihood 
Yes 9 9 
No 31 31 
Inference* 
Yes 19 9 
No 21 31 
Performative* 
Yes 18 8 
No 22 32 
*p< .05. 
6.3.2.5 "And" as coordinator. 
Consideration of research findings by Peterson and McCabe (1988) that 
children's use of and is indicative of mature language use resulted in the decision to 
analyse children's use of and separately from their general use of coordinators (but, 
and, or, or nor) in compound sentences. 
Children's use of each category of and was classified according to whether 
they did or did not use free standing and, conjuncts 2, and conjuncts 3 or more. 
These data are presented in Table 6.5. Significantly larger numbers of IC than MC 
children used free standing and, X 2 (1, n = 80) = 4.32, p< .05; = .26, conjuncts 2, 
n = 80) = 6.30, p < .05; = .31, and conjuncts 3 or more, x, 2 (1,  n = 80) = 
5.88, p < .05; 4 = .30. 
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Table 6.5 
The Number of IC and NEC Children Who Used Each Type of AND 
AND Type IC MC 
= 40) (n = 40) 
Free standing* 
Yes 20 10 
No 20 30 
Conjuncts 2* 
Yes 22 10 
No 18 30 
Conjuncts 3 or More* 
Yes 11 2 
No 29 38 
* 	.05 
6.4 Discussion 
The main aim of this investigation was to explore whether children with and 
without imaginary companions differed in their ability to develop rapport with an 
adult. The study also explored the possibility that children's use of specific 
components of language such as compound and complex sentence structure, types 
of modals, and and as a conjunction contributed to this perceived ability. 
The findings of the present study indicate differences between children with 
and without imaginary companions in their ability to relate to an adult that are 
consistent with previous research findings (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973). Children 
with imaginary companions were more frequently perceived as easier to develop 
rapport with than children without companions. 
The study also found differences between children with and without 
imaginary companions in their use of compound and complex sentence structure, 
inference and performative modals, and and as the conjunction that have not been 
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reported previously. As these specific components of language have not been 
investigated in previous imaginary companion research, the results of the present 
study will be interpreted according to relevant findings in child language 
development. 
Children with imaginary companions more frequently used embedded 
clauses that included the use of subordinating conjunctions in either a temporal 
sequence (e.g., when I...) or reasoning sequence (e.g., because it...) than children 
without companions. According to previous research findings (e.g., Short-
Meyerson & Abbeduto, 1997; Silva, 1984) children's ability to communicate a 
temporal sequence and reason about the thoughts and knowledge of others is 
associated with the maturation of social-cognitive skills that are not necessarily 
context dependent. 
In addition, children with imaginary companions more frequently used 
compound sentences that either began with a coordinating conjunction or contained 
three or more coordinators within it. This finding suggests that children with 
imaginary companions are engaging in sustained connected conversation where the 
statements that they make are logically related to the statements made by another 
person until the topic of conversation is changed (Gottman, 1983). As this type of 
communication has been associated with children's ability to understand the 
thoughts and feelings of others and regulate their interactions (Slomkowski & 
Dunn, 1996), the findings of the present study indicate that children with imaginary 
companions have enhanced social-cognitive skills compared to children without 
companions. 
The more frequent use of and as a method of beginning and combining 
sentences by children with imaginary companions in this study also suggests social- 
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cognitive maturity. According to Peterson and McCabe (1988) this pragmatic use 
of the word and is characteristic of older children (9-years-old) who use it to 
indicate the continuation of their conversational turn and to connect thematically 
related sentences. Consideration of these research findings, the younger age range 
of the sample in the present study, and the findings of the present study suggest that 
children with imaginary companions are using forms of connected communication 
that are indicative of more mature language use. 
This study also found that children with imaginary companions more 
frequently used inference and performative modals than children without these 
companions. As research findings by Wells (1985) indicate that performative 
modals occur in the language of 48% of 4-year-olds and inference modals do not 
occur at all in the language of children younger than 5-years-old, the findings of the 
present study suggest that children with imaginary companions use more 
developmentally advanced modals compared to children without imaginary 
companions. 
In summary, the findings of the present study indicate that children with 
imaginary companions were perceived as easier to relate to than children without 
companions. Investigation of the language used by children with and without these 
companions suggest that language is a contributing factor in this perception. The 
use of more mature language by children with these companions results in 
coordinated interactions that promote the development of rapport between these 
children and another conversationalist. 
The reason that children with imaginary companions use more mature 
language can only be speculated upon. However, the findings of the present study 
combined with previous research findings (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Singer & 
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Singer, 1981) that indicate these children have enhanced verbal skills suggest that 
these children's interaction with the companion is an influential factor in the 
development of these skills. The sustained practice of viewing the companion as a 
separate entity with different thoughts and feelings promotes the development of 
sensitivity and enhances these children's ability to regulate interactions, whilst 
conversing with the companion in a social context is likely to promote the 
development of verbal skills and the conventions associated with conversation. 
Overall, the findings of the present study combined with speculation 
regarding the positive influence of the imaginary companion on children's verbal 
and social skills, suggests that future research should investigate further the 
relationship between children's verbal skills, their ability to consider a perspective 
other than their own, and the presence of imaginary companions. 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this series of studies was to incorporate a systematic 
investigation of the role of the imaginary companion in children's emotional and 
cognitive development within the current developmental framework. Overall, the 
findings of this series of studies indicate that there is relatively little difference 
between children with and without imaginary companions. Of the significant 
differences that were found between these two groups of children, none of these 
was related to negative effects on children's behaviour. Indeed, the presence of the 
imaginary companion was found to be positively associated with childhood 
behaviour as children with these companions demonstrated enhanced social-verbal 
skills, increased engagement in fantasy play, increased predisposition to fantasy, and 
indications of emotional control compared to children without companions. In 
addition, children with imaginary companions were more often reported to be 
firstborns and to be very imaginative. 
These findings present a picture of children with imaginary companions that 
is very different from early research findings (e.g., Svendsen, 1934; Vostrovsky, 
1895) which portrayed these children as nervous and somewhat inadequate. The 
results from this series of studies presents a profile of these children that supports 
more recent research findings (e.g., Manosevitz et al., 1973; Mauro, 1990; Singer & 
Singer, 1981) of socially accomplished children who engage in sustained interaction 
with the companion. 
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Although findings from the present series of studies support previous 
research findings (Manosevitz et al., 1973) that one function of the imaginary 
companion may be to ameliorate the loneliness of a child who does not have any 
siblings close in age, additional questions remain regarding the reason that some 
children experience these companions and others do not. What are the theoretical 
underpinnings regarding the functions of these companions? In order to answer this 
question, the presence of the imaginary companion was examined with regard to 
three major theoretical perspectives regarding children's involvement in fantasy 
play: cognitive-affective theory, children's understanding of the fantasy-reality 
distinction, and children's development of sensitivity which allows them to 
understand another person's perspective. 
Cognitive-affective theory suggests that children's involvement in fantasy 
(as indicated by the presence of the imaginary companion) functions to promote 
emotional and cognitive growth by reducing anxiety and creating a positive 
atmosphere for exploration (Singer & Singer, 1990). Theories regarding children's 
understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction suggest that the presence of the 
imaginary companion may signal differences in children's credulity and ability to 
maintain the boundary between fantasy and reality (Johnson & Harris, 1994), whilst 
these children's enhanced ability to understand others suggests that imaginary 
companions may assist in the development of these children's sensitivity and ability 
develop a perspective other than their own (Somers & Yawkey, 1984). Thus, it 
could be argued that collectively these theoretical viewpoints suggest that children 
with imaginary companions experience an increased sensitivity to environmental 
events. As a consequence of this sensitivity, the imaginary companion is created. 
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This suggestion received support in the present series of studies where 
children with these companions were found to experience anxiety associated with 
sensitivity to the environment and other's opinions, were sensitised to revert to 
latent magical beliefs, and demonstrated an increased understanding of others as 
indicated by their perceived enhanced ability to develop rapport. How can these 
findings be explained? 
One explanation may rest with these children' predisposition to fantasy. 
Children with imaginary companions reported that they experienced images that 
were so real the people and places almost seemed as though they were in the room 
with them. This ability to experience vivid imagery could have a threefold effect. 
First, it could increase these children's ability to experience unpleasant vivid images 
which would create anxiety, second it could increase these children's level of 
credulity, and third it could provide unlimited opportunities to practice social-
cognitive skills. 
Vivid imagery increases these children's ability to experience unpleasant 
mental images: The ability to experience unpleasant vivid images which create 
anxiety may not only make these children more sensitive to anxiety provoking 
environmental events, but their enhanced imagery ability may also increase the 
longevity of the experience. In other words, these children may hear or see 
something and once translated into a mental image it is harder to dispel because of 
its vividness. As a consequence of experiencing these enduring vivid images, 
children create an imaginary entity to regulate them. The creation of this companion 
allows children to deal with their anxieties from a safe emotional distance and 
creates a buffer through which they experience sensitivity related anxieties to 
environmental events but in a secondary way. This explanation is drawn from 
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Somers and Yawkey's (1984) proposition that through play with the companion 
children can experience emotional events without becoming directly involved. 
As a consequence of the type of emotional distancing that is provided by 
play with the imaginary companion, children are offered opportunities to develop 
strategies that assist them to deal with daily stresses. Through play with the 
companion, these children are able to create scenarios which emulate the issues that 
confront them. However, as these issues are created in the positively reinforcing 
atmosphere of pretense with their companion, children can comfortably explore 
different solutions until one is found that adequately solves the problem. This 
method of problem solving not only teaches children that they can use their mental 
resources to overcome difficulties, but also increases their self-esteem, persistence, 
and self-confidence as they begin to recognise that they can effectively control their 
emotional responses to potentially difficult situations. 
Vivid imagery increases these children's level of credulity: This explanation 
is based on Johnson and Harris's (1994) assertion that some children are more 
credulous than others. It could be argued that the combination of imagery ability 
and inwardly directed attitude (as indicated by elevated scores on worry-
oversensitivity anxiety) not only increases children's sensitivity to believe in the 
possibility of magical events, but also results in the creation of the imaginary 
companion. This explanation suggests that credulity alone does not result in the 
presence of the imaginary companion, but that the companion is created from the 
combination of imagery ability and an inwardly directed attitude. Thus, children can 
be credulous without experiencing an imaginary companion. This rationale explains 
the results of the fourth study where children other than those with imaginary 
companions thought that there was a monster in the tent. 
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In addition, the presence of the imaginary companion constantly reinforces 
these children's levels of credulity as they constantly interact with the imagined 
entity. Thus, it becomes a self-perpetuating cycle where children with imaginary 
companions are constantly engaged in imaginative activity that reinforces 
consideration of magical explanations rather than explanations based on scientific 
knowledge. This process may sensitise these children to use magical beliefs rather 
than scientific knowledge to explain highly unexpected events. 
These children's constant engagement in imaginative activity with the 
companion may also promote the development of original ideas that expand less 
conventional modes of thought. Through play with the imaginary companion, these 
children are provided with the opportunity to explore their experiences and 
knowledge in unconventional ways. This exploration not only promotes novel 
experiences, but may also promote a belief in magical outcomes and increased levels 
of credulity regarding unexpected events. Thus, children with imaginary 
companions may develop and refine attitudes that reflect a belief in the possibility 
that counterfactual events could happen. These children's enhanced imagery ability 
combined with consideration of unconventional ideas add depth and richness to 
their imaginative development, whilst play with the companion further extends their 
imaginative activity. Support for this supposition was found in this series of studies 
where children with imaginary companions were reported to be more imaginative 
than children without companions. 
The family environment may also influence children's interaction with the 
imaginary companion and sensitivity to magical beliefs. Parents who believe that 
their child's imaginative activity has a positive effect on childhood development 
may provide an atmosphere that promotes aspects of imaginative growth such as 
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play with an imaginary companion and consideration of magical, rather than factual 
outcomes. In this atmosphere, children may feel that they can interact freely and' 
openly with the companion and explore a wide variety of magical beliefs. 
Vivid imagery provides unlimited opportunities to practice social-cognitive 
skills: This explanation borrows from Somers and Yawkey's (1984) proposition 
that through creating an imagined entity, children have unlimited opportunities to 
practice their social and cognitive skills in a way that allows them to view the 
perspective of another person. As a consequence of this sustained practice, these 
children develop sensitivity to others. Additional to this explanation though is these 
children's ability to imagine an entity that appears real. 
As all children talk to themselves and incorporate elements of reality during 
pretend play (Singer, 1973), children's interaction with a pretend friend would not 
seem to provide them with more opportunities to practice their social skills than 
children who do not have an imaginary companion. However, it is the reality with 
which these children perceive their images (including the imaginary companion) that 
may promote a more realistic practice of sensitivity to others. As the enhanced 
imagery ability of children with imaginary companions allows them to practice 
social skills with a pretend entity that they can visualise as real, it promotes 
children's synthesis and use of knowledge more strictly according to the rules of the 
external world. For example, if the imaginary companion is annoyed, then the 
enhanced image of the companion as viewed by the child necessitates that she or he 
deal with the companion's annoyance in a way that realistically emulates the 
external world. This does not mean that the child does not understand that the 
interactions and emotions are pretend and cannot determine the rules of the game, 
but rather that play with the companion is similar to experiences in virtual reality 
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games. During these games individuals know that the scenarios are not real, but the 
vividness of the images and the necessity to interact with these images to continue 
the game, necessitates the use of real world actions and interactions. Thus, the 
enhanced imagery ability of children with imaginary companions intensifies the 
realism with which children treat both the pretend situation and the imaginary 
companion. 
These children's enhanced imagery ability may also increase the perceived 
reality of pretend play situations by promoting the development of symbolic thought 
processes. This proposition is derived from Singer's (1973) assertion that 
imaginative play reflects the continual private rehearsal process that children use to 
gain control over their symbolic representation system. Interacting in pretend social 
situations requires children to conceptualise a progression of events according to 
the social conventions associated with entering a social interaction, continuing the 
interaction, and ending the interaction. As the imagery ability of children with 
imaginary companions suggests that these children have an enhanced ability to form, 
recombine, and store mental images, these children's conceptualisation of social 
interactions may have a realism that more precisely reflects those which occur in the 
external world. In addition, these children's treatment of the imaginary companion 
as real and consequent assignment of roles and reactions to it during pretend 
situations would promote a perspective that extends beyond the effect that these 
interactions would have on themselves. Examples of extended perspectives may 
include the effect that these interactions have on a separate entity, as well as the 
effect that these interactions have on the relationship between a separate entity (i.e., 
the imaginary companion) and the children themselves. 
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As this view of social interactions is a more realistic reflection of the social 
interactions that occur in the external world, children are required to act and react 
in the pretend situation according to external world conventions if they wish to 
pursue the game to its ultimate conclusion. Thus, these children's imagery ability 
enhances the realism of the pretend situation, and this in turn refines their 
knowledge regarding the accuracy with which mental representations of events 
reflect external world events. 
Earlier, children with imaginary companions were described as having an 
increased sensitivity to the environment that was attributed to their enhanced 
imagery ability. Speculation regarding this finding raises a number of questions for 
future research. One such question is whether children with imaginary companions 
differ in their imagery ability. For example, do children who create imaginary 
companions differ in their ability to visualise details regarding the characteristics of 
these companions? Moreover, if the imagery ability of children with imaginary 
companions does differ, would this result in differences in sensitivity to 
environmental events. Although it is recognised that children create imaginary 
companions for a number of reasons (e.g., anxiety reduction, alleviation of 
loneliness) this line of speculation suggests that individual differences in children 
with imaginary companions may ensue from one central point, namely imagery 
ability. As imagery ability has been proposed to influence these children's sensitivity 
to environmental events, differences in this ability may also effect other behavioural 
outcomes such as credulity, experiences of anxiety, and the ability to view others' 
perspectives. 
Consideration of each of these behavioural outcomes also suggests that 
sensitivity to environmental events may explain the reason that some children have 
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imaginary companions and some do not. It also raises the question of whether the 
sensitivity of children with imaginary companions persists beyond the school years 
into adolescence. For example, does the increased sensitivity of children with 
imaginary companions result in the development of more effective strategies for 
dealing with daily stresses when these children are older and the companion is 
gone? Whatever the outcome of this research, sensitivity to environmental events 
may provide a method of conceptualising the behavioural characteristics associated 
with the presence of an imaginary companion and provide a focal point for 
investigating whether the emotional and cognitive effects of having an imaginary 
companion persist into adult life. 
In conclusion, the findings from this series of studies suggests that children 
with imaginary companions experience only slightly elevated levels of anxiety, 
increased social-verbal skills, and increased levels of credulity compared to children 
without companions. Combined, these findings were interpreted to indicate that 
children with imaginary companions have an increased sensitivity to environmental 
events that is potentiated by their ability to create vivid mental images. However, 
this increased sensitivity does not imply that children with imaginary companions 
are less able to control their reactions to their environment, but rather that their 
enhanced imagery ability at once sensitises, and offers them, opportunities to 
explore less prosaic modes of thought. 
152 
References 
Achenbach, T. M., & Edelbrock, C. S. (1978).The classification of child 
psychopathology: A review and analysis of empirical efforts. Psychological Bulletin, 
85 1275-1301. 
Achenbach, T. M., & Edelbrocic, C. S. (1983). Manual for the Child  
Behavior Checklist. Burlington, VT: University of Vermont, Department of 
Psychiatry. 
Ahadi, S. A., Rothbart, M. K., & Ye, R. (1993). Children's temperament in 
the US and China: Similarities and differences. European Journal of Personality, 7, 
359-377. 
Ames, L. B., & Learned, J. (1946). Imaginary companions and related 
phenomena. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 69, 147-167. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (1991). Census 1991 (No. 2791.6). 
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Author. 
Bakeman, R., & Gottman, J. M. (1997). Observing interaction: An  
introduction to sequential analysis  (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bates, J. E. (1989).Concepts and measures of temperament. In G. A. 
Kohnstamm, J. E. Bates, & M. K. Rothbart (Eds.), Temperament in childhood 
(pp. 3-26). New York: Wiley. 
153 
Bates, J. E., & Bayles, K. (1984). Objective and subjective components in 
mothers' perceptions of their children from age 6 months to 3 years. Merrill-Palmer 
Quarterly, 30, 111-130. 
Bouldin, P., & Pratt, C. (in press). Utilizing parent report to investigate 
young children's fears: A modification of the Fear Survey Schedule for Children-II: 
A research note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry.  
Brooks, M., & Knowles, D. (1982). Parents' views of children's imaginary 
companions. Child Welfare, LX1, 25-33. 
Buss, A. H., & Plomin, R. (1975). A temperament theory of personality 
development. New York: Wiley. 
Carey, W. B., & McDevitt, S. C. (1978). Revision of the infant temperament 
questionnaire. Pediatrics, 65, 735-739. 
Castaneda, A., McCandless, B., & Palermo, D. (1956). The children's form 
of the Manifest Anxiety Scale. Child Development, 27, 317-326. 
Chandler, M. J., & Lalonde, C. E. (1994). Surprising, magical and 
miraculous turns of events: Children's reactions to violations of their early theories 
of mind and matter. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 83-95. 
Diekhoff, G. (1992). Statistics for the social and behavioural sciences:  
Univariate, bivariate, multivariate. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown. 
Eme, R., & Schmidt, D. (1978). The stability of children's fears. Child 
Development, 49, 1277-1279. 
154 
Entwisle, D. R., & Astone, N. M. (1994). Some practical guidelines for 
measuring youth's race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status. Child Development, 65, 
1521-1540. 
Estes, D., Wellman, H. M., & Woolley, J. D. (1989). Children's 
understanding of mental phenomena. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 
22 41-87. 
Fantuzzo, J. W., McDermot, P. A., Holliday Manz, P., Hampton, V. R., & 
Alvarez Burdick, N. (1996). The Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and 
Social Acceptance: Does it work with low-income urban children? Child  
Development, 67, 1071-1084. 
Finch, A. J., Kendall, P. C., & Montgomery, L. E. (1974). 
Multidimensionality of anxiety in children: Factor structure of the Children's 
Manifest Anxiety Scale. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 2, 331-336. 
Flanagan, P. J., Peters, C. J., & Conry, J. L. (1969). Item analysis of the 
Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale with the retarded. Journal of Educational  
Research, 62, 472-477. 
Fraiberg, S. (1968). The magic years. New York: Scribner's. 
Fullard, W., McDevitt, S. C., & Carey, W. B. (1984). Assessing 
temperament in one- to three-year-old children. Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 9, 
205-217. 
155 
Goldsmith, H. H., Buss, A. H., Plomin, R., Rothbart, M. K., Thomas, A., 
Chess, S., Hinde, R. A., & McCall, R. B. (1987). Roundtable: What is 
temperament? Four approaches. Child Development, 58, 505-529. 
Goldsmith, H. H., & Campos, J. J. (1982). Toward a theory of infant 
temperament. In R. N. Emde & R. J. Harmon (Eds.), The development of 
attachment and affiliative systems: Psychobiological aspects (pp. 161-193). New 
York: Plenum. 
Golomb, C., & Galasso, L. (1995). Make believe and reality: Explorations 
of the imaginary realm. Developmental Psychology, 31, 800-810. 
Gorsuch, R. L., Henighan, R. P., & Barnard, C. (1972). Locus of control: 
An example of dangers in using children's scales with children. Child Development, 
43 579-590. 
Gottman, J. M. (1983). How children become friends. Monographs of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 48, (3, Serial No. 201). 
Graham, R. B. (1990). Physiological psychology. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth. 
Gullone, E. (1992). Normative fear in childhood and adolescence: Patterns 
and correlates.  The Australian Educational and Developmental Psychologist, 9, 
39-53. 
156 
Gullone, E., & King, N. J. (1992). Psychometric evaluation of a revised fear 
survey schedule for children and adolescents. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 33, 987-998. 
Harris, P. L., Brown, E., Marriott, C., Whittall, S., & Harmer. S. (1991). 
Monsters, ghosts, and witches: Testing the limits of the fantasy-reality distinction in 
young children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9,  105-123. 
Harter, S., & Chao, C. (1992). The role of competence in children's 
creation of imaginary friends. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 38, 350-363. 
Harter, S., & Pike, R. (1984). The Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence 
and Social Acceptance for Young Children. Child Development, 55, 1969-1982. 
Hathaway, S. R., & McKinley, J. C. (1942). The Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Howell, D. C. (1987). Statistical methods for psychology (2nd ed.). Boston: 
PWS-Kent. 
Hurlock, E. B., & Burstein, M. (1932). The imaginary playmate: A 
questionnaire study. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 41, 380-392. 
Ingram, D. (1989). First language acquisition. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Inuzuka, M., Sato, Y., & Wada, K. (1991). The imaginary companion: A 
questionnaire study [CD-ROM]. Japanese Journal of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, 32, 32-48. Abstract from: SilverPlatter File: PsycLit Item: 30-86818. 
157 
Jalongo, M. (1984). Imaginary companions in children's lives and literature. 
Childhood Education, 60, 166-171. 
Jersild, A. T. (1968). Child psychology (6th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Jersild, A. T., & Holmes, F. B. (1935). Children's fears. Child Development 
Monographs, (No. 12). Teacher's College, Columbia University, New York: 
Bureau of Publications. 
Jersild, A. T., Markey, F. V., & Jersild, C. L. (1933). Children's fears, 
dreams, wishes, daydreams, likes, dislikes, pleasant and unpleasant memories. Child 
Development Monographs. Teacher's College, Columbia University, New York: 
Bureau of Publications. 
Johnson, C. N., & Harris, P. L. (1994). Magic: Special but not excluded. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 35-51. 
Keogh, B. K. (1983). Individual differences in temperament-A contribution 
to the personal, social, and educational competence of learning disabled children. In 
J. D. McKinney & L. Feagans (Eds.), Current topics in learning disabilities. Vol.1  
(pp. 33-55). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
King, N. J., Gullone, E., & 011endick, T. H. (1992). Manifest anxiety and 
fearfulness in children and adolescents. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 153, 
63-73. 
158 
King, N. J., Oilier, K., Iacuone, R., Schuster, S., Bays, K., Gullone, E., & 
011endick, T. H. (1989). Fears of children and adolescents: A cross-sectional 
Australian study using the Revised-Fear Survey Schedule for Children. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 30,  775-784. 
Kline, R. B. (1994). New objective rating scales for child assessment, I. 
Parent- and teacher-informant inventories of the Behavior Assessment System for 
Children: the Child Behavior Checklist, and the Teacher Report Form. Journal of 
Pschoeducationa1 Assessment, 12, 289-306. 
Kohnstamm, G. A., Bates, J. E., & Rothbart, M. K. (1989). Temperament in 
childhood. New York: Wiley. 
Lapouse, R., & Monk, M. A. (1959). Fears and worries in a representative 
sample of children. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 29, 803-818. 
Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of 
mind". Psychological Review, 94, 412-426. 
Lillard, A. S. (1993). Young children's conceptualisation of pretense: 
Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372-386. 
Manosevitz, M., Fling, S., & Prentice, N. M. (1977). Imaginary companions 
in young children: Relationships with intelligence, creativity and waiting ability. 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 18,  73-78. 
159 
Manosevitz, M., Prentice, N. M., & Wilson, F. (1973). Individual and family 
correlates of imaginary companions in preschool children. Developmental 
Psychology, 8, 72-79. 
Mauro, J. (1990). The friend that only I can see: A longitudinal investigation 
of children's imaginary companions. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University 
of Oregon. 
McCathie, H., & Spence, S. H. (1991). What is the Revised Fear Survey 
Schedule for Children measuring?  Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 495-502. 
Merrill, K. W. (1995). Relationships among early childhood behavior rating 
scales: Convergent and discriminant construct validity of the Preschool and 
Kindergarten Behavior Scales. Early Education and Development, 6, 253-264. 
Meyer, J. R., & Tuber, S. (1989). Intrapsychic and behavioral correlates of 
the phenomenon of imaginary companions in your children.  Psychoanalytic  
Psychology, 6, 151-168. 
Nagera, H. (1969). The imaginary companion: Its significance for ego 
development and conflict solution. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24, 165-196. 
011endick, T. H. (1983). Reliability and validity of the Revised Fear Survey 
Schedule for Children (FSSC-R). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 685-692. 
011endick, T. H., King, N. J., & Frary, R. B. (1989). Fears in children and 
adolescents: Reliability and generalizability across gender, age, and nationality. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 19-26. 
160 
011endick, T. H., Matson, J. L., & Helsel, W. J. (1985). Fears in children 
and adolescents: normative data. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 465-467. 
Palmer, F. R. (1986). Mood and modality. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pedlow, R., Sanson, A., Prior, M., & Oberklaid, F. (1993). Stability of 
maternally reported temperament from infancy to 8 years. Developmental  
Psychology, 29, 998-1007. 
Peterson C., & McCabe, A. (1988). The connective AND as discourse glue. 
First Language, 8, 19-28. 
Piaget, J. (1962). Play, dreams and imitation in childhood.  New York: 
Norton. 
Prior, M. (1992). Childhood temperament. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 33, 249-279. 
Prior, M. R., Sanson, A. V., & Oberklaid, F. (1989). The Australian 
temperament project. In G. A. Kohnstamm, J. E. Bates, & M. K. Rothbart (Eds.), 
Temperament in childhood (pp. 537-554). New York: Wiley. 
Reynolds, C. R. (1980). Concurrent validity of What I Think and Feel: The 
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical  
Psychology, 48, 774-775. 
161 
Reynolds, C. R. (1985). Multitrait validation of the Revised Children's 
Manifest Anxiety Scale for children of high intelligence. Psychological Reports, 56, 
402. 
Reynolds, C. R., Bradley, M., & Steele, C. (1980). Preliminary norms and 
technical data for use of the Revised-Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale with 
kindergarten children. Psychology in the Schools, 17, 163-167. 
Reynolds, C. R., & Paget, K. D. (1981). Factor analysis of the Revised 
Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale for blacks, whites, males, and females with a 
national normative sample. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 
352-359. 
Reynolds, C. R., & Richmond, B. 0. (1978). What I Think and Feel: A 
revised measure of children's manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Child  
Psychology, 6, 271-280. 
Reynolds, C. R., & Richmond, B. 0. (1979). Factor structure and construct 
validity of "What I Think and Feel": The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety 
Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 43, 281-283. 
Reynolds, C. R., & Richmond, B. 0. (1985). Revised Children's Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) manual. Los Angeles, CA: Western Psychological 
Services. 
Rosenfeld, E., Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., & Torney-Purta, J. V. (1982). 
Measuring patterns of fantasy behavior in children. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 42, 347-366. 
162 
Sanson, A., Prior, M., Garino, E., Oberklaid, F., & Sewell, J. (1987). The 
structure of infant temperament: Factor analysis of the Revised Infant Temperament 
Questionnaire. Infant Behavior and Development 10,  97-104. 
Schaefer, C. E. (1969). Imaginary companions and creative adolescents. 
Developmental Psychology, 1, 747-749. 
Scherer, M. W., & Nakamura, C. Y. (1968). A Fear Survey Schedule for 
Children (F'SS-FC): A factor analytic comparison with manifest anxiety (CMAS). 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 6, 173 - 182. 
Short-Meyerson, K. J., & Abbeduto, L. J. (1997). Preschoolers' 
communication during scripted interactions. Journal of Child Language, 24, 
469-493. 
Siegel, S., & Castellan, N. J. (1988). Nonparametric statistics for the 
behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Silva, M. N. (1984). Developmental issues in the acquisition of conjunction. 
Papers and Reports on Child Language Development, 23,  106-114. 
Singer, J. L. (1961). Imagination and waiting ability in young children. 
Journal of Personality, 29, 396-413. 
Singer, J. L. (1973). The child's world of make-believe: Experimental 
studies of imaginative play. New York : Academic Press. 
Singer, J. L. (1977). Imagination and make-believe play in early childhood: 
Some educational implications. Journal of Mental Imagery, 1, 127-144. 
163 
Singer, J. L., & Singer, D. G. (1976). Imaginative play and pretending in 
early childhood: Some experimental approaches. In A. Davids (Ed.), Child 
personality and psychopathology (pp. 69-112). New York: Wiley. 
Singer, J. L., & Singer, D. G. (1981). Television imagination and 
aggression: A study of preschoolers. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Singer, D.G., & Singer, J. L. (1990). The house of make-believe: Children's 
play and the developing imagination.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Slomkowski, C., & Dunn, J. (1996). Young children's understanding of 
other people's beliefs and feelings and their connected communication with friends. 
Developmental Psychology, 32, 442-447. 
Somers, J. U., & Yawkey, T. D. (1984). Imaginary play companions: 
Contributions of creative and intellectual abilities of young children. Journal of 
Creative Behaviour, 18, 77-89. 
Spielberger, C. D. (Ed.). (1972). Anxiety: Current trends in theory and 
research. New York: Academic Press. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1973). Preliminary manual for the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children ("How I Feel Questionnaire"). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Subbotsky, E. (1984). Preschool children's perception of unusual 
phenomena. Soviet Psychology, 14, 17-31. 
164 
Subbotsky, E. (1994). Early rationality and magical thinking in 
preschoolers: Space and time. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 
97-108. 
Svendsen, M. (1934). Children's imaginary companions. Archives of 
Neurology and Psychiatry, 2, 985-999. 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1989). Using multivariate statistics (2nd 
ed.). New York: Harper & Row. 
Taylor, J. A. (1951). The relationship of anxiety to the conditioned eyelid 
response. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41, 81-92. 
Taylor, M., & Carlson, S. M. (1997). The relation between individual 
differences in fantasy and theory of mind. Child Development, 68, 436-455. 
Taylor, M., Cartwright, B. S., & Carlson, S. M. (1993). A developmental 
investigation of children's imaginary companions. Developmental Psychology, 29, 
276-285. 
Thomas, A., & Chess, S. (1977). Temperament and development. New 
York: Brunner/Mazel. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging 
frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232. 
Vostrovslcy, C. (1895). A study of imaginary companions. Education, 15, 
393-398. 	• 
165 
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic content analysis (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
Wells, G. (1985). Language development in the pre-school years. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child's theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press/Bradford Books. 
Wellman, H. M., & Estes, D. (1986). Early understanding of mental entities: 
A reexamination of childhood realism. Child Development, 57, 910-923. 
Woolley, J. D. (1995). The fictional mind: Young children's understanding 
of imagination, pretense, and dreams. Developmental Review, 15, 172-211. 
Woolley, J. D., & Phelps, K. E. (1994). Young children's practical 
reasoning about imagination. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 
53-67. 
Woolley, J. D., & Wellman, H. M. (1993). Origin and truth: Young 
children's understanding of imaginary mental representations. Child Development, 
64 1-17. 
166 
APPENDIX A- 1 
Imaginative Play Activities Questionnaire 
UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA 
Department of Psychology 
GPO Box 252C 
Hobart 
Tasmania 7001 
Australia 
IMAGINATIVE PLAY ACTIVITIES OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN 
Date 	  
Please print : 
1. Child's age : Years 	 Months 	 
	
Child's sex : Male 	 Female 	 
2. The person completing this questionnaire is : 
Child's mother 
Child's father 
Both parents 
Other (please specify) 	 
3. Please list below your other children in order of their birth, giving age and sex. 
First Name Age 	 Sex 
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4. Please list below any other members of the household (e.g., relatives, family 
friends). 
Description (e.g., Uncle, family friend) 
  
Age 	 Sex 
       
       
       
       
       
       
5. (a) Please tick the box that indicates which parent or parents the child is 
currently living with. 
Mother only 
Father only 
Mother and Father 
Mother and Stepfather 
Father and Stepmother 
Other   => (please specify) 	 
(b) Are the child's parents : (tick one box) 
Living together 
Divorced 
Separated 
Other 	 (please specify) 	 
6. Tick the one answer below that best describes the child's mother's educational 
level. 
No formal education 
Some primary school 
Finished primary school 
Some high school 
Finished high school 
Finished high school, plus technical training 
Some university/college 
Finished university/college 
Finished university/college, plus additional training 
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7. Tick the one answer below that best describes the child's father's educational 
level. 
No formal education 
Some primary school 
Finished primary school 
Some high school 
Finished high school 
Finished high school, plus technical training 
Some university/college 
Finished university/college 
Finished university/college, plus additional training 
8. (a) Please tick the one answer below that best describes the present 
employment status of the child's mother : 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Casual 
Student 
Home duties 
Not currently employed 
(b) If home duties, or not currently employed, what was the previous 
occupation of the child's mother ? 
9. (a) Please tick the one answer below that best describes the present employment 
status of the child's father : 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Casual 
Student 
Home duties 
Not currently employed 
(b) If home duties, or not currently employed, what was the previous occupation 
of the child's father ? 
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10. Please list below other friends your child usually plays with while she/he is at 
home. 
First Name Age 	Sex 	No. hours plays 
with each week 
11. For each of the following please indicate whether your child's play at home is 
usually : 
Active 
Self-initiated 
Boisterous 
Dependent on adult direction or suggestion 
Quiet 
Seated inside the home 
Energetic 
 
Other 	(please specify) 	  
 
12. Please give details of any difficulties your child has in play : 
13. Tick all the statements below which best describe how your child gets along 
with other children. 
Yes No 
Plays often and well with other children 
Frequently has disagreements and fights with other children 
Seldom plays with other children 
Other  	(please specify) 	  
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14. Is the child's play with other children supervised by an adult ? 
No 
Yes 
  
 
If so, by whom  	
   
15. Does your child have a special place to play ? 
Indoors ? No 
Yes If so, Where ? 	 
Outdoors ? No 
Yes If so, Where ? 	 
16. Please estimate the amount of time usually spent in outdoor play each day. 
Hours 	 Minutes 	  
17. Tick whether your child has a special place to keep her/his toys. 
Yes No 
Chest 
Shelves 
Box 
Bookcase 
Other 	(please specify) 	  
18. Please tick all of the following toys which your child owns, double ticking 
his/her favourites. 
Table and chairs 
Truck 
Housekeeping toys 
Aeroplanes 
Trains 
Boats 
Beads 
Hammer and nails 
Paints 
Blocks 
Crayons 
Clay/Playdough 
Paper and paste 
Nintendo/Gameboy 
Tricycle 
Wagon 
Swing 
See-saw 
Slide 
Climbing apparatus 
Sand box 
Boxes and boards 
Skates 
Balls 
Dolls 
Doll's furniture 
Toy animals 
Computer games 
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Other 
 
(please specify) 	  
   
19. Tick whether your child is usually : 
Yes No 
Careful with her/his toys 
Destructive with her/his toys 
Other (please specify) 	  
20. (a) Please indicate the amount of contact your child has with music and 
literature by placing a circle around the number that best describes your child's 
contact. 
For example for the first scale: 
If your child has contact with singing every day, circle the number 1; 
If your child has contact with singing two/three times a week, circle the number 2; 
If your child has contact with singing once a week, circle the number 3; 
If your child has contact with singing less than once a week, circle the number 4; 
If your child never has contact with singing, circle the number 5. 
Everyday Never 
Singing 1 	 2 	 3 4 5 
Piano 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Record/CD player 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Radio 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Other music (please specify) 	 
1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Television 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Stories, read 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Stories, told 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Pictures shown 1 	 2 3 4 	 5 
(b) Who is the child's main source of contact with music ? (tick all that apply) 
(please specify) 
His/her mother 
His/her father 
Both mother and father 
Other 
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(c) How does your child generally react to his/her contact with music ? 
Yes No 
Actively Participates 
Listens quietly 
Appears bored/distracted 
Other (please specify) 	 
(d) Who is the child's main source of contact with literature ? (tick all that 
apply) 
His/her mother 
His/her father 
Both mother and father 
Other 
 
(please specify) 
   
(e) How does your child generally react to his/her contact with literature ? 
Yes No 
Actively Participates 
Listens quietly 
Appears bored/distracted 
Other (please specify) 	  
21. Please list his/her most favourite books. 
22. Please estimate the amount of time your child spends each day with : 
His/her mother Hours 	 Minutes 	 
His/her father 	Hours 	 Minutes 	 
Shyness 
Excitability 
Thumbsucicing 
Flightiness 
Awkwardness 
Submissiveness 
Daydreaming 
Over-dependence on adults 
Undue demand for attention 
Lack of self-confidence 
Sensitiveness 
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23. Please comment briefly on the nature of the activities jointly engaged in by 
members of the family and the child. (For example: routines, reading, hobbies, 
excursions to the zoo, museums, railroad stations, airports, lake, marketing, nature 
walks.) 
Father and child 	  
Mother and child 	  
Siblings and child 	  
Family group 
Others 	  
24. Please tick any of the following problems experienced by your child that are 
giving parents concern at present or have given concern in the past. 
Restlessness 
Nailbiting 
Overactivity 
Nose picking 
Hair pulling or twisting 
Masturbation 
Jealousy 
Fearfulness 
Aggressiveness 
Competitiveness 
Irritability 
25. Tick whether your family has any of the following pets. 
Dog 
Fish 
Cat 
Bird 
Other (please specify) 	  
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26. (a) Please rate your child on the following scale (mark the scale with an X at 
the point you think best describes your child). 
Shy & 
reserved 
Neither shy 
nor outgoing 
Open & 
outgoing 
(b) Please rate your child on her/his ability to talk and interact with adults 
(mark the scale with an X at the point which you think best describes your 
child). 
Very good at 	 Neither good nor 
talking & interacting 	 bad at talking & 
with adults 	 interacting with adults 
Does not talk 
& interact 
well with 
adults 
(c) Please rate your child on his/her ability to talk and interact with other 
children (mark the scale with an X at the point which you think best describes 
your child). 
Very good at 
talking & interacting 
with children 
Neither good nor 
bad at talking & 
interacting with children 
Does not talk 
& interact well 
with children 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE 
CONTINUING 
The following questions deal with mythical beings. A mythical being is a 
person or thing whose existence is fictional and around which stories and cultural 
traditions have arisen. Western Examples of these beings include: Santa Claus, 
Tooth Fairy, Easter Bunny, and Elves. Please answer the following questions 
regarding the degree to which your child believes in, and includes, these beings in 
his/her activities. 
27. Do you tell/read your child stories about mythical beings such as Santa Claus ? 
No 
Yes 
   
  
If so, How often ? 	 
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28. Do you involve your child in mythical traditions such as placing a tooth under 
his/her pillow for the Tooth Fairy, or leaving supper for Santa ? 
No 
Yes 
  
 
Please specify 	  
  
29. (a) Does your child believe in : (tick all that apply) 
Yes No 
Santa Claus 
Tooth Fairy 
Easter Bunny 
Elves 
Other J 	(please specify) 	  
(b). If your child no longer believes in the existence of these mythical beings at 
what age did this belief stop ? 
Santa Claus 	Years 	 Months 	  
Tooth Fairy 	Years Months  
Easter Bunny 	Years 	 Months 	  
Elves 	Years Months  
Other Years 	 Months 	  
(c). How does your child react when the existence of one of his/her favourite 
mythical beings is questioned ? 
Angry denial 
Doesn't care 
Passive acceptance 
Cries 
Other 	 (please specify) 
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30. Please rate your child 's level of imaginativeness by placing a circle around the 
number that best describes your child. 
1 means that your rate your child as very imaginative; 
2 means that your rate your child as moderately imaginative; 
3 means that your rate your child as slightly imaginative; 
4 means that your rate your child as neither imaginative nor unimaginative; 
5 means that your rate your child as slightly unimaginative; 
6 means that your rate your child as moderately unimaginative; 
7 means that your rate your child as very unimaginative. 
Very 	 Very 
imaginative 	 unimaginative 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
31. Does your child ever make-up stories about his/her favourite mythical beings ? 
If so, which beings does she/he involve? 
32. Does your child ever involve his/her favourite mythical beings in pretend play ? 
If so, Which beings does he/she involve ? 
33. Does your child ever explain events as magical ? 
No 
Yes 
   
  
If so, which events '?  
  
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY 
BEFORE CONTINUING 
The following questions deal with imaginary companions. An imaginary 
companion is a very vivid imaginary character (person, animal, or object) with 
which a child interacts during his/her play and daily activities. Although the 
companion does not actually exist, it is very real to the child who endows it with an 
individual personality and consciousness. As a consequence, the child often refers 
conversationally to the companion and indicates its presence throughout the day. 
Please answer all of the following questions if your child now has an imaginary 
companion of if she/he has ever had one. If not please complete question 34 and 
turn to page 18. 
34. Tick whether your child has ever had an imaginary companion. 
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No, he/she has never had one 
Yes, he/she has one now 
Yes, he/she used to have one 
Please turn to page 18 
Please continue to answer questions 
Please continue to answer questions 
35. Tick the answer below that comes closest to the number of imaginary 
companions that your child now has or has had. 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
More than four (please specify)  
36. Tick whether the child's imaginary companion is/was : 
Yes No 
Other  	(please specify) 	  
37. Tick whether your child' imaginary companion is/was : 
Yes No 
The same age as the child 
Older than the child 
Younger than the child 
Age is not known 
38. (a) Please list below the name(s) of your child's imaginary companion(s). 
A person 
An animal 
A male 
A female 
Sex unknown 
An object (please specify) 	 
(b) Do you have any ideas as to your child's choice of these specific names ? 
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Name of a friend 
Name of a relative 
Toys 
Books 
Television 
Other (please specify) 
39. How old was your child when his/her imaginary companion(s) first appeared ? 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
More than four (please specify) 	 
40. If your child no longer has an imaginary companion, how old was she/he when 
the imaginary companions disappeared ? 
Years 	Months 	 
41. Tick all the answers below that come close to describing how your child's 
imaginary companion disappeared. 
Yes No 
Suddenly, without any explanation 
The child gradually stopped playing with 	Yes No 
and talking about his/her imaginary companion 
The imaginary companion was replaced by 	Yes No 
another imaginary companion 
Yes No 
The imaginary companion moved away or died 
The imaginary companion disappeared 	 Yes No 
when the child started kindergarten 
The imaginary companion disappeared soon after 	Yes No 
the child had a fight or disagreement with him/her 
Other 	(please specify) 	  
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42. Does/did your child's imaginary companion : 
Yes No 
Appear almost every day 
Appear frequently, but not every day 
Appear usually on weekends 
Appear only once or twice 
Other (please specify) 	 
43. Tick the answers which best describe the mood your child is/was usually in 
when talking about or playing with his/her imaginary companion. 
Happy and in high spirits 
Lonely 
Quiet and reserved 
Angry 
Tearful 
No specific mood 
Other (please specify) 
44. Tick all the answers below which apply/applied to your child's relationship to 
his/her imaginary companion. 
They usually play peacefully together 
They sometimes have disagreements and arguments 
At times the child consults or asks permission of 
his/her imaginary companion before doing something 
At times the imaginary companion asks permission of 
the child to do something 
(for example : "to accompany the child outdoors") 
The child uses his/her imaginary companion to 
escape blame or punishment 
(for example : "He told me to do it" or "She did it") 
Yes No 
 
 
    
Other 	=> (please specify) 	  
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
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45. To which of the following places or activities does/did your child's imaginary 
companion usually accompany her/him ? ( tick all that apply) 
Yes No 
Out of doors 
In the home 
Driving in the car 
While eating 
While shopping 
To and at kindergarten 
To bed 
While watching television 
The imaginary companion sometimes 
appears as a character on television 
The child talks on the telephone 
to the imaginary companion 
Other  	(please specify) 	  
46. Tick whether your child's imaginary companion occupies/occupied any physical 
space such as : (tick all that apply) 
Yes No 
Needs its own chair at the table 
Needs room in the car 
Needs a place in the child's bed 
Doesn't need any space of its own 
Other 
 
(please specify) 	  
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47. Tick all of the following ways in which your child's imaginary companion 
interacts /interacted with the family. 
The imaginary companion doesn't upset daily routine 
At times the family has to change its routine 
to include or please the imaginary companion 
The imaginary companion doesn't like family members 
other than the child 
By means of the child, the imaginary companion 
communicates and gets along well with the rest of the family 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
 
     
Other 
 
(please specify) 	  
48. Tick below any behaviour of yours that seems/seemed to prompt the imaginary 
companion to appear. 
Yes No 
Punishing or scolding the child 
Requiring the child to stay indoors or in his/her room for some reason 
Your not being able to attend or play with the child at a particular moment 
Questioning the child about or expressing interest in the imaginary companion 
Other 
 
(please specify) 	  
  
49. Tick the answer below which comes closest to your treatment of your child's 
imaginary companion : 
Yes No 
Encourage the imaginary companion 
Discourage the imaginary companion 
Ignore the imaginary companion 
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50. Tick whether you as a parent feel that your child's imaginary companion is/was 
Yes No 
Good for your child 
Harmful to your child 
Has no effect on your child 
Other 	> (please specify) 	  
51. Does/did your child : (tick all that apply) 
Prefer to interact with his/her imaginary companion 
even when other children are available to play with 
Put aside his/her imaginary companion when 
other children are around to play with 
The child does not talk about or play with his/her 
imaginary companion when strangers are around 
Yes No  
Yes No  
Yes No 
Yes No 
  
The child shares her/his imaginary companion with other children 
Other 	= (please specify) 	  
52. In the following space, please feel free to comment further or share any other 
observations you have made concerning your child's imaginary companion. 
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OPTIONAL 
Dear parent, thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
We would like to take this opportunity to invite you to assist us in gathering more 
information concerning your child's play behaviour. All information will be treated 
strictly confidentially. If you are interested, please write your name, address, and 
contact telephone number in the space provided below 
Name 	  
Address •  
Telephone No • 	  
If you have any other comments you wish to make please do so in the space 
provided below. 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE 
PLACE IT IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND RETURN IT TO YOUR 
CHILD'S TEACHER. 
ALL RESULTS WILL BE TREATED CONFIDENTIALLY 
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APPENDIX A-2 
Cover Letter to Parents 
UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA 
Department of Psychology 
University of Tasmania 
P.O. Box 252C 
Sandy Bay 7005 
Dear parent or guardian, 
My name is Paula Bouldin. I am a PhD student in the Department of Psychology 
at the University of Tasmania. Under the supervision of Prof. Chris Pratt, I am conducting 
a survey to investigate the imaginative play activities of preschool children. As parents you 
are in the best position to comment on your child's imaginative play, favourite games and 
books, and other important issues. I would be most appreciative if you could supply this 
information by completing the enclosed questionnaire. 
The questionnaire seeks information on a wide range of topics. These topics include 
your child's general style of play, as well as the more imaginative play that is associated 
with mythical beings (e.g., Santa Claus) and imaginary friends. The majority of questions 
can be answered by placing a tick in a box, although some do require a brief statement. The 
questionnaire can be completed by either or both parents for the child who is currently 
attending the kindergarten where it was distributed. However, if there is more than one child 
attending the kindergarten a separate questionnaire should be completed for each child. 
The questionnaire should be sealed in the envelope supplied and returned to the box 
provided at your child's kindergarten. It can be returned anonymously. However, as I wish 
to contact some families who have completed the questionnaire to discuss participation in 
further studies in this area; I would ask you to supply your name and address on the last 
page of the questionnaire. Please be assured that in all cases information will be treated in 
the strictest confidence. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me on 
(002) 202260 
Thank you for your time. 
Sincerely, 
• • • • • • ........ • • • • • • • • • • 
Paula Bouldin 	 Chris Pratt 
APPENDIX A-3 
The 22 Behaviors that are listed in the Imaginative Play Activities 
Questionnaire 
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Restlessness 
Nailbiting 
Overactivity 
Nose picking 
Hair pulling or twisting 
Masturbation 
Jealousy 
Fearfulness 
Aggressiveness 
Competitiveness 
Irritability 
Shyness 
Excitability 
Thumb-sucking 
Flightiness 
Awkwardness 
Submissiveness 
Daydreaming 
Over-dependence on adults 
Undue demand for attention 
Lack of self-confidence 
Sensitiveness 
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APPENDIX B-1 
Parent Consent Form for Studies Two and Three 
UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA 
Department of Psychology 
Consent Form 
Dear parent or guardian, 
My name is Paula Bouldin. I am a PhD student in the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Tasmania. Under the supervision of Prof Chris Pratt, I am conducting a 
follow-up study on childhood imaginative play that continues from previous research work in 
which you and your child have participated. At present, I am very interested in obtaining 
information regarding children's behaviour. This study requires that parents complete a series 
of behaviour checklists on aspects of their child's behaviour, such as how he/she relates to 
other children and adults. In addition, a structured interview will be administered to each 
child that will collect information on aspects of his/her fantasy behaviour (e.g., involvement 
in pretend play). If you are willing to participate in this study, could you please read and sign 
the consent form below. 
	 of 	  
hereby consent to complete a series of behaviour checklists that will record my child's 
behaviour and to the administration of a structured interview to my child, as part of the 
research study to be undertaken by Paula Bouldin and Prof Chris Pratt. 
I understand that : 
1. The study will involve myself as a parent completing checklists on my child's 
temperament, what makes my child scared, and what my child thinks and feels; 
2. A structured interview will be administered to my child that will investigate his/her fantasy 
behaviour; 
3. My child's individual results will not be released to any person unless prior written 
consent from a parent is obtained; 
4. The data will be kept in a confidential manner; 
5. I may withdraw my child from this study at any time simply by stating my desire not to 
continue. 
"I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to let my child participate in this investigation and understand that I may 
withdraw at any time without penalty. I agree that research data gathered for the study may 
be published provided that my child cannot be identified as a subject." 
Signature of parent 	 Date 	  
"I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this parent and I 
believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation ." 
Signature of investigator 	 Date 	  
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APPENDIX B-2 
Summary Tables 
1. Table B2-1. Summary of the Evaluation of Homogeneity of Variance-covariance 
Matrices for Each of the Three Analyses 	 p.188. 
2. Table B2-2. Tests of Homogeneity of Regression for all Dependent Variables in 
Each of the Three Analyses 	 p.189. 
3. Table B2-3. Tests of Homogeneity of Regression for the Covariate (Age) and IC 
in Each of the Three Analyses 	p.190. 
4. Table B2-4. Test of Multicollinearity for Each Dependent Variable-covariate Set 
in Each of the Three Analyses.   	 p.191. 
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Table B2-1 
Summary of the Evaluation of Homogeneity of Variance-Covariance Matrices for 
Each of the Three Analyses  
Dependent Variable Box's M Test 
Fear F(36,17443) = 1.03, p = .42 
Anxiety F(10, 24784) = 1.25, p = .25 
Temperament F (10, 24784) = 0.65, p = .77 
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Table B2-2 
Tests of Homogeneity of Regression for All Dependent Variables in Each of the 
Three Analyses  
Source of Variation F 
Multivariate 
df 	Sig of F 
Stepdown 
df Sig of F 
Fear 0.86 8/63 .29 
Factorl 0.29 1/70 .60 
Factor2 0.10 1/69 .75 
Factor3 0.06 1/68 .81 
Factor4 5.89 1/67 .02* 
Factor5 0.70 1/66 .41 
Factor6 0.50 1/65 .48 
Factor7 2.46 1/64 .12 
Factor 8 0.03 1/63 .86 
Anxiety 0.98 4/67 .89 
Worry 0.54 1/70 .47 
Physiol 0.09 1/69 .77 
Conc 0.06 1/68 .80 
Lie 0.46 1/67 .50 
Temperament 0.98 4/67 .79 
Approach 0.01 1/70 .93 
Inflexibility 0.17 1/69 .68 
Persist 0.09 1/68 .77 
Rhythm 1.44 . 	1/67 .24 
Note. Worry = worry/oversensivity anxiety; Physiol = physiological anxiety; Conc = 
concentration anxiety. 
*p < .05. 
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Table B2-3 
Tests of Homogeneity of Regression for the Covariate (Age) and IC in Each of 
the Three Analyses  
Effect DV 
Univariate 
F 	df F 
Stepdown 
df a 
Fear 
Covariate Factorl 2.32 1/71 2.32 1/71 .01 
Factor2 5.33' 1/71 3.74 1/71 .01 
Factor3 0.44 1/71 0.04 1/70 .01 
Factor4 3.73 1/71 6.38* 1/69 .01 
Factor5 2.24 1/71 1.58 1/68 .001 
Factor6 6.15' 1/71 3.88 1/67 .001 
Factor7 0.88 1/71 0.13 1/66 .001 
Factor 8 0.17 1/71 0.23 1/65 .001 
IC Factorl 1.36 1/71 1.36 1/71 .01 
Factor2 0.07 1/71 0.07 1/71 .01 
Factor3 2.06 1/71 2.20 1/70 .01 
Factor4 0.03 1/71 0.01 1/69 .01 
Factor5 0.00 1/71 1.30 1/68 .001 
Factor6 2.51 1/71 3.65 1/67 .001 
Factor7 2.44 1/71 2.41 1/66 .001 
Factor 8 1.31 1/71 0.96 1/65 .001 
Anxiety 
Covariate Worry 0.23 1/71 0.23 1/71 .01 
Physiol 2.89 1/71 3.78 1/71 .01 
Conc 1.40 1/71 3.81 1/70 .01 
Lie 0.00 1/71 0.20 1/69 .01 
IC Worry 4.32' 1/71 4.32* 1/71 .01 
Physiol 0.33 1/71 0.33 1/71 .01 
Conc 4.96' 1/71 6.95* 1/70 .01 
Lie 0.00 1/71 2.13 1/69 .01 
Temperament 
Covariate Approach 2.31 1/71 2.31 1/71 .01 
Inflexibility 7.16" 1/71 5.27* 1/71 .01 
Persist 3.34 1/71 1.45 1/70 .01 
Rhythm 5.64' 1/71 1.97 1/69 .01 
IC Approach 2.58 1/71 2.58 1/71 .01 
Inflexibility 0.97 1/71 0.97 1/71 .01 
Persist 0.02 1/71 0.01 1/70 .01 
Rhythm 0.83 1/71 0.27 1/69 .01 
Note. Worry = worry/oversensivity anxiety; Physiol = physiological anxiety; Conc = 
concentration anxiety. 
a Significance cannot be evaluated would reach p < .05 in the univariate context. 
*p < .05. 
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Table B2-4 
Test of Multicollinearity for Each Dependent Variable-Covariate Set in Each of 
the Three Analyses  
Variable R-Squared F-Statistic Significance 
Fear 
Factorl 0.04 1.00 .40 
Factor2 0.14 2.71 .04 
Factor3 0.11 1.76 .13 
Factor4 0.21 3.01 .01 
Factor5 0.28 3.67 .00 
Factor6 0.18 1.77 .10 
Factor7 0.32 3.28 .00 
Factor8 0.24 1.95 .05 
Anxiety 
Worry 0.08 2.07 .11 
Physiol 0.14 2.84 .03 
Conc 0.30 5.87 .00 
Lie 0.08 0.91 .50 
Temperament 
Approach 0.06 1.50 .22 
Inflexibility 0.18 3.84 .00 
Persistence 0.09 1.39 .24 
Rhythm 0.21 3.01 .01 
Note. Worry = worry/oversensitivity anxiety; Physiol = physiological anxiety; Conc 
= concentration anxiety. 
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APPENDIX B-3 
MANCOVA Source Tables for IC by Anxiety, IC by Temperament, and 
IC by Fear 
IC by Anxiety 
Tests of Significance for Worry Using Coy Adj Sequential Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Within and residual 229.86 71 3.24 
Regression 1.15 1 1.15 .35 .554 
IC 13.99 1 13.99 4.32 .041 
Multivariate Tests of Significance 
Test Name Value Exact F Hypoth. DF Error DF Sig. of F 
Pillais .12024 3.18899 3.00 70.00 .029 
Hotellings .13667 3.18899 3.00 70.00 .029 
Wilks .87976 3.18899 3.00 70.00 .029 
Roys .12024 
Univariate F-tests with (1, 72) D. F.  
Variable Hypoth. SS Error SS Hypoth. MS 
	
Error MS 	F 	Sig. of F 
Physiol 1.53385 329.76943 1.53385 4.58013 .33489 .565 
Conc 13.68500 198.52415 13.68500 2.75728 4.96322 .029 
Lie .00583 102.57822 .00583 1.42470 .00409 .949 
Roy-Bargman Stepdown F - tests 
Variable Hypoth. MS Error MS StepDown F Hypoth. DF Error DF 	Sig. of F 
Physiol 1.53385 4.58013 .33489 1 72 .565 
Cone 16.50874 2.37435 6.95296 1 71 .010 
Lie 2.40289 1.12573 2.13452 1 70 .148 
Note. Worry = worry/oversensitivity anxiety; Physiol = physiological anxiety; Conc 
= concentration anxiety. 
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IC by Temperament 
Tests of Significance for Approach using Coy Adj Sequential Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Within and residual 23.10 71 .33 
Residual 1.15 1 1.15 3.54 .064 
IC .84 1 .84 2.58 .113 
Multivariate Tests of Significance 
Test Name Value Exact F Hypoth. DF Error DF Sig. of F 
Pillais .01715 .40724 3.00 70.00 .748 
Hotellings .01745 .40724 3.00 70.00 .748 
Wilks .98285 .40724 3.00 70.00 .748 
Roys .01715 
Univariate F-tests with (1,72) D. F. 
Variable Hypoth. SS Error SS 
	
Hypoth. MS Error MS 	F 
	
Sig. of F 
Inflex .18409 13.68345 .18409 .19005 .96863 .328 
Persist .00828 24.81588 .00828 .34466 .02402 .877 
Rhythm .55364 48.18043 .55364 .66917 .82735 .366 
Note. Inflex = inflexibility; Persist = persistence; Rhythm = rhythmicity 
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IC by Fear 
Tests of Significance for Factor 1 using Coy Adj Sequential Sums of Squares 
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Within and residual 48.99 71 .69 
Regression .04 1 .04 .06 .810 
IC .94 1 .94 1.36 .247 
Multivariate Tests of Significance 
Test Name Value Exact F Hypoth. DF Error DF Sig. of F 
Pillais .14144 1.55326 7.00 66.00 .165 
Hotellings .16474 1.55326 7.00 66.00 .165 
Wilks .85856 1.55326 7.00 66.00 .165 
Roys .14144 
Univariate F-tests with (1,72) D. F.  
Variable Hypoth. SS Error SS 	Hypoth. MS Error MS F 	Sig. of F 
F2 .04112 42.16401 .04112 .58561 .07022 .792 
F3 1.50833 52.82239 1.50833 .73364 2.05595 .156 
F4 .01206 33.18247 .01206 .46087 .02617 .872 
F5 .00178 64.28951 .00178 .89291 .00199 .965 
F6 1.32010 37.93641 1.32010 .52689 2.50544 .118 
F7 1.64105 48.48228 1.64105 .67336 2.43709 .123 
F8 .80531 44.41701 .80531 .61690 1.30541 .257 
Note. F = Factor. 
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APPENDIX C-1 
Children's Predisposition to Fantasy Interview 
Question 1 
A. Do you have dreams when you are asleep at night ? 
[ Prompt: Do you see pictures in your head when you are asleep at night?] 
B. Can you tell me about some of your dreams ?/ What sorts of things do you 
dream about? (Can you tell me about some of the pictures that you see in your 
head when you are asleep ?) 
C. Are they happy dreams or sad dreams ? (Are they happy pictures or sad 
pictures?) 
Question 2 
A. Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head (daydream) during the 
day ? 
B. What kinds of pictures do you see ?(What kind of things do you daydream 
about? / Can you describe them to me or tell me about them)? 
C. Are they happy pictures (daydreams) or sad pictures (daydreams)? 
D. Do you picture these things in your head (daydream) when you are on your own 
(when there is nobody else around) ? 
E. Do the people and things that you picture in your head (daydream about) 
sometimes seem so real that you think you can almost see or hear them in front 
of you? 
[Prompt: Can you see the pictures in your head (daydreams) like you see me?] 
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Question 3 
A. Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think about? 
B. What kinds of things do you think about that scare you ?/Can you tell me about 
(or describe) them ? 
C. Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things ? 
Question 4 
A. Do you play pretend games when you are by yourself (on your own or when 
nobody else is around)? 
B. What kinds of pretend games do you play by yourself? 
Question 5 
A. Do you play pretend games when you are with your friends ? 
B. What kinds of pretend games do you play with your friends ? 
Question 6 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel so happy that you don't ever 
want the game to end ? 
Question 7 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel like you can really see the 
pretend places and people in the room with you ? 
Question 8 
A. Do you have a make-believe friend who you talk to and who goes places with 
you? 
B. Did you have a make-believe friend who you talked to and who went places 
with you ? 
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APPENDIX C -2 
The Selected and New Items that Comprise the Children's Predisposition to Fantasy 
Interview 
Table C2-1 
Selected Items from the Four Factored Sub-scales of the Children's Fantasy  
Inventory by Rosenfeld et al. (1982) as well as the New Items that Comprise the 
Children's Predisposition to Fantasy Interview  
Item 
R 41. 
R 42. 
R 43. 
R 44. 
R 45. 
Factor 1 "Frequency of Imaginative Activity"  
Do you picture these things in your head when you are on your own 
(when there is nobody else around) ? 
Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head during the day ? 
Do you play pretend games when you are by yourself (on your own or 
when nobody else is around)? 
What kinds of pretend games do you play by yourself? 
Do you play pretend games when you are with your friends ? 
What kinds of pretend games do you play with your friends? 
Do you have dreams when you are asleep at night? 
Can you tell me about some of your dreams?/ What sorts of things do 
you dream about? 
Are they happy dreams or sad dreams? 
Do you see pictures in your head when you are asleep at night? 
Can you tell me about some of the pictures that you see in your head 
when you are asleep? / What sorts of things do you picture in your head 
when you are asleep? 
(table  continues) 
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Item 
Factor 3 "Fanciful Fantasy"  
R 2. 
R 35. 
R 39. 
R 34. 
R 
so 
17. 
R 31. 
R 25. 
Do you have a make-believe friend who you talk to and who goes 
places with you ? 
Did you have a make-believe friend who you talked to and who went 
places with you ? 
Are they happy pictures or sad pictures ? 
Factor 5 "Scary Fantasy"  
Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think 
about ? 
What kinds of things do you think about that scare you?/Can you tell 
me about (describe) them? 
Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Factor 6 "Vividness of Fantasy"  
Do the people and things that you picture in your head sometimes seem 
real that you think you can almost see or hear them in front of you ? 
Can you see the pictures in your head (daydreams) like you see me? 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel so happy that you 
don't ever want the game to end ? 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel like you can really 
see the pretend places and people in the room with you ? 
Note. R = Reworded item; N = New Item 
APPENDIX C-3 
Response Variables and Sample Definitions Code Book - Study Three 
(Developed by Paula Bouldin) 
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Purpose of this code book 
This code book has been specifically devised to allow categorisation of children's 
responses to each question of the Children's Predisposition to Fantasy Interview 
(CPFI). The purpose of this categorisation was to assess children's involvement in 
dreams, daydreams, and pretend games. 
In accordance with the sequence of the interview, the code book is divided into five 
sections: a) dreams, b) daydreams, c) scary thoughts, d) pretend games, and e) 
imaginary companions 
Code the responses to each question by placing a tick in the box beside the 
appropriate answer on the score sheet provided. Unless specifically directed, score 
ONE response for each child.  
A. Dreams 
Question la 
Do you have dreams when you are asleep at night? 
[Prompt: Do you see pictures in your head when you are asleep at night?] 
The prompt question was only asked if the response to question la was negative. 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes the following type of responses:  
Yes 
Night and morning 
Sometimes at night and sometimes in the morning 
In the middle of the night 
Usually 
Mark the response negative if it includes the following type of responses:  
No 
Not really 
Mark the responses sometimes if it includes the following type of responses:  
Hardly have any dreams 
Not often 
Sometimes 
Sometimes, most of the time not 
Sometimes, don't dream much 
Not usually, sometimes 
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If the response to question la is affirmative or sometimes, score the response 
according to question la and proceed to question lb. 
If the response to question la is negative, proceed to the probe question and score 
the probe response according to question la. 
If the response to the probe question is affirmative or sometimes, score the response 
according to questions la and proceed to question lb. 
If the response to the probe question is negative, score the response according to 
question la and proceed to question 2. 
Question lb 
Can you tell me about some of your dreams?/ What sorts of things do you 
dream about? (Can you tell me about some of the pictures that you see in your 
head when you are asleep?) 
Responses are divided into memory and dream content. Children's responses can be 
scored on both memory and dream content. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. 
Mark the response can't remember if it includes the following types of responses:  
Can't remember 
I forgot 
Refuse to describe 
Too many to remember 
Don't know 
Maybe 
Mark the response remember if the answer to question lb includes a description.  
If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question lb and proceed to question lc. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question lb and proceed to score dream content. 
Dream content 
Descriptive responses are scored according to a mythical-realistic dimension 
which incorporates three classifications. These include mythical items that belong 
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to a generic group of non-existent beings (e.g., fairies) fictional items that refer to 
specific fictional characters (e.g., cartoon characters) and realistic items which 
includes beings that exist (e.g., animals). 
Descriptive responses can be scored to indicate one theme (mythical, fictional, or 
realistic) or it can be scored to indicate multiple themes (e.g., mythical and fictional; 
mythical, fictional, and realistic). If the content incorporates more than one theme 
place a tick in the boxes beside the appropriate themes. For example, if a dream 
includes both mythical and fictional items, then both types of response would be 
ticked. 
Mark the content mythical if it includes the following types of responses:  
Unicorns 
Witches 
Giants 
Monsters 
Aliens 
Dragons 
Dinosaurs 
Fairies 
Magical events or transformations 
Ghosts 
Mark the content fictional if it includes the following types of responses:  
Cartoon characters (e.g., characters from the twins of destiny cartoon such as Jules 
and Julie and Eunuchs) 
Peter Pan 
Noddy 
Pirates 
Batman 
Superman 
queen 
Star 
Mark the content realistic if it includes the following types of responses:  
Animals (tigers, cats, monkeys, birds, gorillas) 
People (family members, friends) 
Social and living events (school fairs, school, moving house, walks) 
Score dream content and proceed to question 1 c. 
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Question lc 
Are they happy dreams or sad dreams? (Are they happy pictures or sad 
pictures?) 
Responses are divided into memory and dream mood. Children's responses can be 
scored on both memory and dream mood. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question lc and proceed to question 2a. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question lc and proceed to score dream mood. 
Dream mood 
Responses are divided into happy, sad, or happy and sad. 
Mark the response as happy if it includes the following types of responses:  
Happy 
Mostly good dreams 
Happy mostly 
good pictures 
Mark the content as sad if it includes the following types of responses:  
Sad 
Bad 
Don't know, sometimes bad 
Mark the content as happy and sad if it includes the following types of responses:  
Some happy, some sad 
Some scary, some not 
Half happy, half sad 
Some good, some bad 
Score dream mood and proceed to question 2a. 
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B. Daydreams 
Question 2a 
Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head (daydream) during the 
day? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response negative if it includes the following type of responses:  
No 
Only when I'm dreaming 
I don't get pictures in my head 
Mark the response sometimes according to the criteria for question la.  
If the question yields an affirmative or sometimes response, score the response 
according to question 2a and proceed to question 2b. 
If the question yields a negative response, score the response according to question 
2a and proceed to question 3a. 
Question 2b 
What kinds of pictures do you see? (What kind of things do you day dream 
about/Can you describe them to me or tell me about them?) 
Responses are divided into memory and day-dream content. Children's responses 
can be scored on both memory and day-dream content. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question 2b and proceed to question 2c. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question 2b and proceed to score day-dream content. 
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Day-dream content 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, and realistic in accordance with the 
mythical-realistic dimension. Score day-dream content according to the criteria for 
question lb. 
Score daydream content and proceed to question 2c. 
Question 2c 
Are they happy pictures (daydreams) or sad pictures (daydreams)? 
Responses are divided into memory and day-dream mood. Children's responses can 
be scored on both memory and day-dream mood. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question 2c and proceed to question 2d. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question 2c and proceed to score day-dream mood. 
Day-dream mood 
Responses are divided into happy, sad, or happy and sad. Use the criteria for 
questionlc. 
Score day-dream mood and proceed to question 2d. 
Question 2d 
Do you picture these things in your head (daydream) when you are on your 
own (when there is nobody else around)? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response negative according to the criteria for question la.  
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Mark the response sometimes if it includes the following types of responses:  
Sometimes alone 
Sometimes in class 
Sometimes with mum 
Sometimes with other people 
Score the response according to question 2d and proceed to question 2e 
Question 2e 
Do the people and things that you picture in your head (daydream about) 
sometimes seem so real that you think you can almost see or hear them in 
front of you? 
j Prompt: Can you see the pictures in your head (daydreams) like you see 
The prompt question was only asked if the response to question 2e indicated that 
additional information may be obtained through further questions. 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, sometimes, or can't remember. 
Mark the response affirmative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response negative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response sometimes according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response can't remember according to the criteria for question lb.  
If the question yields a can't remember response, proceed to the prompt question. 
The prompted response is scored according to the criteria for question 2e. 
Score all other responses according to question 2e and proceed to question 3a. 
C. Scary Thoughts 
Question 3a 
Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think about? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. Use the criteria for 
question 1a. 
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If the question yields an affirmative or sometimes response, score the response 
according to question 3a and proceed to question 3b. 
If the question yields a negative response, score the response according to question 
3a and proceed to question 4a. 
Question 3b 
What kinds of things do you think about that scare you?/Can you tell me 
about (or describe) them? 
Responses are divided into memory and scary thoughts content. Children's 
responses can be scored on both memory and scary thoughts content. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
If 'the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question 3b and proceed to question 3c. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question 3b and proceed to score scary thought content. 
Scary thought content 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, and realistic in accordance with the 
mythical-realistic dimension. Score scary thought content according to the criteria 
for question lb. 
I Score scary thought content and proceed to question 3c. 
Question 3c 
Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes 
Mark the response affirmative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response negative according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response sometimes according to the criteria for question la.  
I Score the response according to question 3c and proceed to question 4a. 
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D. Pretend Games 
Question 4a 
Do you play pretend games when you are by yourself (on your own or when 
nobody else is around)? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. Use the criteria for 
question la. 
If the question yields an affirmative or sometimes response, score the response 
according to question 4a and proceed to question 4b. 
If the question yields a negative response, score the response according to question 
4a and proceed to question 5a. 
Question 4b 
What kinds of pretend games do you play by yourself? 
Responses are divided into memory and pretend game content. Children's responses 
can be scored on both memory and pretend game content. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question 4b and proceed to question 5a. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question 4b and proceed to score pretend game content. 
Pretend game content 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, and realistic in accordance with the 
mythical-realistic dimension. Use the criteria for question lb with the following 
additions to the mythical, fictitious, and realistic categories. 
Mark the content mythical if it includes any of the items listed in question lb, or 
the following types of responses:  
Pretending to be a mythical character that has magical properties (e.g., fairy) 
Pretend to be floating in a supernatural way 
Devising games that involve any of the items listed in question lb 
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Mark the content fictional if it includes any of the items listed in question lb, or the 
following types of responses:  
Pretending to be a fictional character (e.g., Batman, Captain Planet) 
Devising games that involve any of the items listed in question lb 
Mark the content realistic if it includes any of the items listed in question lb, or the 
following types of responses:  
Pretending to be different animals (e.g., playing puppies) 
Devising games from social and living events (teacher-pupil, tea-parties, dress-ups) 
Well known games (e.g., hide and seek, chasey, duck, duck, goose, sport) 
Building things from real items (e.g., lego, duplo, making a boat out of cushions) 
Devising stories for real items such as plastic dinosaurs, and dolls 
Devising games that involve any of the items listed in question lb 
Score pretend game content and proceed to question 5a 
Question 5a 
Do you play pretend games when you are with your friends? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. Use the criteria for 
question la. 
If the question yields an affirmative or sometimes response, score the response 
according to question 5a and proceed to question 5b. 
If the question yields a negative response, score the response according to question 
5a and proceed question 6. 
Question 5b 
What kinds of pretend games do you play with your friends? 
Responses are divided into memory and pretend game content. Children's responses 
can be scored on both memory and pretend game content. 
Memory 
Responses are divided into can't remember or remember. Use the criteria for 
question lb. 
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If the question yields a can't remember response, score the response according to 
question 5b and proceed to question 6. 
If the question yields a descriptive (remembered) response, score the response 
according to question 5b and proceed to score pretend game content. 
Pretend game content 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, and realistic in accordance with the 
mythical-realistic dimension. Use the criteria for question lb with the additions 
that are listed in question 4b. 
Score pretend game content and proceed to question 6. 
Question 6 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel so happy that you don't 
ever want the game to end? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. Use the criteria for 
question la. 
I Score the response according to question 6 and proceed to question 7. 
Question 7 
Sometimes when you play pretend games, do you feel like you can really see 
the pretend places and people in the room with you? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. Use the criteria for 
question la. 
Score the response according to question 7 and proceed to question 8a. 
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E. Imaginary Companion 
Question 8a 
Do you have a make-believe friend who you talk to and who goes places with 
you? 
Responses are divided into affirmative or negative. Use the criteria for question la. 
If the question yield's an affirmative response, score the response according to 
question 8a and conclude the scoring for interview. 
If the question yield's a negative response, score the response according to question 
8a and proceed to question 8b 
Question 8b 
Did you have a make-believe friend who you talked to and who went places 
with you? 
Responses are divided into affirmative or negative. Use the criteria for question la. 
Score the response according to question 8b and conclude the scoring for the 
interview. 
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APPENDIX D-1 
Post -test Interview - Study Four 
If the child went into the tent- 
Q1A. What did you think when you went inside the tent? 
If the child answers with a single adjective answer (e.g., good) proceed with 
Probe A 
[Probe A: e.g., What was good about it?] 
If the child's answer is descriptive of the tent and what they saw proceed with 
Probe B. 
[Probe B: That was what you saw but what were you thinking before you went 
into the tent?] 
If the child's statement indicates the belief that something may have been in the tent 
proceed to question 4a. 
If the child's answer is vague (e.g., don't know) proceed to question 2. 
If the child did not want to go into the tent - ask question lb 
Q1B. Oh, did you not want to go into the tent - Can you tell me why ? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 2. 
........ 
Q2. Did you think there was something inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did you 
think there might be something inside the tent?] 
If the child's answer is vaguely affirmative (e.g., a head nod) proceed to question 3, 
otherwise proceed to question 4a. 
If the child's answer is indicative of the control phase referring to retrieving the pad 
from the tent, proceed to the probe. 
N. N. N N. NNNNN 	 N N eV N 
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Q3. What did you think was inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did you 
think there might be something inside the tent?] 
If the child's answer is indicative of the control phase referring to retrieving the pad 
from the tent proceed to the probe, otherwise proceed to question 4a. 
Q4A. Did you think there might have been a monster inside the tent? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 4b. 
. no no no nu no ho ne no no no nu no no no no no no no no no nu no no no no no 
Q4B. Did you think there may have been something else inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did you 
think there might be something inside the tent?] 
If the child answers negatively to questions 4a and 4b proceed to question 4d. 
If the child answers affirmatively to question 4b, proceed to question 5. 
If the child answers affirmatively to question 4a, proceed to question 4c. 
If the child's answer is indicative of the control phase referring to retrieving the pad 
from the tent, proceed to the probe. 
ho no ne no no no no no nO PIO no no no "." nO nO. nO nO ....... no ••■• 
Q4C. Did you think the monster inside the tent was like the one you described 
to me for my story? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 5. 
...... he N he h• ha he he no no no no no nu no no ne no no no no no no nr no no 
Q4D. What made you think that there was nothing inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did you 
think there might be something inside the tent?] 
If the child's answer is indicative of the control phase referring to retrieving the pad 
from the tent proceed to the probe, otherwise proceed to question 5. 
P., N. N. /V ".• NNNNN •••■• he he eSe 	eN.• /So /So /le .......... •••■ no no 
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Q5. Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head (daydream) during 
the day? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 6a. 
Q6A. Do you ever see make-believe things or pictures in your mind and think 
about them? 
If the child answers negatively proceed to question 7a. 
If the child provides a detailed description of the pictures that they see proceed to 
question 6c, otherwise proceed to question 6b. 
NNNN 	 No No No N N ON. N ".■ "0 "0 "0 ".0 "0 N. 
Q6B. What kinds of pictures do you see? 
If the child's answer is vague (e.g., lots, I don't know) proceed to question 6b1. 
If the child's answer is descriptive proceed to question 6c. 
N 	 N NN"...N.N.NN N 	 Ne N /No N. /Se N 
Q6B1. Can you describe them to me? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 6c. 
N.N.N.N.NNN.NoNoNNNeNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN.S.N.NNN 
Q6C. Do the people and things that you picture in your head (daydream 
about) sometimes seem so real that you think you can almost see or hear them 
in front of you? 
Irrespective of child's answer proceed to question 6d. 
Q6D. Can you see the pictures in your head (daydreams) like you see me? 
Irrespective of the child's answer proceed to question 7a. 
0,0 ey 	".• 	".• 	 ON, ey 	 es. 
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Q7A. Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you think 
about? 
If the child answers negatively the interview is concluded. 
If the child's answer is vague (e.g., yes) proceed to question 7b. 
If child describes scary thoughts proceed to question 7c. 
••■••••,,rnal,..-Nen... ,,Nneno,•,....■ •••••,•,•••■•".••••••■• ..... no,••••••■•••••••••••■••••••••■• 
Q7B. What kinds of things do you think about that scare you/Can you tell me 
about them? 
Irrespective of child's answer proceed to question 7c. 
h. h. no no no no no no h h no h no h ne /.... "... ..... ".... no n.• el, .0, ...... 0,0 ..... 0, ne /Se *No •••■• 
Q7C. Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Conclusion of interview. 
ne,,,,,,,,e.,,,,,,...NN,ononenoN•NoNno",,e"..nono,,,,,,hr".•,,I,Nnen..", 
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APPENDIX D-2 
Parent Permission Form for Studies Four and Five 
UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA 
Department of Psychology 
Parent Permission Form 
Dear parent or guardian, 
My name is Paula Bouldin. I am a PhD student in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Tasmania. Under the supervision of Prof. Chris Pratt, I am conducting a study on 
childhood play to investigate the role of imaginative activity in childhood development. As I am 
interested in all aspects of imaginative play including imaginary companions, this study seeks 
information regarding the play of children who do and do not have imaginary companions. An 
imaginary companion is a very vivid imaginary character (person or animal) that does not actually 
exist although the child treats it as though it does. 
This study requires children to actively participate in one controlled pretend play session at 
their preschool or school. During this session, children will be asked to describe a storybook character 
such as an animal or monster and then imagine that it exists in the room with them. Each child's 
reaction to this imagined character will be observed and recorded on video. Previous research has  
indicated that children thoroughly enjoy this type of pretend play situation and often do not want it to 
end. 
Be assured that every child who participates will be accompanied throughout this session and 
that all recordings and other data will remain strictly confidential. Individual results will not be 
released to any person except at parental request and you may withdraw your child from this study at 
any time simply by stating your desire not to continue. In addition, approval for this study has been 
obtained from the University Ethics Committee. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to 
contact me on (002) 207664. 
If you are willing to allow your child to participate in this study, could you please read the 
following paragraph and sign the form below. 
"I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to let my child participate in this investigation and understand that I may 
withdraw at any time. I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published 
provided that my child cannot be identified as a participant." 
Signature of parent 	 Date 	  
Contact phone number........... ..... ......................... 
Address (if no contact phone number).............. ..... ............................................ 
Could you please indicate if your child has an imaginary companion by circling either yes or 
no in the space provided below. 
Imaginary companion...... ..... YES ... 	......NO 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
• • • • • • • • • • • - • • ..... • • - • • • • • • 
Paula Bouldin 	 Chris Pratt 
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APPENDIX D -3 
Procedure and Instructions for Conducting Study Four 
Procedure 
Author: 
• Sets up the camera and testing room prior to each testing session. 
• Accompanies each child to and from the classroom. 
• On arrival at the testing room, introduces the child to the experimenter and then 
leaves. 
• Packs up the testing room at the end of each session. 
Experimenter: 
After the introductions, invites the child to sit at least 40cm from the tent. 
The experimenter must ensure that:  
• The child is seated facing the side of the tent where the silhouette will be 
projected. 
• The child cannot see into the tent through the tent flaps. 
• Both the child and experimenter are in line with the camera lens without 
obstructing recording. 
• The projector remote control is concealed. 
The experimenter then sets the camera to record and commences with a 5 to 10 
minute conversation that asks children about their favorite TV shows, games, and 
stories. 
Introduction 
Hi (child's name) we'll just sit here shall we? You know I'm really 
interested in finding out the kinds of games and stories that boys/girls of 
your age like, so I'm going to ask you a few questions about your favorite 
games, stories, and TV shows. O.K.? 
Control phase 
At the end of this conversation the experimenter then asks the child: 
"Could you get my writing pad out of the tent for me? Thanks." 
The test phase  
The experimenter then tells the child: 
Well, I'm trying to write a story for children your age. Its about a monster 
that lives in a cave, a bit like that tent over there. In my story, this monster is 
so good at hiding that it might be near you in the cave but you wouldn't 
know unless it decided to let you see it The only problem is, I'm having 
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trouble describing what it looks like and I need your help. Do you think you 
could help me describe the monster? 
• The child is urged to fully describe the monster. Whilst the child is describing the 
monster, the experimenter is to continually draw the child's attention to the tent 
with comments such as "Do you think the monster would fit in the tent?". 
• After the child has finished describing the monster, the child's efforts are to be 
praised and their attention again drawn to the tent whilst projecting the monster-
like silhouette onto it 
• The silhouette is to be projected for up to three seconds (maximum). 
• If the child reacts to the silhouette and indicates that they saw something, the 
silhouette is not to be projected again. 
• If the child does not react to the silhouette or does not indicate that they saw 
something, the silhouette is to be projected again and two additional remarks are 
to be made. These are: "Are you okay?" and "O.K. you just looked a bit 
worried". This second statement should be said in a light dismissive tone of 
voice. 
• If the child responds to these questions with vague responses (e.g., "look!") or 
questions the experimenter regarding what they saw, two additional questions 
are to be asked. These are : "What's that?" and "What do you think it is?" 
• After ensuring that the child had seen the projection, the experimenter then says: 
"Thanks (child's name) your description is really good and has really helped me a 
lot. Would you put my writing pad back in the tent for me?" 
• Children who do not wish to enter the tent do not have to do so. 
Post-test phase  
• The experimenter says "I just have to add your description of the monster to my 
story, whilst I'm doing this you can play with any of the toys in this room." 
• The experimenter will then move away from the child and appear engrossed in 
adding the child's description to the story. 
• After an interval of 90 seconds, and whilst the child is playing, the experimenter 
will ask the child the post-test questions. 
The post-test questions  
• The experimenter can use the written interview provided, but must be familiar 
with the questions and guidelines regarding the progression of the interview. 
• The interview questions must be asked exactly as they appear in the written 
interview. 
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• On completion of the post-test questions, the experimenter stops the camera 
recording. 
Debriefing 
The experimenter de-briefs the child with regard to the fact that the shadow 
is a trick, but does not show the child the whole set-up. For example: 
(child's name) you know that shape that you saw on the tent here (points to 
side of tent) well its a trick that I can do with light. See, I have a very 
special gadget that uses the light to form a shadow, so there wasn't anything 
in the tent it was just the light. Okay? Do you want to have a look in the 
tent with me? See, there's nothing in here. It's nice in here isn't it? you 
could have tea parties in it. How many friends do you think would fit in 
here? 
This explanation can be varied according to each child's level of 
understanding. However, in each case the experimenter must ensure that the child 
understands that the silhouette was a trick and encourage them to think of pleasant 
uses for the tent. 
General points 
1. If a lot of children are being tested from one class, the experimenter asks the 
child to keep it a secret and not to spoil the surprise for others. 
2. The experimenter stops the procedure immediately if the child appears distressed. 
3. The words pretend and make-believe are not to be mentioned at all. 
4. The experimenter should not indicate that they have seen the shadow and should 
adopt a neutral attitude toward the possibility that monsters exist and could exist in 
the tent. 
5. The experimenter should always remain facing the child. Do not sit side 
on/profile to the child because the child will move around to face you and place 
their back to the camera. 
6. Use the word daydream instead of pictures in the head for older children (6years 
to 8 years). If daydream is not understood then revert to pictures in your head. 
7. The experimenter should write down (in the note book provided) her subjective 
impressions regarding the ease or difficulty with which rapport was established 
with each child. These impressions should be written down as soon as the child 
leaves the testing room and should include whether the child was easy or difficult 
to talk to and whether she/he required continual prompting to speak. 
APPENDIX D-4 
See and Touch Questions from Taylor et al. (1993) 
Can you see (friend's name)? 
Can you see (friend's name) the way you see me? 
Do you think I can see (friend's name) right now? 
Can you touch (friend's name)? 
Can you touch (friend's name) the way you touch me? 
Do you think I can touch (friend's name)? 
Can you describe (friend's name) to me? 
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APPENDIX D-5 
Response Variables and Sample Definitions Code Book - Study Four 
(Developed by Paula Bouldin) 
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Purpose of this code book 
This code book has been specifically devised to allow categorisation of children's 
responses following the projection of a monster shaped silhouette. The purpose of 
this categorisation was to assess children's: a) responses to seeing a silhouette of a 
monster after having described one, b) beliefs that an imaginative monster could be 
reflected in reality, and c) general immersion in fantasy. 
In accordance with the sequence of the study, the code book is divided into three 
sections: a) the control phase, where the child initially retrieves the pad from the 
tent; b) the test phase, which includes the child's response to seeing the silhouette, 
and subsequent approach to, and behavior at, the tent; and c) the post test phase, 
which includes play with toys and a post test interview. 
Code the responses in each section by placing a tick beside the appropriate answer 
on the score sheet provided. Unless specifically directed, score ONE response for 
each child. 
A. Control Phase 
Could you get my writing pad out of the tent for me? Thanks 
Responses are divided into no hesitation or hesitation. 
Mark the response no hesitation if it includes the following types of response:  
There was less than a two second delay between the interviewer's request and the 
child's readiness to enter the tent and retrieve the pad. This definition excludes any 
difficulties the child may have had either finding the opening of the tent, or a path 
past the interviewer into the tent. 
Examples may include: 
Enters the tent through the doorway without hesitation. 
Lifts up the sides of the tent and retrieved the pad. Child's head and shoulders do 
not necessarily enter the tent. 
Crawls under the tent walls so that head and shoulders are inside the tent 
Mark the response hesitation if it includes the following types of response:  
There was a two second or greater delay between the interviewer's request and the 
child's readiness to enter the tent and retrieve the pad despite an awareness of, and 
an ability to negotiate a path to, the opening of the tent. 
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B. Test Phase 
RESPONSE TO SEEING THE SILHOUETTE 
Whilst projecting the silhouette, the interviewer asked, "Do you think the 
monster would fit in the tent? 
Responses to the silhouette are divided into non-verbal responses which include 
each child's expression or general response and physical reaction, and verbal 
responses. Children's responses can be scored as both non-verbal and verbal. 
In cases where the child either did not react to the silhouette, or required 
prompting to indicate that they had seen the silhouette, two prompts were used. 
These prompts were: 
[ Prompt A: Are you O.K. there?] 
[ Prompt B: O.K. You just looked a bit worried] 
Prompt A was initially asked to convey empathy and induce the child to indicate 
whether they had seen the silhouette. If no response was obtained prompt B was 
asked. However, the content of this prompt was never an indication of a child's 
facial expression. It was used as a light-hearted dismissive statement to explain the 
interviewer's previous question and to prompt the child to indicate if they had seen 
the silhouette. 
If the child's reply to prompts A and/or B included a verbal response indicating that 
they had seen something (e.g., "Look!") two additional prompts were used to elicit 
further information. These prompts were: 
[Prompt C: What's that?] 
[Prompt D: What do you think it is?] 
Prompt C was initially asked to induce a child to explain what they had seen. If the 
response to this prompt was either vague (e.g., "There was a flash") or questioning 
(e.g., "What is it?") then prompt D was asked. 
Non-verbal Responses  
Expression or general response 
Responses are divided into general response or no response. 
Mark the behaviour as general response if it includes the following types of 
response:  
Chewing coat sleeve 
Lowered tone 
Startled 
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Giggles 
Shivers. .Mm 
Mark the behaviour no response if it includes the following types of response:  
The child does not react as described above. 
The child does not react except to answer the prompts by nodding their head. 
Physical reaction 
Responses are divided into movement or no movement. 
Mark the response movement if it includes the following types of response:  
Crawling around the perimeter 
Going inside the tent 
Lifts the side of the tent and looks inside 
Crawls to the tent opening and opens tent flaps 
Looks at the side where the silhouette appeared 
Touches the tent where the silhouette appeared 
Makes to approach the tent 
Goes back to investigate the tent 
Turns or moves away from the tent 
Looks around the room 
Points to the side of the tent where the silhouette had been projected 
Mark the response no movement if it includes the following types of response:  
The child does not engage in any of the previously described behaviors. 
Verbal Responses  
Responses are divided into spontaneous comments and prompt statements. If a 
spontaneous comment required clarification then prompts C and D were asked. If 
the child did not react to the silhouette then prompts A and B were asked followed 
by prompts C and D if further explanation was required. Children's responses can 
be scored in both spontaneous and prompted categories. 
Spontaneous comments 
Responses are divided into no spontaneous comment, spontaneous non-monster, or 
spontaneous monster. 
Mark the response no spontaneous comment if it includes the following types of 
responses:  
The child does not make any statements or comments at all. 
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Mark the response spontaneous non-monster if it includes the following types of 
responses:  
Non-monster statements, questions, and exclamations where the context of the 
conversation indicates that the child saw something but does not specifically state 
that they thought it was the monster's silhouette. 
Examples may include: 
How's that done? 
What's that thing? 
Cool! 
Huh Huh look! 
Ooh I saw something! 
There's a light flashed on 
There's something flashing on it! 
Look! 
How come it's glowing? 
Monsters have it dark in there and it's light in there 
Let me see in here 
There's a light just flashed on 
There's something flashing on it 
I can see changes in there 
Oh, there it is 
There's something there 
Guess what? I saw something on the tent there 
Mark the response spontaneous monster if it includes the following types of 
responses:  
Monster statements, questions, and exclamations where the context of the 
conversation indicates that the child believes they saw a monster's silhouette. 
Example may include: 
Hey! How did he get in there? 
Is that a real monster? 
I saw something flash and it looked like the monster 
I saw a light and he was like a monster 
I saw something flash and it looked like a monster 
Prompt statements 
Responses are divided into p-no comment, p-non-monster, or p-monster. 
For the following prompt categories, indicate the type of prompts that were used to 
elicit the response(s) by placing a tick in the box that denotes prompt A/B and/or 
prompt CID. 
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Mark the response P-no comment if it includes the following types of response:  
The child does not react until prompted and when prompted does not comment 
except to answer the prompt questions. 
Mark the response P-non-monster if it includes the following types of response:  
The context of the conversation indicates that the child believes that something, but 
not the monster, is inside the tent. 
Examples may include: 
It had a shadow of a blue shape 
It's only a photo or something 
I saw a shadow in there 
I saw something flashing there 
Shadow, it's flashing 
There's something going on and off in there, keeps flashing on and off 
Black tiger 
Mark the response P-monster if it includes the following Woes of response:  
The context of the conversation indicates that the child believes that a monster is 
inside the tent. 
Examples may include: 
That might be the monster's shadow 
The monster 
A monster 
Probably the monster 
Looked like a dinosaur...looked like a dragon too 
I saw a monster pale blue 
The monster how can he do it? 
I'm not scared of any monster! I go BOOF! 
There's a dark green monster on the tent 
Could be the monster 
But I can see a shadow of a monster in there 
Saw a light in there of a monster 
APPROACH TO THE TENT 
The approach to the tent is divided into non-verbal behaviours which includes each 
child's physical movements, and verbal behaviours. Children's behaviours can be 
scored as both non-verbal and verbal. 
Both non-verbal and verbal behaviours are divided into no hesitation, hesitation, or 
does not approach. 
227 
Non-verbal Behaviour 
Mark the response no hesitation if it includes the type of response that is described 
in the control phase, or the following examples:  
Child rushes to inspect the tent 
Child demonstrates an eagerness to inspect the tent immediately following the 
projection of the silhouette 
Child approaches the tent without hesitation 
Mark the response hesitation if it includes the type of response that is described in 
the control phase.  
Mark the response does not approach if it includes the following types of 
response:  
The child does not make any movement toward the tent. 
Examples may include: 
Child moves closer to the interviewer 
Verbal Behaviours  
Mark the response no hesitation if it includes the following types of response:  
The child's comments indicate eagerness to look inside the tent. 
Examples may include: 
Can I have a look? 
Mark the response hesitation if it includes the following types of response:  
The child's comments suggest a reluctance to enter the tent and replace the pad. 
Examples may include: 
Is it O.K. if I slip it under? 
Mark the response does not approach if it includes the following types of 
response:  
The child responds to the interviewer's request to replace the pad negatively. 
Examples may include: 
No 
I don't want to 
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BEHAVIOUR AT I HE TENT 
Behavior at the tent is divided into non-verbal behaviours which includes each 
child's physical movements, and verbal behaviours. Children can be scored on both 
non-verbal and verbal behaviours. 
Non-verbal Behaviours  
Responses are divided into enters the tent, or does not enter the tent 
Mark the response enters the tent if it includes the following types of response:  
Child enters the tent and replaces the pad at the back of the tent. 
Crawls under the tent side, and with head and shoulders inside the tent, replaces the 
pad. 
Peeks through the tent flaps so that head and/or shoulders are inside the tent and 
places the pad inside 
Crawls through the tent flaps so that head and/or shoulders are inside the tent 
Mark the response does not enter the tent if it includes the following types of 
response:  
Lifts up the side of the tent and slides the pad under the tent walls 
Refuses to enter 
Throws the pad through the tent flaps without opening them 
Slides pad under the tent wall without lifting up the side of the tent 
Opens tent flaps, but does not enter and throws the pad through the flaps 
Verbal Responses 
Responses are divided into no comment, non-monster, or monster. 
Mark the response no comment if it includes the following types of response:  
The child does not make any comments 
Mark the response non-monster if it includes the following types of response:  
It's fun in here 
When I look at the side it comes on 
I didn't even have to go in 
No really, there is something 
Ooh I wonder what that is 
There's a twig I found it 
'Cause there's something in there 
What was that light then? 
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See, it's only a shadow 
This stuff is just kidding 
Nothing, there was a shadow but there's none in here 
Is anyone in there? 
Mark the response monster if it includes the following types of response:  
I hope there's no monster in there 
There has to be a monster in here, I saw one 
I think that monster's still there 
`Cept you keep watching it. Can you see one? 
See? How did it get in there? 
The monster's too big! 
No monster, where's the monster? He must be a good hider 
I can't see a monster in here. I'll not go in 
Real fast because the monster is fast 
But there's a monster in there! 
Make sure the monster doesn't get me 
I don't know how 'cause the monster's not in there 
As long as the monster isn't there 
C. Post Test Phase 
PLAY WITH TOYS 
Play with toys is divided into non-verbal behaviours which includes each child's 
physical movements, and verbal behaviours. Children's play can be scored on both 
non-verbal and verbal behaviours. 
Non-verbal Behaviour 
Non-verbal behaviours are divided into intermittent looking at the tent or no 
intermittent looking at the tent. 
Mark the response no intermittent looking if it includes the following types of 
response:  
The child does not look at the tent 
Glances at the tent for less than two seconds whilst playing with the toys. 
Mark the response intermittent looking if it includes the following types of 
response:  
Child keeps looking at the tent 
Child looks at the tent intermittently during play with the toys 
Child looks at the tent for longer than two seconds whilst playing with the toys 
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Verbal Behaviour  
Verbal responses are divided into no comment, non-monster, or monster. 
Mark the response no comment if it includes the following types of response:  
Child did not make any comments at all whilst playing with the toys. 
Mark the response non -monster if it includes the following types of response:  
I got one of these at home 
What's this? 
This doesn't work 
My brother's got one of these 
Mark the response monster if it includes the following types of response:  
Monster's gone away, so he's not going to come again 
Make the monster mad 
The shadow's not there anymore, I think he might be having a sleep 
Do you think the monster will come again? 
Do you think monster's are true? 
POST-TEST INTERVIEW 
Question la - What did you think when you went inside the tent? 
[Probe A: What was good/scary about it?] 
[ Probe B: That was what you saw but what were you thinking before you 
went into the tent?] 
Probe A was asked to induce the child to provide a more detailed answer than a 
single positive or negative word regarding what they thought about when they went 
inside the tent. 
Probe B was asked if the child answered the question with a description of what 
they saw inside the tent rather than what they thought when they went into the tent. 
Responses are divided into monster, non-monster, descriptive, positive, negative, or 
don't know. 
Mark the response monster if it includes the following types of response:  
The monster, I saw that he had hair all sticking up out of his head 
I didn't see any monster! 
I thought there was a monster but I didn't know 
The monster 
There was a monster's shadow 'cause it was up and again 
I thought there was going to be a monster in there 
Got lots of invisible monsters there and a really good hiding monster 
Might be hiding in the sheet or something 
It had a monster in it! 
Because of the monster. I thought the monster was watching me 
I was thinking there was a monster in there 
I saw a blue bit and I thought it was the monster 
Big foot 
It was the same, that scary antelope 
A monster 'cause I saw something moving there 
The monster with big foot steps 
A monster 'cause I saw the flash there 
A furry monster 
Mark the response non-monster if it includes the following types of response:  
There's nothing in there except the shadow 
That I saw something 
That there was a tiger in there 
I thought there was a few friends in there 
A teddy bear 
Something in there I didn't notice before 
The pad was there 
It looked like a tree 
This secret one (indicates twig) 
A gorilla 
Things like pens 
The paper 
A clown 
A bird 
I thought it was a cubby house 
I thought it might be colorful inside 
Because there was a projection, I saw it 
You feel all camouflaged in there 
Like a cave 
That monster would fit in it 
It was just normal nothing in there 
Mark the response descriptive if it includes the following types of response:  
There was something looked like people on the side here 
That it was all white 
It's my favorite color 
It was this tent 
I liked the light 
Just like seeing white things, just white things 
It was plain, dull 
Cubby's good 
It wasn't dark 
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Lots of room 
It stinks 
It glowed 
Mark the response don't know if it includes the following types of response:  
Don't know 
Uhmm 
Can't remember 
I'm not sure 
I forgot 
I guess 
Mark the response positive if it includes the following types of response:  
Good 
It was fun 
It was great 
Warm 
Secure 
Liked it 
It's not scary 
Mark the response negative if it includes the following types of response:  
Scared 
Scary 
Not really 
Strange 
If the first response is positive or negative, proceed to Probe A and score the probe 
response according to monster, non-monster, or don't know categories of question 
la and proceed to question 4a. 
If the first response is a descriptive statement, proceed to Probe B and score the 
probe response according to monster, non-monster, or don't know categories of 
question la and proceed to question 4a. 
If the first response is monster or non-monster, score the response according to 
question la and proceed to question 4a. 
If first the response is don't know, score the response according to question la and 
proceed to question 2. 
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If the child did not want to go into the tent proceed to the response to question 
lb 
Question lb - Oh did you not want to go into the tent - Can you tell me why? 
Responses are divided into monster, non-monster, or don't know. 
Monster, non -monster, and don't know are scored according to the criteria for 
question la. 
I Score the response according to question la and proceed to question 2 
Question 2 
Did you think there was something inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did 
you think there might be something inside the tent?] 
The probe question was asked if the child's initial answer indicated that they were 
referring to the control phase when they went to retrieve the pad, rather than the 
post-test phase after they saw the projection. It was used to re-focus the child's 
attention on the sighting of the monster's silhouette without specifically mentioning 
it. 
Responses are divided into monster, non-monster, affirmative, or don't know. 
Mark the response monster according to the criteria for question la.  
Mark the response non-monster if it includes any of the items listed in question la 
or the following types of response:  
No, because there was no colors 
Nothing `cept the bars holding it up 
Not really 
Nods negatively 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes the following types of response:  
Yes 
Nods affirmatively 
Mm - nods affirmatively 
Uhuh - nods affirmatively 
Yep 
Nope... actually I did 
Yes 'cause I saw something on the outside there 
no 'cause I'll get scared 
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Yeah 
There could be 
Mark the response don't know according to the criteria for question la.  
If the response is affirmative but only includes one word or a head nod, do not 
score the response but proceed to question 3. 
Score all other responses to question 2 or the probe question according to the 
criteria for question 2 and proceed to question 4a. 
Question 3 
What did you think was inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did 
you think there might be something inside the tent?] 
The probe question was asked if the child's initial answer indicated that they were 
referring to the control phase when they went to retrieve the pad, rather than the 
post-test phase after they saw the projection. It was used to re-focus the child's 
attention on the sighting of the monster's silhouette without specifically mentioning 
it. 
Responses are divided into monster, non-monster, or don't know. 
Monster, non-monster, and don't know are scored according to the criteria for 
question la. 
Score all responses to question 3 or the probe question according to the criteria for 
question 3 and proceed to question 4a. 
Question 4a - Did you think there might have been a monster inside the tent? 
Responses are divided into affirmative or negative. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
Yeah, I saw it's shadow 
Yes, probably 
I thought it was a real monster 
A monster 
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Mark the response negative if it includes the following types of response: 
No 
Nods negatively 
Don't think so 
Not really 
No, it must have been a tree 
No, there was nothing 
There's no such thing as monsters 
Score the response according to question 4a and proceed to question 4b 
Question 4b - Did you think there may have been something else inside the 
tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did 
you think there might be something inside the tent?] 
The probe question was asked if the child's initial answer indicated that they were 
referring to the control phase when they went to retrieve the pad, rather than the 
post-test phase after they saw the projection. It was used to re-focus the child's 
attention on the sighting of the monster's silhouette without specifically mentioning 
it. 
Responses are divided into affirmative or negative. 
Affirmative and negative are scored according to the criteria for question 4a. 
If questions 4a and 4b both yield negative responses, score the responses according 
to the criteria for questions 4a and 4b, and proceed to question 4d. 
If question 4b yields an affirmative response, score the response according to 
question 4b and proceed to question 5. 
If the response to question 4a was scored as an affirmative response, proceed to 
question 4c. 
Question 4c - Did you think the monster inside the tent was like the one you 
described to me for my story? 
Responses are divided into affirmative or negative. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
He was! 
That flash might be it's power! 
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Yeah, it might be a ghost or a monster 
I saw it 
Mhmm 
Yeah, he must be a very good hider 
He must have got out of his story 
Yes, I didn't want to go in 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 4a, or 
the following types of response:  
Just a teddy one 
I Score the response according to question 4c and proceed to question 5. 
Question 4d - What made you think that there was nothing inside the tent? 
[Probe: What about when you went to put my writing pad back in the tent did 
you think there might be something inside the tent?] 
The probe question was asked if the child's initial answer indicated that they were 
referring to the control phase when they went to retrieve the pad, rather than the 
post-test phase after they saw the projection. It was used to re-focus the child's 
attention on the sighting of the monster's silhouette without specifically mentioning 
it. 
Responses are divided into justification or no justification. 
Mark the response justification if it includes the following types of response:  
Saw there was nothing there 
'Cause I looked in there 
Couldn't hear anything breathing 
'Cause the green thing I saw flashing on and off was probably those stripes up there 
reflecting on here 
I didn't see anything else 
Because I lifted up the tent and looked in there 
'Cause when I went inside to get the pad there was nothing and I knew there was 
nothing. 
There was just white walls 
Because if there was anything inside you'd be able to see it. 
There's no such thing 
'Cause you look at the tent and there's nothing that could hide in it - too see 
through 
'Cause there was nothing there and I didn't ever think there was something inside 
the tent. 
Nobody was in there unless they came in that end and if they could go in I could see 
them walking in that one 
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Mark the response no justification if it includes the following types of response:  
Uhmm 	nothing 
Because I just thinked 
I forgot 
Can't remember 
Score the response to question 4d or the probe question according to the criteria for 
question 4d and proceed to question 5. 
Question 5 
Do you sometimes see pictures of things in your head (daydream) during the 
day? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
I think in my mind 
Lots of them 
I do get pictures in my head 
Always 
I get pictures in my imagination 
I see monsters and if he was in the tent I was gonna go BOOF! And hit him on the 
head so hard. 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 4a, or 
the following types of response:  
What's pictures mean? 
Yes, When I'm asleep 
Mark the response sometimes if it includes the following types of response:  
Sometimes 
Yes, sometimes 
Not often 
No, not that much 
Sometimes its something I imagine and sometimes its something I dream. 
Score the response according to question 5 and proceed to question 6a. 
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Question 6a - Do you ever see make-believe things or pictures in your mind 
and think about them? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
I see pictures in my head 
I do 
I usually think about heroines in a story 
I do, but I don't think about them 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or the 
following types of response:  
No, they're just real 
I did see them on the tent only when the light was flashing 
Mark the response sometimes if it includes any of the items listed in question 5, or 
the following types of response:  
Actually it depends on what I see 
Sometimes off the TV 
If the question yields an affirmative or sometimes response, score the response 
according to question 6a and proceed to question 6b. 
If the response is negative, score the response according to question 6a and proceed 
to question 7a. 
If the response is descriptive, score it as "affirmative" in question 6a and then score 
it according to the criteria for question 6b. Following this, proceed to question 6c. 
Question 6b -What kinds of pictures do you see? 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, realistic, or don't know. 
Mark the response mythical if it includes the following types of response:  
Monsters 
Ghosts 
Dinosaurs 
Witches 
Vampires 
Fairy things/fairies 
Aliens 
Unicorns 
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Mark the response fictional if it includes the following types of response:  
Cartoons 
Peter Pan 
Jack and the beanstalk 
References to events or things that occur in a story 
Reference to artificial enlargement (e.g., things that make things grow huge, a giant 
tree) 
Reference to dreams (e.g., thinking about what they mean) 
Real animals with fictional markings or powers (e.g., a cat boxing, a duck squirting 
water everywhere, octopus with poka dots) 
Mark the response realistic if it includes the following types of response:  
Animals (e.g., monkeys, tigers, ducks, wolves, snakes, gorillas, crocodiles) 
Objects or nature (e.g., toys, yacht, lollipops, sky, grass, teddies) 
People (e.g., activities with mum or dad, skeletons, Play School people, soldiers, 
what people like and what people forget I think I can remember) 
Social and living events (e.g., movies, working in a mine, rollerblading, missing a 
plane, making up dollies to have a picnic, things that I know) 
Mark the response don't know if it includes any of the items from question la and 
the following types of response:  
Lots 
Everything 
Happy things 
Just pictures 
All sorts of things 
If the response is don't know, score the response according to question 6b and 
proceed to question 6b1. 
If the response is mythical, fictional, or realistic, score the response according to 
question 6b and proceed to question 6c. 
Question 6b1 - Can you describe them to me? 
Responses are divided into mythical, fictional, realistic, or don't know. 
Mark the response mythical if it includes any of the items listed in question 6h, or 
the following types of response:  
Reference to the monster that was described (e.g., I saw blue, they're hairy and 
scary, the things in the tent) 
Angels 
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Mark the response fictional according to the criteria for question 6b.  
Mark the response realistic if it includes any of the items listed in question 6b, or 
the following types of response:  
Description of teddy bears (e.g., some are brown with round faces; there's 
shortime, long arms, a head and a mouth) 
Reference to mother's bride dress or doll 
Reference to killing a real snake 
Mark the response don't know if it includes any of the items listed in question la,  
6b, or the following types of response:  
Happy times 
I haven't got too many 
Score the response according to question 6b1 and proceed to question 6c. 
Question 6c - Do the people and things that you picture in your head 
(daydream about) sometimes seem so real that you think you can almost see or 
hear them in front of you? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
Everything 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 4a, or  
the following types of response:  
No, I don't make pictures that much 
I can't see them 
Dreams don't seem real 
Mark the response sometimes according to the criteria for question 5.  
Score the response according to question 6c and proceed to question 6d 
Question 6d - Can you see the pictures in your head like you see me? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes.. 
241 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
Yeah 'course! 
Yes I can 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 4a, or 
the following types of response:  
Sort of 
They're a bit fuzzy 
Almost 
Mm... yes sort of 
I'd have to look in the mirror to see you 
No, I can't see the monster in my brain 
Mark the response sometimes if it includes any of the items listed in question 5, or 
the following types of response:  
Sometimes when I'm at home I can 
Score the response according to question 6d and proceed to question 7a. 
Question 7a - Do you sometimes get real scared because of something that you 
think about? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
No, only when I see something that's really really scary 
Mark the response negative if it includes any of the items listed in question 4a, or 
the following types of response:  
No, I just think of good dreams and bad dreams 
Nope, 'cause I know they're not real 
No, I think about my favorite things 
No, I quite enjoy it 'cause I know its a funny one, just my imagination 
Mark the response sometimes if it includes any of the items listed in question 5, or 
the following types of response:  
Yes I do if I'm having a nightmare 
No sometimes when I dream about mummy getting killed I worry about that 
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If the response is negative, score the response according to question 7a and 
conclude the scoring for the interview. 
If the question yields a one word affirmative response, score the response according 
to question 7a and proceed to question 7b. 
If the response is descriptive, score it as "affirmative" in question 7a and then score 
it according to the criteria for question 7b. Following this, proceed to question 7c. 
Question 7b - What kinds of things do you think about scare you - Can you 
tell me about them? 
Responses are divided into mythical fictional, realistic, or don't know.. 
Mark the response mythical if it includes any of the items listed in question 6b, or 
the following types of response:  
Navu, he's green, he's got sharp teeth, and he eats tiny boys. 
Dragons 
Big foot 
Dead people who hang around people and go on and on and kill all my friends 
Mark the response fictional if it includes any of the items listed in question 6b, or 
the following types of response:  
The dinosaurs that crushed the rest of the people in Jurassic Park 
Videos - Witchy witches 
About this story 	a really bad man 
Ghosts rides 
Agro 
Mark the response realistic if it includes any of the items listed in question 6b, or 
the following types of response:  
Reference to mother dying 
Reference to pets dying (e.g., my kitten I don't have anymore) 
Reference to murder or harm to self and/or others (e.g., some people will take me 
away, one time we had a crash) 
Reference to dark scary places (e.g., in the dark hearing noise you can't see) 
Being teased or somebody else being in trouble 
Mark the response don't know according to the criteria for question la.  
Score the response according to question 7b and proceed to question 7c. 
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Question 7c - Do you try really hard not to think about these scary things? 
Responses are divided into affirmative, negative, or sometimes. 
Mark the response affirmative if it includes any of the items listed in question 2, or 
the following types of response:  
Yeah, but different things keep coming up into my head 
I don't think of them 
Yes, I try really hard to think about nice things 
Yes, but they still come while you're sleeping 
Yes, scary things scare me 
Nods affirmative and says "But you can't get them out of your mind." 
Mark the response negative according to the criteria for question 4a.  
Mark the response sometimes according to the criteria for question 5.  
Score the response according to question 7c and conclude the scoring for the 
interview. 
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APPENDIX - E 
Coding Guidelines - Study Five 
Modals 
These are a grammatical main clause in which the speaker expresses attitudes or 
opinions. 
Children's use of modals are indicated if they use clauses with the following words: 
can 	could 
must should 
might 	may 
would 	I'd 
will 
Probably 	wouldn't 
have got to have to 
can't 	couldn't 
Examples: 	"I can see you" 
"Might be the monster" 
"Mind if I have another look?" 
"It could be the monster" 
Types of modals  
Children's use of modal types are classified according to whether they use: 
• Constraint modals that indicate constraints upon an individual's ability to act. 
Example: "I can't remember". 
• Likelihood modals that indicate the probability of an event being actualised or 
true. 
Example: "He'd be dead when I punched him" 
• Inference modals, where the individual infers the probability of an event from the 
available information 
Example: "Probably the monster!" 
• Performative modals that indicate actions. 
Example: "I can see changes in there!" 
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Compound sentences 
These are sentences that include the use of a coordinating conjunction such as and, 
but, or, or nor. 
Children's use of these sentences can be classified according to whether they use: 
• Free standing sentences only, where the coordinator began the sentence. 
Example: "But there's a monster in there." 
• Conjuncts 2 only, where the sentence included one coordinator 
Example: "He couldn't be too big or he couldn't fit in there" 
• Conjuncts 3 or more only, where the sentence included two or more 
coordinators 
Example: "It had a rocking chair and a light and I was thinking about that but 
then I suddenly said I'm frightened by bears so I wouldn't do that and I've 
decided to write about a horse" 
• • Both free standing and conjuncts 2 or more, where the coordinator began the 
sentence and included one or more additional coordinators 
Example: "And he's camouflaged and he has big eyes" 
And as the coordinator 
These include three types of children's use of and: 
• Free standing and, where it began the sentence and was used as an indicator that 
the child had not finished speaking. 
Example: "And he has a sword." 
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• Conjuncts 2, where the sentence included one and. 
Example: "He's a pink monster and that's all." 
• Conjuncts 3 or more, where the sentence included two or more ands. 
Example: "They've got sharp teeth and it was white and it's like a big monster and 
so you can't touch it...." 
Complex sentences 
These are sentences that include the use of a subordinating conjunction that embeds 
one sentence within another sentence. 
Example: "I saw the things [that were in the tent] 
subordinating 
conjunction 
L complex clause _I 
Sentences are also considered complex if the conjunction is missing. 
Example: "I saw [ they were happy"] rather than "I saw [that they were happy"] 
However, sentences are not considered complex if the verb is missing. 
Example: "I think [the monster] rather than "I think [that is the monster] 
Subordinating conjunctions indicate time or reason and include words such as: 
like 	if 
when whenever 
wherever 	so 
as if 	because 
unless that 
Children's use of complex sentences were classified according to whether they used 
a: 
• Free standing clause only, where the subordinating conjunction began the 
sentence and was used as an indicator that the child was continuing the 
conversation. 
Example: ["Because I lifted up the tent and looked in there"] 
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• Embedded clause only, where the subordinating conjunction embedded a 
sentence within another sentence. 
Example: "I thought [there was a monster in there]" 
• Both free standing and embedded clause  
Example: "Cause when I went in to get the pad there was nothing and I knew there 
was nothing except for the pad" 
